High-risk and long-term: future narratives of the space industry by Johnson, Mark
High-Risk and Long-Term: Future  
Narratives of the Space Industry 
 












Doctor of Philosophy 
 










































This thesis examines the use of future narratives in high-risk industries, 
using the case study of the United Kingdom (UK) space industry. Situated at 
the intersection of prior scholarly work on both futures and narratives, 
future narratives are stories, roadmaps or predictions that are orientated 
towards a long-term perspective – years or decades ahead – and seek to 
present a coherent outcome for a given technology. Drawing on a textual 
analysis of in-depth interviews conducted with actors in the public and 
private space sectors in the UK, this thesis proposes a three-part typology 
for understanding the forms of future narratives generated to promote, 
defend and further the cause of such technologies. The first is the finite 
future. This is a promissory narrative which has a clear goal, a clear end-
point, and a number of systems for keeping those within a high-risk 
development programme tied to the success or failure of that programme. 
The second is the normalized future – this serves as a stark contrast to the 
promises of cutting-edge technology, innovation and exotic science from 
the earlier days of space technology, and positions space as a mundane and 
normalized technological industry that is merely ‘a part of everyday life’. 
The third is the adaptive future which consists of qualifications and other 
forms of credibility, and projects the viability and trustworthiness of a 
technology indefinitely into the future. By studying these narratives the 
thesis contributes to a body of work on high-risk technologies and the 
industries that produce them. The findings from the project lead me to 
argue that future narratives of this sort are crucial to understanding 
contemporary high-risk technologies; that the temporal dimension of such 
development programmes is of critical analytical importance; and that 
future narratives point the way towards subsequent research for 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1. Research Outline 
 
This thesis examines the use of ‘future narratives’ in high-risk industries, 
using the case study of the United Kingdom (UK) space sector. Situated at 
the intersection of prior scholarly work on both ‘futures’ and narratives, 
these future narratives are stories or predictions that are orientated 
towards a long-term perspective, years or decades ahead, and seek to 
present a coherent outcome for a given technology. By studying these 
particular forms of narrative the thesis contributes to a body of work on 
high-risk technologies and technological industries. This is achieved by 
using the space industry as an example of technological industries that are 
defined by their approach to risk, and – this thesis will argue – their 
approach to potentially very lengthy timescales as well.  
 
Space is an industry where the technologies produced are highly complex 
and tightly coupled – meaning that small failures have the potential to 
cascade into larger failures – according to Perrow’s (1999) definition of 
high-risk technologies. Such a definition includes a range of industries and 
scientific programmes including nuclear power and nuclear weapons, 
chemical plants, aircraft, dams, and indeed space technology. Alongside 
space technology, space agencies – national bodies tasked with 
coordinating space activity – can be understood as an example of ‘High-
Reliability Organizations’ (HROs) (Weick et al, 1999; van den Eede et al, 
2006; Boin & Schulman, 2008). These are organizations wherein variables 
of profit, efficiency and turnover are secondary to the primary concern that 
their technologies must never suffer accidents or failures – submarines, air-
traffic controls and nuclear power are other examples. Both high-risk 
technologies and those managed by HROs have or have had a number of 
common features – many are state-run, or previously state-run, or have 
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significant state oversight, and much of their internal planning (e.g. Lachow, 
1995; Symmons, 2010) and public discourse (e.g. Wynne, 1983; Sjöberg, 
2008; Mort, 2008:94) is centred upon the risks that have to be managed.   
 
However, these commonalities rarely take explicit account of the often 
significant temporal frames within which space technologies (and others) 
operate. In the light of the research data acquired, this thesis explores the 
temporal dimension to such industries in addition to their risks, and 
proposes that the space industry, and potentially many other high-risk 
industries, should be analytically re-framed as ‘high-risk long-term’ (HRLT) 
sectors due to the equal importance of both dimensions identified in this 
work. Programmes within industries of this sort may take years or even 
decades to reach completion in addition to the significant levels of risk 
throughout. This thesis thus explores the space industry as an example of 
an industry which produces extremely ‘risky objects’ (Latour, 2005:81) over 
long periods of time, and proposes a three-part typology for understanding 
the forms of narratives generated to promote, defend and further the 
cause of such technologies and those involved in their construction. In this 
way the work is grounded in and contributes to Science and Technology 
Studies (STS), an interdisciplinary field that aims to study the effects of 
science and technology on human society, political and economic decision-
making on technological matters, and the social and political construction 
of scientific and technological matters (Hackett et al, 2007).  
 
Through this process the thesis aims to answer two research questions 
about high-risk technologies via the case study of the UK space industry. 
These two questions are: 
 
- What role do future orientated narratives play in the development 




- How are such narratives constructed and utilized in the development 
of high-risk technologies? 
 
The findings from this project lead me to argue that these two questions 
are fundamentally related, and that what I call ‘future narratives’ – detailed 
stories and predictions that promise particular forms of outcome for a 
given technological programme – are absolutely crucial to contemporary 
high-risk technologies. It also finds that the temporal dimension is more 
prominent than in prior work on high-risk technologies, and thus 
encourages the adoption of the ‘HRLT’ terminology. Within the space 
industry the creation, management and use of these future narratives 
present coherent narratives for space technology as a whole, and also for 
individual space programmes. These futures support and sell the value of 
contemporary space technology and also take forms which offer potential 
insight into other high-risk industries. This thesis puts forward a model of 
three different forms of future narrative developed to support and promote 
high-risk technologies, each of which is covered by a different chapter.  
 
The first of these is the finite future, explored in Chapter 4. This is a 
promissory narrative which has a clear goal, a clear end-point, and that 
relates to a specific mission or programme. The second of these is the 
normalized future, examined in Chapter 5 – this serves as a stark contrast to 
the excitement and promises of cutting-edge technology, and the 
innovation and exotic science that were a feature of earlier eras of space 
technology. It instead positions space technology, and in turn the space 
industry, as a normalized technology industry that is merely ‘a part of 
everyday life’, thereby carrying out a significant reorientation of the sector’s 
technological goals. The third of these is the adaptive future, discussed in 
Chapter 6. This future narrative utilizes qualifications and other forms of 
credibility, and project the viability of a component indefinitely into the 
future. They set no objectives or offer conclusions; rather they provide 
reassurance about a component’s successful functioning within unspecified 
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and potentially infinite future programmes. This third form of future 
narrative can be adapted to fit into any programme having been 
transformed from a contested technology into a working and trusted 
component. 
 
The data collection for this study was achieved through interviews with key 
personnel in leading space technology organizations. This research method 
was chosen due both to the scarcity of available documentary evidence on 
the internal workings of the UK space industry, and in order to ascertain 
information directly from those within the sector on the types of narratives 
created and circulated, the uses to which they are put, and what space 
sector employees believe the new dominant narratives are.  The first of 
these organizations was the Swindon-based UK Space Agency (UKSA), the 
agency responsible for the UK’s civil spaceflight programme. It serves a 
central coordination role for UK space activities except those involving the 
Ministry of Defence. Subsequently employees were interviewed in a range 
of other institutions, including the European Space Agency’s (ESA) research 
facility in Britain (Harwell, Oxfordshire); the International Space Innovation 
Centre (focused on technology development and spin-offs, also at Harwell); 
the Technology Strategy Board, a government body with a remit to boost 
private investment in technology in the United Kingdom (Swindon); and 
Reaction Engines Limited, an Oxfordshire aerospace company designing 
and attempting to manufacture a ‘spaceplane’ called ‘Skylon’, which will 
serve as an illustrative study of the ideas discussed in Chapter 5. Remaining 
interviewees were drawn from a number of other smaller space 
organizations from across the UK. 
 
This introductory chapter will now explore the concept of narratives which 
are integral to this thesis, and then considers the history of narratives 
within the case study of the space industry. It explores space technology 
narratives generated at the birth of the industry, the changes these 
narratives have undergone, the contemporary state of the space industry, 
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and why the space industry was selected as an appropriate case study to 
answer the questions of this thesis. The chapter concludes by summarizing 
the structure of the remainder of the thesis. 
 
1.2. Narratives  
 
The concept of the future narrative proposed by this thesis lies between 
prior work studying both narratives and futures. This section (1.2) will 
summarize prior scholarly work on narratives before examining the early 
narratives of the space industry. Chapter 2 explores the additional 
importance of ‘futures’ to this work. The sections after this (1.2.1 and 1.2.2) 
explore space industry narratives up to the past two decades in order to lay 
the foundation for understanding its current narrative forms which are 
explored in the analysis chapters. Many of the new narratives identified in 
this work express either explicit continuity or explicit disjuncture with the 
space industry’s past, and therefore that past must be established before 
moving forward. 
 
Sociology has long noted the key role of narratives in the resolution of 
scientific or technological issues or disputes (Elzinga, 2004). Most narratives 
serve as postscripts to contested events in which the narrative presents a 
sanitized and well-ordered version of history (Deuten & Rip, 2000; Law, 
2002; Elzinga, 2004). Many authors have argued for a central role of the 
narrative or account in social life and research (e.g. Polkinghorne, 1988; 
Bruner, 1990; Orbuch, 1997). That central role may be expressed as the 
object of research, the method of research, or the product of research 
(Ewick & Silbey, 1995). In the case of this thesis, it is the object of research. 
Narratives are situationally produced and depend on the context and 
organization of their creation (Ibid). In technological industries they are 
used to demonstrate the value of the programme and illustrate the link 
between the product and its embedding within society (van Lente, 2000). 
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This is often done via material documents, web pages, roadmaps (as 
explored in Chapter 4), and other similar written codifications of a given 
narrative. As the thesis will show, space sector narratives take a wide range 
of different forms which are marshalled to convince different actors at 
different points in a space programme. Narratives also generally possess an 
explicit temporal order (Ewick & Silbey, 1995; Orbuch, 1997) which can 
mask uncertainty and ambiguity. As we shall see, the temporality of high-
risk future narratives is a crucial part of the analysis presented in this thesis 
– the length of time that completion of such programmes may take results 
in very specific forms of narrative. 
 
Narratives offer an insight into accepted truths, but are not a way of 
discovering those truths (Orbuch, 1997); they do not represent an objective 
reality (Schatzberg, 2004) or a dispassionate history. A narrative orientated 
towards the future therefore cannot actually seek to make accurate 
predictions about the reality of a future that has yet to happen, but must 
nevertheless be convincing and ‘believable’ enough to sell the goals of the 
programme in question. Narratives emphasize ‘legitimacy’ (Barnes, 
1974:140) and objectivity even though the social world lacks inherent 
narratives (White 1987:24) or overarching themes (Radder, 1992). 
Narratives may invoke similar ideas of universality, coherence, and sense in 
the social world (Ewick & Silbey, 1995), and many of the futures within the 
space sector explored in this thesis serve to legitimate space technologies 
in these ways. 
 
As well as claims to objectivity, broad concepts and buzzwords may be 
useful when trying to describe a narrative to those within a range of 
different industries or agencies that each have their own particular 
institutional or working cultures (Elzinga, 2004) – this was reflected in the 
interview data. Equally, the contents of personal accounts can provide 
significant insights. Upon asking them to explore the narratives used within 
the space sector, many interviewees used personal experiences or 
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anecdotes to illustrate their points throughout the research, and these 
were often used as examples of broader trends or concepts within the 
space sector which they understood themselves to be working within. The 
micro-narratives of interviewees reflected, were informed by, and arguably 
themselves informed, the wider macro-narratives of the space industry. 
Even personal narratives invoke collective symbols (Comaroff & Comaroff, 
1991; Ewick & Silbey, 1995) or political positions about current projects or 
past activities. To understand the specific forms of narratives that 
interviewees described within the space industry and their relation to other 
high-risk industries, it is important to first assess the narratives that were 
created and distributed at the birth of the industry. This highlights the work 
these narratives did to support these nascent technologies, why they have 
since faded in recent decades, and describes the background to the three-
part narrative typology presented in this thesis. 
 
1.2.1. Early Space Narratives and the Space Race 
 
Prior to the end of the Cold War, a distinct set of narratives for the space 
industry can be identified. These are essential to understand as they serve 
to elucidate the origins of the space industry, and the lack of these 
narratives in the contemporary space industry highlights the importance of 
developing an understanding of the new narratives that support the sector. 
Equally, this section will show that the presence of narratives has been 
important to the space industry since its inception, and this importance has 
not diminished in the last several decades. As we shall see, many parts of 
the space sector today have taken the forms they have due to the sector’s 
historical roots, even if the narratives that supported those roots have long 
since faded. This section will thus explore the origins of the space industry 
and the initial narratives that came to dominate, what these meant for the 
directions in which the space industry developed, and how these narratives 
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foregrounded particular interests that were deemed to have a stake within 
the nascent space sector.  
 
Interest in spaceflight began long before the possibility of launches was 
taken seriously, either politically or technically. Mackenzie (1990:44) argues 
that in the 1920s and 1930s there was a ‘technological social movement’ 
that formed around rocketry; an aura of ‘science fiction, crankishness and 
amateurism’ suffused it, but the interest was there. As early as 1946, the 
Rand Corporation noted the potential value of artificial satellites for both 
research and national defence (Krige & Russo, 2000). Spaceflight 
subsequently began in earnest after the Second World War, at which point 
science policy became effectively institutionalized within the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and other space agencies. 
The United States’ decision to create NASA and race against the Soviet 
Union to reach the moon has been extensively covered by political 
scientists (Launius, 2000), so relevant aspects will only be covered briefly 
here and with a focus on the broader theme of the narratives behind this 
decision.  
 
The narrative of space technology at the start of the Cold War was 
epitomised by competition between the US and USSR as an alternative or 
proxy for war (Ibid; Ehrenfreund & Peter, 2009). The US space programme 
accelerated once Sputnik (the first ever low-orbit satellite) had been 
launched and the subsequent ‘frenzy’ (Ellul, 1964:145) within the US 
government and technologists to catch up with the USSR resulted in US 
space and missile systems becoming ‘crash programme[s]’ (Hill, 2012:5) 
that were granted access to almost unlimited state resources. Despite 
President John F. Kennedy’s statement in 1961 that humanity should 
‘explore the stars together’ (Cowen, 1995:312), the Apollo programme 
became representative of US-Soviet competition (Launius, 2003). This was 
made public by perhaps one of the most well-known future narratives of 
recent times – Kennedy’s declaration of the same year that the US planned 
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to land on the Moon by the end of the 1960s – which exemplified the 
expectations placed upon US technologists and industries. It was politically 
essential for both sides to demonstrate their technical abilities, but the 
technologies themselves would only be disseminated to their existing allies 
(or those they wished to cultivate). Space technology in this era was not 
seen in terms of the sophistication of the technology in question nor the 
services they offered: the technology was the means to an end, and the 
overarching narrative was one of great political blocs competing to reach 
technological milestones and the accompanying assumptions about the 
supremacy or inferiority of each bloc’s technical capabilities. This 
demonstrates how high-risk technologies like the space industry may be 
supported by a strong set of connected future narratives. Fear of the Soviet 
Union coupled with an emphasis upon national pride resulted in a powerful 
future narrative that relevant actors – researchers, politicians, military and 
citizens – could all support. It was one which both promised great 
technological benefits whilst simultaneously threatening dire consequences 
if the success did not materialize. 
 
Missions out of the public eye also held political weight. It was believed by 
US policymakers that in the longer term, worldwide satellite 
communications could support third-world nations (Launius, 2000) seeking 
‘self-realization’ and serve as an anti-Communist instrument of 
‘communications, education and propaganda’ (Slotten, 2002:328). Here a 
future narrative was put forth whereby this nascent technology could have 
its first promised social impact, and yet even this social impact remained 
defined within the broader narrative of NATO/Warsaw Pact competition. 
This not only projected a use for the space programme into a potentially 
uncertain post-Apollo future, but also highlights the role of implicit 
assumptions in future narratives – the objective of enabling anti-
Communist resistance would make no sense were the Cold War expected 
to end before such a programme could be brought to fruition. As Chapter 4 
explores, even today many significant space narratives hinge upon a similar 
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concept that outside conditions must remain within a certain realm of 
possibilities in order for the narrative to maintain coherence – interests 
must remain aligned, or outside technologies must be developed at a 
sufficient speed, for the programme to remain viable. 
 
In addition to the key roles of states, state militaries were the other crucial 
actors within this early era. As Rappert et al (2007) note, since 1945 a 
significant volume of scientific and technical personnel have been 
employed within defence industries, even in peace-time, and many of 
these were involved with nascent space programmes after the conclusion 
of the Second World War. Identifying space technology’s origins as being 
firmly within the military, from the capture of V2 scientists to the 
development of ICBMs and the US’s desire for reconnaissance satellites, 
Fisk (2008:176) argues that space programmes changed swiftly into a 
‘highly visible, aggressive and comprehensive civilian space programme’. 
This was an early ‘Faustian bargain’ (Ibid) where the military desire for 
missiles – space launch vehicles in another guise – was accepted as the way 
forward in the absence of a viable alternative. At the same time the 
possibility of space emerging as a fourth military sphere, beyond land, sea 
and air, drove technical development in a space arms race (Peterson, 1997) 
within the nominal peace of the Cold War. Huntley et al (2010) also note an 
early assumption that military uses of space were inevitable – many 
predictions for future policy were made on this basis and until the 1960s 
there was a clear stress on the ‘military and space’ combination (Elzinga & 
Jamison, 1995:584). This shows another early example of a future 
narrative, one where the assumption that other militaries will be 
developing military space technology acts as an impetus for one’s own 






1.2.2. Post-Cold War Space Interests 
 
However, with the end of the Cold War these narratives have now faded – 
the context within which they were relevant no longer exists. As the above 
narratives can no longer propose relevance – and the assumption of the 
indefinite continuation of the Cold War no longer applies – it is crucial to 
understand the new position of space technology in industrialized nations 
as a background to exploring what new narratives have arisen to support 
these changes. With the loss of the Space Race future narrative, the space 
sector hit a problem of negative perceptions, both in the United Kingdom 
and internationally. This is despite profit of over £7bn in 2008/9 
(Department of Business, Innovation and Skills [BIS], 2010a) growing to 
£9.1bn 2011/12 (UKSA, 2012) – and globally – despite an estimated $260bn 
yearly profit for global space technology as a whole (BIS, 2010b), and 
continuing commitments to space technology by most developed nations 
(Peter, 2006; Balogh et al, 2010, Balogh, 2011). In industrialized nations 
spaceflight is now often seen as something ‘wasteful’, or failing to deal with 
‘real’ social problems on the ground (Goldman, 1992; Vedda, 2008). Lacking 
a narrative that emphasises the national importance of space now the Cold 
War is over, many find it difficult to perceive much direct benefit from 
space technology. Deciding ‘whether the great powers should waste money 
in space or spend it on Earth’ (Goldman, 1992:21) is for many the 
dichotomous perspective with which the value of space missions is 
assessed. Even those outcomes perceived as positive – links forged by 
communication satellites (Elhefnawy, 2004) for instance, ubiquitous to 
developed and developing nations – are rarely understood by the public as 
being from space technology (Vedda, 2008; Pass, 2011). Policy areas 
dealing with rapid change (generally technological) may be misunderstood 
by the general population (Goldman, 1992:51) who might not view 
technology as a ‘latent public good’ (Nelson, 1992:61) in the same way as 




Space Policy remains a ‘low salience’ issue – it does not win elections, drive 
campaigns nor inflame public passion (Vedda, 2008:27), and the current 
body of scholarly space policy work contains relatively little non-historical 
examination (Hoerber, 2012). The reason for this lack of academic interest 
lies, at least in part, in the inability to consider space policy without 
reference to the Space Race narratives (Siddiqi, 2010) discussed above, 
despite their minimal continued relevance (Marshall, 2008). This state of 
affairs leaves post-Cold War space capabilities unexamined. The emphasis 
on the Space Race which is long over – at least in its original form – 
explicitly positions space technology as something of the past; something 
out-dated; and something only relevant within the specific political 
situation of an international superpower duopoly. The lack of new public 
narratives for space technology (Vedda, 2008) leaves its uses, values and 
impacts unclear, unexamined, and broadly unknown to those outside the 
space industry.  
 
However, as the space sector continues apace and is more profitable today 
than ever before, it is prudent to explore what new narratives may have 
arisen to justify the value of investment in this high-risk technological 
industry, and how these narratives function. As the impacts of 
contemporary space technology are far greater than many realize, the 
agendas they represent merit a far more detailed understanding than we 
currently possess. In turn, such understandings contribute to STS by 
providing an insight into how high-risk complex technologies are socially 
calibrated, and the essential role of narratives within this process. 
 
1.3. The Contemporary Space Sector 
 
Of the three types of future narrative this thesis proposes, the finite future 
narrative proposed in Chapter 4 is most strongly reminiscent of the future 
narratives of the Space Race era discussed above, focusing on scientific 
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advance, national pride and inspiration. However, whilst international 
relations and implicit state scientific competition remain powerful shaping 
forces of space programmes (Launius, 2000), contemporary spaceflight 
includes not just states but ‘industries, universities, and other NGOs’ (Peter, 
2006:108), as well as private companies. This has led to a range of new 
promised benefits for the scientific programmes, and these new benefits 
mark the departure of the future narratives in Chapter 4 from the 
traditional Space Race narrative elucidated above. Many space 
programmes now seek to offer benefits to a significantly greater range of 
actors than only states and militaries, expanding the remit and potential 
interest of this ‘older’ model of space programme.  
 
By contrast, the normalized and adaptive future narratives of Chapters 5 
and 6 are very different. These future narratives are a result of a significant 
change in the space industry in one primary area – the increase in the 
number of actors relevant to space programmes and, as part of this, the 
growth of ‘private spaceflight’ and the reorientation of much of the space 
industry towards ‘service provision’ (broadband, communication, 
television, etc) instead of scientific or technological advancement. This shift 
has introduced new actors to the space sector and contributed to the 
necessity of developing new future narratives of the sort seen in the later 
two analysis chapters. The next section will summarize prior literature on 
private spaceflight, conclude this chapter’s analysis of the space industry up 
to the current day, and highlight the importance of this new context to the 
analysis presented in subsequent chapters. 
 
1.3.1. Private Spaceflight and Service Provision 
 
As the Cold War ended, space programmes changed from being the domain 
of the superpowers to being available to a greater number of states and 
non-state actors. This shift was characterized first and foremost by space 
25 
 
technology becoming a multi-regional arena (Goldman, 1992:31; de 
Montluc, 2009; Sheehan, 2007:9) as China, India, Japan, Brazil, Europe and 
others began or grew space programmes. A number of developing nations 
have also initiated space programmes (Peter, 2006:109) outside of the 
global ‘North’. For nations with existing spaceflight experience, space 
technology is an increasingly cooperative exercise (Broniatowski et al, 2006; 
Peter, 2006; Horneck et al, 2010). Although it was not until 1972 that a non-
superpower launched a satellite (Peterson, 1997), now over a hundred 
states have a stake in at least one satellite (Union of Concerned Scientists, 
2011). Depending on definitions, roughly ten countries now have direct 
space access (de Montluc, 2012) and more than 6000 satellites have been 
launched since Sputnik (Siddiqi, 2010). Given the idea of space exploration 
as being normatively Western as a result of the United States’ victory in the 
Space Race, non-Western programmes are traditionally understood as 
‘aspirations for a Western modernity’ (Siddiqi, 2010:435). However, these 
states have taken up a number of different and fundamentally non-
Western-normative agendas, preferring instead to focus upon the 
construction and management of communication and infrastructure 
(Luukkonen et al, 1992) rather than the pursuit of abstract science. Many 
other countries, although invariably relying on technology already 
developed elsewhere (Smith, 1993), have taken to serious engagement 
with space technology, but only with the side of space technology 
concerned with infrastructure, not scientific advance. This remains akin to 
the kind of ‘technonationalism’ (Sheehan, 2007:9-10) the US and USSR 
practised during the Cold War – connecting success in space technology to 
national pride and achievement (Huntley et al, 2010) – but with different 
programmes, different desired futures, and different technical goals.  
 
Taken as a global industry, therefore, much of the contemporary space 
industry is unconcerned by scientific and technological advances via space 
technology. The industry is interested instead in pursuing infrastructure and 
services, not cutting-edge research. However, this observation holds not 
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just for emerging space actors but also for long-established space-faring 
nations such as the UK. The past two decades have seen a newfound 
emphasis on privatization and, in turn, a service-provision mentality for 
much of the well-established space industry in the UK and beyond 
(Salomon, 1996; Slotten, 2002; Ehrenfreund & Peter, 2009). The cause of 
this shift even within nations which do possess the capabilities for space 
science is important to unpick, and is integral to much of the future 
narrative analysis presented in this thesis. 
 
After the Second World War, fundamental transformations of the role of 
science in politics led to the conflation of scientific research with economic 
production (Elzinga & Jamison, 1995; Jamison, 2006). This was the model of 
‘Big Science’ – the coordination of large numbers of people; the 
‘legitimation of, and advocacy for’ large amounts of public money; and 
transforming ‘contested knowledge’ into ‘accepted facts’ through discourse 
and rhetoric around the (often experimental) results the programme 
produces (Kinsella, 1996:65). Blankenship (1974) defines ‘Big Science’ as a 
research system in which there is a large commitment of resources on a 
governmental scale, the normally decentralized structures of scientific 
communities are replaced by clear bureaucracies between which there is a 
dependency relationship, and disciplinary boundaries in science and 
technology are crossed. Examples include particle accelerators, the Human 
Genome Project, and the space industry (Ibid). However, governmental 
funding for Big Science has declined in recent decades and those who now 
advocate programmes that were once understood within a Big Science 
paradigm – high-risk technologies and the scientists associated with these 
industries – are forced to look for other means to sell the value of their 
programmes and convince potential investors, supporters and stakeholders 
of their value (Autio et al, 1996). A previously collective focus on science – 
that the best scientific research may be achieved by cooperation and state 
funding – has been replaced by a neoliberal model of research and 
technological development (Lave et al, 2010). This new outlook emphasizes 
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relationships between science, technology and their sponsors (Kinsella, 
1996), rather than the pursuit of high-end science from state support 
alone. 
 
In the wake of this change, Andre Lebeau (former Director of ESA) has 
argued that competition and bloc prestige for space have now vanished 
(Salomon, 1996) and space agencies cannot extract the same ‘unswerving 
support’ from states they could in the past (Ibid:86). He claims that 
because of this, the balance of power has shifted towards industry, both 
reducing the role of the state and simultaneously ‘revealing the maturity of 
space technology’ (Ibid:86) when deployed straight into the market. A 1994 
Eurospace report similarly argued that the space industry is now 
fundamentally driven by customer demand, not innate concern over the 
health of the space industry nor a feeling one’s state ‘should’ be involved in 
space (1994). This is what Feenberg identifies as the contemporary trend 
for ‘technology’ to be understood within the broader constructs of 
‘economy’ and ‘innovation’ and therefore reduced it to ‘common sense 
instrumentalism’ (Feenberg, 1999:1). This new market-orientated 
understanding of technology proposes a model of economics and 
technology wherein ‘the market’ drives technological development, a 
narrative which this thesis shows is represented in the contemporary space 
industry. Such a view is reflected in economic literature on space 
technology (Greenberg, 1993; Lee, 2000; Hertzfeld, 2007; BIS, 2010b; etc) 
which focuses on technology cycles, innovation and similar concepts 
wherein development is taken for granted, and the only question is how to 
speed the process up – Ehrenfreund and Peter, for example, point very 
explicitly to industries and private actors ‘innovating’ and playing a key role 
in the current open market space situation (2009) in addition to many 
other actors already mentioned (Levine, 1985; Launius, 2003; Sadeh, 2005; 
etc). This new facet of the industry has become known as ‘private 




As well as the decline of Big Science, additional factors including 
contemporary ‘economic, commercial and financial liberalisation’ along 
with developments in technology and communications (de Montluc, 
2009:20) have also contributed to allowing private spaceflight to come to 
the fore, with its proponents predicting three decades ago ‘competition 
and deregulation’ becoming the future ‘hallmarks’ of space operations 
(Levine, 1985:562). Private spaceflight seeks efficient, reliable, cheap and 
routine launches (Sadeh, 2005) and safe and flexible access to space 
(Launius, 2003), both a long way from the predominantly risky, costly and 
long-term space industry epitomized by Big Science (Elhefnawy, 2004). 
Outer space has recently been termed an ‘industrial park of unfathomable 
size’ private actors wish to develop, and every year from 1997 onwards 
private expenditure on spaceflight has exceeded that of governments 
(Vedda, 2002:201). Private actors will have different agendas and thus 
present different narratives to those of governments – business seeks not 
to develop or research space, but rather to turn a profit (Elhefnawy, 2004).  
 
Private spaceflight is therefore primarily concerned with providing services 
– weather monitoring, Internet access, broadcast abilities, communications 
(Slotten, 2002; Sadeh, 2005; Sadeh, 2011). The normalized and adaptive 
futures uncovered by this study, although of course unpredicted at the time 
of this literature review and the beginning of the research, are both 
responses to this rise of space industry privatization. The former (in 
Chapter 5) emphasizes the normalization or mundane scope of the 
programme in order to appeal to risk-averse private actors, whilst the latter 
(in Chapter 6) is tied to a specific component or technology via the 
reassurance that the technology can be used for any future programme – 






1.4. Selection of the Space Industry 
 
The space industry was therefore selected as the case study for this thesis 
for two reasons. The first of these was the domination of political science 
and policy research in prior work examining the space industry (as explored 
above), and the relative scarcity of sociological work on the sector. This is 
not to say that there have not been sociological examinations of the space 
industry before now (e.g. Redfield, 1996; Entradas, 2011; Pass, 2011) but 
these are few and far between when compared to other high-risk 
industries. It was apparent that this thesis could mark a major contribution 
to the sociological analysis of this sector and to high-risk sectors more 
generally, whilst also leaving this examination quite open and flexible in the 
direction it would take given the scarcity of prior sociological work to 
influence interpretation of the findings.  
 
The second reason was the strength of the older space industry narrative 
which even those with no prior knowledge of the industry will be aware of 
– the Space Race. I was struck by the endurance of this older narrative for 
the space industry as one that emphasized competition, scientific 
advancement, and the roles of scientists and technologists as 
fundamentally pushing the boundaries of technology and in the process 
doing something ‘for all mankind’. These were legitimizing concepts 
(Barnes, 1974) for the immense volume of government money placed in 
the space programme in its first few decades, but as the above section 
showed, these hold little continued relevance in the present day in even 
well-established space-faring nations. Instead the increasingly-privatized 
outlook of the contemporary sector stresses the roles of many different 
actors (Kinsella, 1996) and means that such programmes can no longer 
expect access to unquestioned high levels of public funding and support, as 




The previous Space Race understanding of the space industry has been 
explored in this chapter in order to both give background to the case study 
in question, and to highlight the prior existence of a strong future-
orientated narrative within the sector. This summary also showed that 
although the Cold War is long over and the unquestioned state funding 
reduced to a fraction of its previous size, this narrative remains the 
dominant one in public discourse for the space industry (Siddiqi, 2010). The 
space industry thereby seemed a clear choice to study these questions. It 
was both under-explored by sociology and had already demonstrated its 
ability to create narratives for lengthy high-risk programmes, but the 
dominant narrative of this sort seemed clearly outdated from my literature 
review due to the reduced scientific objectives of the space industry and 
the coterminous growth of private spaceflight. The space industry’s 
continued success in the United Kingdom (BIS, 2010a; UKSA, 2012) and 
abroad (Broniatowski et al, 2006; Peter, 2006) strongly suggested the 
creation of new future narratives which lacked prior scholarly examination.  
 
1.5. Thesis Structure 
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 explores the analytic and 
conceptual tools I use to study my research questions on the role of future 
narratives in high-risk industries. It first covers existing work in STS on 
technological development and describes why the Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) was selected as the theoretical perspective for this 
work. It then highlights the gap in prior scholarly work on the development 
of high-risk industries and explores the concept of ‘futures’ as an avenue by 
which we may understand the development of these technologies by 
combining it with work on narratives outlined here. It summarizes existing 
literature on futures, considers how actors and interests may be positioned 
and managed via such future narratives, and also covers prior work on 
categorizing different types of futures and the uses to which they may be 
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put. It also notes a range of futures questions which were relevant to this 
research, and summarizes how this thesis’ three-part typology – finite, 
normalized and adaptive futures – will subsequently build upon the existing 
body of futures work within STS.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses methodology, and covers issues of data collection, 
interviewing and research ethics. It starts by explaining the selection of 
interviewing as the research method for this study, before summarizing 
relevant literature on interviews such as gaining access to interviewees. It 
discusses the sampling method used for the research interviews, notes 
challenges in the process of gaining access to interviewees and how this 
may affect a study’s outcome, and then lists the interviewees for the thesis 
in terms of their affiliation and the self-defined categories to which they 
belong. It then explores questions of data analysis, the use of grounded 
theory for the creation of analytic concepts, and concludes with a summary 
of appropriate ethical considerations. 
  
The three subsequent analysis chapters each cover one form of future 
listed in the typology outlined in this chapter. Chapter 4 is the first of these 
and proposes the concept of the finite future narrative, a type of narrative 
formed by the creation and management of a ‘roadmap’ and a set of 
promised objectives, and specifically designed for space science 
programmes. The chapter begins by exploring how space programmes are 
planned and the importance of roadmaps in this planning process. It 
considers the place of roadmaps within the space sector as predictions of a 
programme’s development which appeal to a wide range of actors, and 
how they are designed to encourage those outside the space industry to 
invest within the programme and subsequently to remain within the 
programme until its completion. It examines the legitimizing work such 
roadmaps do, how they are designed to both predict and alter the future, 
and their negotiation of long timescales. The second part of the chapter 
then moves on to consider what the predicted outcomes and promises of 
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space science programmes are, and how these are used to sell the value of 
programmes that are commonly thought of as pursuing only ‘abstract 
science’. It considers the purely scientific promises of scientific missions, 
the oft-repeated claims that space programmes are inherently 
‘inspirational’, and the belief that space programmes enhance national 
pride on the global stage. It then explores the concept of ‘spin-off’ 
technology as another contemporary promise of space science. The 
chapter concludes by summarizing how roadmaps and promises are 
brought together to create finite future narratives, and why these are 
specifically used to support a subset of space programmes which are 
ordinarily perceived as producing only ‘pure’ scientific research with no 
other benefits or outcomes. 
 
Chapter 5 explores the creation of normalized future narratives by 
highlighting the conservative tendency which now dominates the space 
industry, despite the common perception of the space industry as a highly 
experimental and innovative sector. The chapter explores the perception of 
risk, reliability and failure in the space industry, and then covers three 
major sources of conservatism identified from the research data. The first 
of these is the changing customer base in the space industry away from 
governments and towards private and commercial actors and the 
subsequent emphasis on the provision of services (as introduced in this 
chapter); the second is the preference for the use of older components 
within the space industry, and the long-established employees of the space 
sector who reinforce this preference; and a third is a three-part theme 
focused on the cost of satellite launch, the impossibility of satellite 
retrieval, and the required lifespan for launched satellites. The chapter 
explores how even very cutting-edge technologies in the space sector are 
defined within existing discourses and expectations for space technology, 
rather than being presented as new and innovative. This examination is 
done in part via the case study of the ‘Skylon’ spaceplane. The chapter 
concludes by summarizing both the reasons for presenting these high-risk 
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technologies as being mundane and ordinary, and how space industry 
future narratives have subsequently become normalized as a response to 
these pressures.  
 
Chapter 6 explores how space components become ‘credible’, and how this 
credibility is translated into adaptive future narratives. The chapter argues 
that those within the space industry understand credibility as being 
‘acquired’ by a new component over three stages – early credibility, 
technical development credibility, and launch credibility. These forms of 
credibility, if successfully acquired, can be used to create an adaptive future 
narrative which emphasizes the universality and wide applicability of a 
component for use in future space programmes. The first part of the 
chapter analyzes how credibility is gained early on in the creation of new 
space components – this may be via accreditation by a trusted body of 
experts, or via government funding which ‘de-risks’ the component for 
private investors. The second part of the chapter assesses how credibility is 
acquired, negotiated and maintained throughout the technical 
development process of a space component. A key part of this is the 
discursive use of ‘Technology Readiness Levels’ (TRLs) as a method for 
quantifying the ‘stage’ a component’s development is at (within a linear 
and deterministic model of technology) which the chapter analyzes in 
depth. This is followed by an examination of different definitions and 
metrics of the TRL system, the process of testing which space technologies 
undergo, the creation of ‘standards’ and ‘margins’ by which the results of 
these tests are understood, and the role of testing in the development of 
space components. It then analyzes the third dimension of credibility – 
consisting of ‘qualification’ and ‘flight heritage’ – and how these aid a 
component in being considered a reliable and a viable option for a satellite. 
The chapter concludes by summarizing these three forms of credibility and 
how the evidence of their acquisition may be used to create adaptive 




Chapter 7 is the conclusion of the thesis. It begins with a brief retrospective 
summary of the research and the methodology before summarizing the 
core findings of the work, both in terms of the three-part typology of future 
narratives and the uncovered importance of the temporal dimension to 
high-risk technologies. The chapter then recaps each of the three future 
narrative types elucidated in the three analysis chapters. It describes finite 
future narratives and the two aspects they consist of, and explores the 
types of space programme to which these narratives are appropriate; the 
creation of normalized future narratives and the conservative drivers that 
have led to the rise of this second narrative type; and adaptive future 
narratives and how forms of credibility are leveraged to create standardized 
‘off-the-shelf’ components. Following on from this summary, the chapter 
proposes that some ‘high-risk’ technologies such as the space industry will 
benefit from being analytically re-conceived as ‘high-risk long-term’ (HRLT) 
technologies due to the importance of the temporal dimension identified in 
the research. The chapter then lastly considers the implications of this 























This chapter begins by exploring the study’s grounding within Science and 
Technology Studies (STS). It describes the relevant background for 
understanding the field of STS and covers the Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT), a leading theory in STS for understanding the 
development process of new technologies. Whilst highly valuable when 
considering most technological development, a search of the STS literature 
reveals a comparatively under-explored region that this thesis will 
contribute to – the development of high-risk technologies – and this 
chapter proposes that this gap may be explored via the interdisciplinary 
field of ‘futures’. We then explore the field of futures and its current 
relationship to STS, focusing particularly on how futures have been 
categorized in prior work up to this point. The final section of the chapter 
draws upon the relevant issues from SCOT and futures research to 
introduce a concept which I describe as ‘future narratives’. The chapter 
then explores the futures work which formed the foundation of the three 
types of future narrative uncovered in the research that I call finite, 
normalized and adaptive, and concludes with a summary of the above 
points. 
 
Before beginning this examination, a brief note is required about the 
timescales of high-risk technologies. As the significant importance of the 
temporal dimension of these technologies only became clear in the course 
of the research, the STS literature that was drawn on to underpin the study 
covered only the aspects of risk to such technologies, not the aspects of 
temporality. However, it was clear from the prior literature on high-risk 
technologies (covered below) that many of these could take years or 
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decades to develop. Additionally, a large part of prior scholarly work on 
futures is focused on concepts of temporal proximity and distance, and the 
use of futures as tools for ‘navigating’ varying lengths of technological 
development. The identified implicit relevance of timescales within high-
risk literature – combined with the importance of time in futures research – 
later formed the foundation for the analysis of temporality in high-risk 
industries in this thesis. 
 
2.2. Science and Technology Studies 
 
Science and Technology Studies is a field of academic investigation that 
seeks to understand the social, political, cultural, philosophical and 
economic aspects of science and technology development (Hamlin, 1992; 
Giere, 1993; Bowden, 1995; Elzinga & Jamison, 1995; Sismondo, 2010). It 
aims to demonstrate that science and technology are closely tied to this 
wide range of other interests and agendas (Bijker, 1993). This is in clear 
contrast to non-sociological accounts of science and technology which 
produce claims of neutrality, technological linearity and objectivity (Borup 
et al, 2006:290). Hughes defines this issue with ‘traditional’ accounts of 
science and technology thus:  
 
‘Histories [present] invention of artefacts and discovery of facts in a 
chronological narrative. Technology was usually defined as the 
technical artefacts; science as knowledge.’ (Hughes, 1986:282) 
 
To attempt to counterbalance such accounts, STS grew from the 1960s and 
1970s onwards and sought to create a sociology of science with political 
impact and relevance (Hamlin, 1992) that would acknowledge and examine 
the social dimension to science and technology. In addition to critiquing 
these unproblematic narratives of science and technology, world events 
such as the invasion of Vietnam and the Space Race raised further concerns 
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about the power wielded by the military-industrial users of certain 
technologies (Elzinga & Jamison 1995:587; Winner, 1986). This generated 
questions of how best to understand the interplay between technologies 
and those who wield or control them. STS showed that technological 
change is not just invention or innovation, but involves the application of 
science and engineering knowledge, which is an entirely social and political 
process (Smith, 1993) and one far removed from objectivity and value-
neutrality. Aspects such as the direction and application of funding are 
determined by political processes which will influence future choices of 
research, and affect how that research is viewed retrospectively. As Hamlin 
puts it: 
 
‘However much one might claim to be neutral, open-minded, 
unbiased or impartial, or however one buttressed one's claims with 
methods, one's claim to occupy a uniquely privileged perspective 
could always be denied on the grounds that one was inextricably 
tied to one's social situation.’ (Hamlin, 1992:515) 
 
This perspective on the importance of context is also reflected in STS’ 
investigation of technology. Originally technology was seen as merely the 
hardware (Orlikowski, 1992) used towards instrumental goals, and 
technology was only worth studying if it had a direct impact on how a job 
was done. However, in recent decades far more scholarly work focused 
upon technology has emerged (e.g. Hamlin, 1992; Balmer & Sharp, 1993; 
Cowan, 1994; Akrich, 1997; Rammert, 1997; Berg, 1998; Feenberg, 1999; 
Klein & Kleinman, 2002; Jørgensen et al, 2009). When considering the 
question of narratives, Rammert offers a key theoretical claim by arguing 
that technology is only considered to be ‘functioning’ when its elements 
behave ‘according to the rules’ (1997:176) and according to the predictions 
and intended narratives of use laid out for it. This definition helps us to 
understand how the success or failure of many high-technology 
programmes is dependent on the capabilities and future expectations 
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assigned to the final product. What the product was intended to do is 
essential to its perceived outcome, and these expectations are key aspects 
of the analysis presented in this thesis. 
 
2.2.1. The Social Construction of Technology 
 
What aspects of STS may we draw upon to understand the development of 
high-risk technologies such as those in the space industry? STS is a broad 
field and several main schools of thought may be identified. These include 
the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT), Actor-Network Theory (ANT), 
and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK). The first of these to focus 
upon studying the development of new technology was SCOT. SCOT was 
developed in the early 1980s primarily by Wiebe Bijker and Trevor Pinch 
(Pinch & Bijker, 1984; Pinch, 1996; Bijker et al, 2012). It built upon SSK’s 
critiques of previous social scientific work for failing to ‘open’ the processes 
by which scientific knowledge was created – natural scientists retained a 
monopoly on explaining theory, method and testing (Bruun & Hukkinen, 
2003) and SCOT aimed to challenge the subsequent empiricist view of 
technological history. Many of the original targets of this ‘social 
constructivist critique of science’ (Giere, 1993:105) were primarily deeply 
theoretical discussions about concepts like pulsars and gravity waves (Ibid) 
rather than about ‘ordinary’ or ‘mundane’ science or technology. SCOT 
takes the position that ‘artefacts are human products, and marked by the 
circumstances of their production’ (Sismondo, 2010:10) and that the 
apparently neutral scientific method was created and therefore defined 
solely by humans via competition and debate (Douglas, 2010). SCOT argued 
that there is no predetermined path of technical evolution for a given 
artefact, and the job of historians or sociologists is to deduce why one was 




SCOT became especially concerned with technology rather than science as 
a result of the ‘turn to technology’ (Woolgar, 1991:21). Woolgar identifies 
the original intentions of SSK to make science sociologically relevant, that 
the turn of technology was a shift in the object of research towards the 
technological rather than the scientific, and that this was one of the key 
identifying differences between the new SCOT programme and its SSK 
progenitor. He emphasizes: 
 
‘The construal of a technology as a causal factor seems to imply that 
there are definitive, identifiable features and characteristics of that 
technology, whereas the central thrust of social shaping is to 
suggest that such features and characteristics are contingent, that 
any such features we would wish to attribute to a technology are 
the temporary upshot of a series of complex social (definitional) 
processes, largely due to the efforts of particular social agencies 
(groups).’ (Woolgar, 1991:31) 
 
These ‘definitional’ processes are part of what SCOT terms ‘interpretive 
flexibility’ (Pinch & Bijker, 1984). This is the concept that there is both a 
level of flexibility in the design of artefacts – it is not simply that the most 
efficient or useful design wins out – and that there is a similar debate 
within the eventual use of a given artefact (Ibid). A key SCOT study that 
explored this concept was the case of ‘high-wheelers’ and safety bicycles 
(Bijker, 1995:19). The study showed that the bicycle’s development path 
was social and not technological (Ibid:199) and that the design of the 
‘safety bicycle’ was a response to the social issues created by the ‘high-
wheeler’ that came before. This showed the lack of a predetermined 
technological path, and that different social groups assigned different 
aspirations and competencies to these emerging technologies. Each social 
group with a stake in the bicycle ‘interacted and competed’ to determine 
the eventual form the technology would take (Douglas, 2010:295) during 
the technology’s ongoing development. Similarly, Bijker’s (1995) 
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examination of Bakelite set out explicitly to take a technology with an 
apparently unproblematic development, and expose that quite the 
opposite was the case. Other technologies investigated via SCOT include 
radio (Douglas, 1999), telephones (Fischer, 1992), and the Internet (Abbate, 
1999). 
 
SCOT’s proponents therefore believe technological change, even at the 
‘smallest’ level, is caused by social processes with no internal ‘technological 
logic’ present (Bruun & Hukkinen, 2003:101). Since the criteria of 
technological functionality are socially defined, technologies cannot simply 
be adopted because they ‘work better’ (Ibid). Instead, it is not their ability 
to ‘work’ which determines their place but rather their workability within a 
context (which in this research is the removal of the Space Race narrative as 
explored in Chapter 1, the decline of Big Science, and the growth of the 
private sector and neoliberal rationales in high-technology industries). To 
determine whether an artefact works or not, Bijker (1993:117) uses the 
term ‘technological frame’ to describe the ways social groups interpret 
artefacts. A frame comprises everything that leads to the ‘attribution of 
meanings of technical artefacts’ (Bijker, 1995:123) and everything that 
influences the actions of social groups who either have a stake in the 
technology, or use it. If differing groups operate within differing frames, 
one group may consider a technology to be ‘working’ perfectly whilst 
another may consider it defective. In this way a frame is akin to a narrative 
that describes a particular concept of the ‘correct’ working of the 
technology. The idea of the frame is a crucial part of existing analyses of 
technological development, although – as we shall see – existing SCOT work 
offers comparatively little on the specifics of high-risk technologies; thus 
the departure of this thesis from existing work into new theoretical 
territory. 
 
It is due to these intellectual commitments that SCOT was selected as the 
theoretical framework for this research. SCOT recognizes that technology is 
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firmly embedded within its social context (Bijker, 1993; van Lente, 2000). As 
the previous chapter noted, this was once “the Space Race”, and that 
narratological context was sufficiently strong and sufficiently all-
encompassing for both the actors involved in the space industry (i.e. the US 
and the USSR) that all explanations for that era draw recourse to it. 
However, with its disappearance, what new social contexts does space 
belong to? Similarly, for SCOT acceptance and rejection (or success and 
failure) are socially determined (Pinch & Bijker, 1984; Bijker, 1995), and I 
was therefore able to ask why the space industry was still accepted and 
what it now offered. SCOT’s theoretical framework of the social and the 
technical allow us to examine how technologies are defined as working 
(Bijker, 1993), and in light of the shift towards private spaceflight, a new 
understanding of ‘working’ space technology seems necessary. Lastly, as 
will be noted in the next section (2.2.2), SCOT brings with it a significant 
body of work into other high-risk technologies, which could be readily 
drawn upon for comparisons and contrasts. 
 
It is at this point worth briefly commenting on why Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT), the other leading STS theory of technological development, was not 
selected for this research. ANT is an anthropological approach to the study 
of science and technology developed in the mid-1980s by Bruno Latour, 
John Law and Michael Callon (Callon, 1986a; 1986b; Latour, 1999; Law & 
Hassard, 1999). Much of ANT’s research methodology is focused on the 
idea of ‘follow[ing] the actors’ (Callon et al, 1986:4; Winner, 1986; Latour, 
1996) and observing the actions they perform throughout the network 
(Pantzar, 1997). Indeed, the title of a central ANT work, ‘How to Follow 
Scientists and Engineers Throughout Society’ (Latour, 1987, my emphasis) 
highlights the importance of this following process for much of ANT’s 
thinking. This procedure is cited as one of the major methodological 
advantages (Pestre, 2008) ANT holds over traditional accounts. Rather than 
looking at the ‘end state’ of a technology, ANT rather suggests conducting 




ANT was originally rejected as an analytic perspective due to the strengths 
of SCOT’s intellectual commitments vis-à-vis the social and technical as 
outlined above, but interestingly, as the research progressed, an 
unanticipated issue arose which highlighted the unexpected difficulty I 
would have faced had I pursued ANT research. A core component of ANT’s 
methods of data study is via the examination of ‘inscriptions’ – documents 
– that are used within a network of technological development (Bruun & 
Hukkinen, 2003). Research entails close scrutiny of inscriptions produced in 
order to produce a final account which traces the use of these inscriptions 
(Latour, 2005:128). During the course of my research interviews, the 
scarcity of appropriate documentation became quickly apparent. Many 
interviewees made it clear to me that detailed data was unavailable either 
because documents were confidential to the UKSA, or they were 
confidential due to agreements with private actors, or they were not 
technically confidential but would require permission from potentially 
dozens of actors to be ‘released’, or – in a few rare cases – they had some 
military or governmental backing that meant they could not be made fully 
public. In some cases I was offered the opportunity to view a small amount 
of a document or go through a lengthy process to be allowed to view ‘safe’ 
parts of the document. These observations support Balmer’s (2004:199) 
assertion that secret information should not be viewed as a single 
monolithic whole, but as a complex set of data within which some parts 
may be more or less secretive than others. Winner (2004) similarly notes 
that in recent years an increasing amount of information that was once 
public has been withdrawn or hidden by the state, and reframed as crucial 
data that must be protected, providing a problem for the researcher (as in 
this study). This meant the only documents available were those which 
were designed to be viewed by the wider public and these were generally 
very representative of the ‘official line’, or written after the conclusion of 
the programme the document covered. Had I elected to pursue an ANT 
study despite the ethnographic concerns, this would have been a significant 
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second stumbling block, but as it is this concern did not impinge upon the 
acquisition of valuable data via interviewing (as described in Chapter 3). 
 
2.2.2. Understanding the Development of High-Risk Technologies 
 
To what extent can SCOT be applied to studying the development of high-
risk technologies? We have identified a core aspect of SCOT that seeks to 
explain how new technologies are developed – the idea of the 
technological frame. This is a way to define how a particular artefact is 
interpreted by different social groups, and shows that the development of a 
new technology is heavily dependent on the conflict and interplay between 
these frames. This emphasis on the ongoing conflict between frames is 
essential to a SCOT analysis of this process, but it is also where existing 
literature on technological development breaks down and becomes 
inadequate for a full understanding of high-risk technologies.  
 
Technological development is not just limited to ‘mundane’ technologies 
such as lightbulbs or bicycles. These kinds of case studies, although 
illustrative, do not tell us about the development of high-risk technologies. 
Many technologies studied by SCOT are low-cost or mass-produced 
products with small amount of risk and a wide range of actors able to 
invest, contribute, or shoulder some of that risk. In addition to the classic 
studies of bicycles, Bakelite and bulbs (Bijker, 1995), such technologies 
studied by SCOT include examinations of musical synthesisers (Pinch, 2002), 
digital libraries (Kilker & Gay, 1998), mountain bikes (Rosen, 1993), 
automobiles (Kline & Pinch, 1996), mobile phones (Campbell & Russo, 
2003), wheelchairs (Woods & Watson, 2004), personal computers (Selwyn, 
2007), radio (Douglas, 1999), and many others. By contrast, high-risk 
technologies normally require massive financial commitment (e.g. Galison, 
1997), are produced in small number (e.g. Law, 2002; Mort, 2008), interact 
with a smaller number of actors (e.g. Mackenzie, 1990), and of course 
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possess significant levels of risk. To demonstrate the importance of these 
distinctions, this section will now explore existing scholarly enquiry into 
high-risk technologies, consider these differences in detail, and propose 
‘futures’ as an essential tool to studying high-risk technologies within a 
SCOT framework. 
 
 A key work within this field is that by Perrow (1999), whose book offers a 
high-level overview of the field and a range of case studies. Perrow 
analyzes examples including the Challenger Disaster and the Three Mile 
Island accident and suggests that two features determine the high-risk 
nature of such technologies: they are highly complex, and they are tightly 
coupled, meaning that a failure within one aspect of the technology is likely 
to have knock-on effects and result in an overall catastrophic failure of the 
system. A related definition is that of the ‘High-Reliability Organization’ 
(Boin & Schulman, 2008:1050). This concept is instead focused on the 
social structures that utilize the technology rather than the complex and 
tightly-coupled nature of the technology itself. Boin and Schulman argue 
that the social use of high-risk technologies is often structured around a 
principal governing tenet that the technology must never fail. This means 
that other metrics of cost, efficiency or regular upgrades must all become 
secondary to the reliability of the technology. Although both these works 
propose a number of high-risk and high-reliability examples (as described in 
Chapter 1), the current body of case study work into such technologies is 
substantially wider, and serves to further illustrate the differences between 
these technologies and their more ‘mundane’ counterparts. Additionally, 
whilst the ‘high-risk’ and ‘high-reliability’ models as described here 
emphasize the use of the technology, scholarly examinations of specific 
high-risk technologies have tended to focus instead primarily upon the 
development of those technologies. 
 
Scholars have examined the development of a range of technologies that 
fall into these high-risk and high-reliability categories. This includes work on 
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nuclear power (Winner, 1986; Cowan, 1990), air traffic control (La Porte & 
Consolini, 1991; Downer, 2011), civilian aviation (Downer, 2010), military 
aerospace (Law, 2002), supercolliders and particle accelerators (Galison, 
1997; Knorr-Cetina, 1999), fusion research (Kinsella, 1996, 1999), 
biotechnology (Balmer & Sharp, 1993), nuclear weapons (Rosenberg, 1983; 
Mackenzie, 1990), chemical plants (Perron & Friedlander, 1996), 
submarines (Mort, 2008), space telescopes (e.g. Luukkonen et al, 1992; 
Chompalov & Shrum, 1999; Baldesarra, 2005), and missile defences (Lakoff 
& York, 1989). In doing so many of these works note the arrival  and 
departure of new financial, technical and governmental actors during the 
developmental programmes, but rarely record significant changes in the 
programme objectives during this process. Once resources have been 
committed and the many-year timescale has been accepted, the end goals 
of such technologies appear to shift significantly less than their more 
‘mundane’ counterparts.  
 
In producing these analyses, many of the above had to use declassified 
data only available years or decades after the programme. This is often 
required because the development of many of these technologies remains 
a predominantly secretive affair carried out behind closed doors. This may 
be state secrecy (e.g. Alexander, 1983) or private secrecy of commercial 
actors unwilling to divulge or share sensitive information on such expensive 
and often cutting-edge programmes (Unikel, 1998). It is therefore very 
possible that the documents available show a bias towards consensus or 
unified thinking which does not accurately represent prior debate and 
flexibility within these programmes. These scholarly enquiries nonetheless 
predominantly display significantly less evidence of shifting objectives 
throughout the years or decades of the technology’s development than 
SCOT might lead one to expect. This is not to say objectives and agendas 
are rigidly unchangeable in high-risk development programmes, but it is 
difficult to identify in these case studies the kind of rapid, regular and 
highly-contested frame competition that Bijker (1993) identifies as taking 
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place during the development of the technology. Based on this reading of 
existing high-risk literature and the reduced sense of ongoing debate and 
deliberation these works display, it is apparent that this tenet of SCOT’s 
frame competition is not analytically well-suited to the particular nature of 
high-risk technology.  
 
In addition to this problem of ongoing debate and flexibility, Bijker (1993) 
argues that frames compete in an open marketplace of competition. In 
SCOT the development of the technology is open and allows for many 
actors to enter and leave the programme and attempt to enforce their own 
preferences and agendas onto the final product. Although criticized for this 
inherently pluralistic stance (Klein & Kleinman, 2002), it remains a core 
tenet of the SCOT theoretical framework. However, just as the high-risk 
technology case studies demonstrate a comparative paucity of regular and 
significant frame shifts during a technology’s development, they also 
highlight the reduced number of actors who are able to compete within 
these technologies, and the considerable influence and power these actors 
wield. This is especially apparent in the works of Lakoff & York (1989), 
Mackenzie (1990), Kinsella (1996), Knorr-Ceinta (1999), Law (2002), and 
Mort (2008), but is prevalent throughout the above literature. The actors 
that are able to compete are those with enough social and political capital 
to access the closed market of debate, and significant financial and 
technical capital in order to propose contributions to the programme. 
 
We have therefore now identified two points of disjuncture with existing 
work on technological frames for high-risk industries. High-risk 
technologies are developed in a relatively closed market, not an open one; 
and a dominant frame is almost always firmly established before the 
commitment of resources, rather than the dominant frames being 
challenged and altered throughout the commitment of resources. In this 
light the traditional model of interpretive flexibility and the ongoing open-
market situation it implies struggles to explain the developmental process 
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of high-risk technologies. However, despite the resources apparently 
marshalled before development begins and the bias towards powerful and 
influential actors, many high-risk technological developments are 
‘unsuccessful’ (Lakoff & York, 1989; Gooday, 1998). What, therefore, 
determines the technological outcomes of these industries, if it is not 
ongoing open-market frame competition?  
 
Since the frame competition in high-risk technologies all but ceases at an 
early stage, there must be another factor at play. To identify this factor we 
turn back to the high-risk case studies described above. These case studies 
are replete with examples of struggles over continued support from 
governments, the military, private investors, and so forth. There are also 
examples – such as Lakoff and York’s analysis of the US ‘Strategic Defense 
Initiative’ anti-missile programme – where high-risk technologies did not 
meet their objectives and ceased development. Whereas in a mundane 
technology the loss of confidence or support in a dominant frame may lead 
to it being replaced by a new dominant frame, for a high-risk technology 
this loss of support will in most cases bring the programme to an end. In 
order for a high-risk programme to reach its end goal, therefore, continual 
support must be present – a dominant frame must be compelling enough 
to warrant commitment on a scale and timespan that the programme 
requires. SCOT argues that once there is a single, widely-agreed-upon 
dominant frame for an emerging technology, that interpretation becomes 
the truth of the artefact and its functioning (Pinch & Bijker, 1984; Bijker, 
1993; Bijker, 1995; Bijker & Pinch, 2002; Klein & Kleinman, 2002). In this 
way a dominant frame for a technology which has not yet been developed 
must contain a narrative of the future – the technology does not yet have 
functioning to show, and so a dominant frame must be supported by 
predictions and promises about its future functioning in years or decades to 
come. This will be distinct from any frame that exists in an ongoing 
competition within an open-market situation, for it is related to a 
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technology that only exists on the drawing board rather than a technology-
in-development. 
 
As such, a gap in the literature is identified here which this thesis will aim to 
fill. Although the initial stages of a high-risk development are reflected in 
existing SCOT work on interpretive flexibility and the competition between 
frames in a market situation (even a closed market), this form of 
competition fades as the programme proceeds. If the high-risk programme 
is unable to present its goals as being desirable and compelling, it will 
simply not continue, rather than continuing under the guise of a different 
frame. In order to present its objectives as desirable, dominant frames 
must contain a future-orientated aspect that is far more crucial than in 
comparatively ‘mundane’ technologies. Establishing this strong orientation 
of high-risk technologies towards the (potentially very distant) future does 
not, however, explain what these future-orientated narratives do, or what 
they promise, or how they are designed to offer compelling conclusions to 
lengthy and high-risk technologies. We therefore return to the research 
questions outlined in the previous chapters. What roles do these future-
orientated narratives play in high-risk technological developments, and 
how are they constructed and utilized? We have established that some 
form of future-orientated narrative must be integrally tethered to 
dominant frames in high-risk technology programmes, but the functioning 
of these narratives is unexplored, and elucidating this is the goal of this 
work. 
 
However, one potential objection to this model is clear when we consider 
the rise (discussed in the previous chapter) of private spaceflight. Surely 
private spaceflight and its emphasis on competition and open-market space 
technology means that there are multiple frames competing throughout? 
To pre-empt and deal with this criticism we should return to SCOT’s 
understanding of frames. In the ‘classical’ model there are multiple 
interpretations of the technology that may change or rise and fall in 
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influence throughout the development of a technology; the ongoing 
development of the technology and the flexibility and change in the 
dominant frame(s) occur at the same time. However, the prior examination 
of the literature shows that in high-risk technologies the resources that 
must be committed are so significant that little or no active development of 
a technological programme begins until a dominant frame has been 
established. The concept of future narratives thus does not argue that 
there is no competition to decide on the objectives of the technology, but 
rather that once resources are committed, there is little change in the 
objectives throughout the programme. Once the objectives are selected, 
the programme will only then begin to marshal resources, and 
subsequently succeed or fail based on its ability to convince actors via the 
‘future narratives’ presented. Given the understanding presented here of 
high-risk technologies being compelled to sell the value of the future 
predicted in a dominant frame, the field of ‘futures’ is essential to 
understanding the development of technology within high-risk industries. 
This thesis will now explore this field in detail to understand what it 




As Brown et al (2000:5) state in their work Contested Futures, ‘the future 
has become big business’. Long-term thinking, environmental concerns, the 
creation of potential future scenarios, ‘horizon scanning’ and other 
considerations of the future have become key methods to legitimize 
decisions ranging from policy choices of international scope to the planning 
and objectives of small companies or individual actors (Sans-Menéndez & 
Cabello, 2000:232). The claim that future impacts of a technology can be 
predicted reinforces the oft-held linear deterministic conception of 
technological outcomes (Williams, 2006) that STS has worked hard to 
challenge. The reasons for this rise in prediction are many; one argument 
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posits that as a result of the drive for progress and expansion, so 
fundamental to modernity, futures are now seen as things that should be 
grasped, analysed and understood (Slaughter, 2002). Alternatively, Giddens 
(1997) argues a new interest in futures stems from feeling a loss of control 
about the future which needs to be mitigated as much as possible via 
greater analysis. Another rationale is that since all actors have their own 
desired futures (Smith et al, 2005), and any individual industry or group can 
only have limited influence on that future (de Laat, 2000), organizations 
which examine futures may be better placed to anticipate the actions of 
rivals, impending regulation, or the emergence of new markets (Georghiou, 
1996). ‘Futures’ is an interdisciplinary field concerned with studying these 
predictions – how they are created, who creates them, what purposes they 
are used for, and the methods used to attempt to quantify the inherent 
uncertainty of forecasting any social or political phenomenon ahead of the 
present. To study these futures, Brown et al (2000:4) suggest we should 
examine how a given future is ‘constructed and managed, by whom and 
under what conditions’. Futures are socially constructed and are subject to 
flexible interpretation – in this case the constructed future is that of a high-
risk programme, and the flexibility is over the desirability of such a future. 
A number of scholars have proposed methods of categorizing the 
differences between different forms of futures, and it is to these 
categorizations we will now turn to examine the existing ways in which 
futures have been understood and their value to the study of technology. 
Subsequently the chapter then explores specific aspects of futures 
literature highly relevant to both high-risk industries and technological 
development programmes as a whole, which will subsequently be built 







2.3.1. Categorizing Futures 
 
This thesis proposes three new kinds of future, termed here future 
narratives. I have called these three categories finite, normalized and 
adaptive futures. Each of these is grounded in existing work on futures 
coupled with the original research undertaken in this study in order to 
explain the dynamics of lengthy technological developments in high-risk 
industries. Examining this futures work will make clear the methods by 
which we can begin to arrive at this new three-part categorization.  
 
There have been to date a number of attempts to classify and categorize 
futures. Smith et al (2005:156) suggest five major uses of futures: 
identifying possibilities and plausible outcomes; acting as ‘problem-defining 
tools’ or heuristics; stabilizing activity via a common reference-point shared 
between actors; generating metaphors and visions about relevant actors 
who carry symbolic value; and as narratives for the ‘marshalling of 
resources’ and focusing inputs and outputs. These are all uses to which 
futures may be put, and Smith et al (2005) thereby categorize and typify 
futures according to their eventual objectives.  
 
Alternatively, Michael (2000:24-32) suggests five axes upon which futures 
can be measured in terms of their structure, not their objectives. The first is 
distance – something taking a week is seen as more feasible than 
something taking a year, while long temporal distance also reduces 
urgency. Defining the temporal distance of the future positions the reader 
for immediate action or a long-term measured plan, and makes 
assumptions about the roles opportunism or strategy may play. The second 
is the subject – futures can either draw recourse to individuals, or to 
broader societal themes. The third is the ‘form of rationality’ – substantive 
or instrumental objectives will affect the presentation of the technology; 
ends-orientated futures may be criticized as utopian or hailed as visionary, 
whilst process-orientated ones may be praised for realism and pragmatism 
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or derided as business-as-usual (Michael, 2000:28). The fourth is valency – 
a positive future is something to be worked towards whilst a negative 
future is to be fought against (Sans-Menéndez & Cabello, 2000), but 
‘positive’ futures may be negative for some actors and vice versa. Fifthly, 
Michael distinguishes between futures that are slow and fast, as well as far 
and near – a fast future might be one we mindlessly rush towards or one 
focused on ‘entrepreneurial grasping of the future moment’ (2000:32), 
whilst a slow future may be one we drift towards or one that can be 
reflexively examined and legislated on (Ibid). 
 
The three types of future narrative which are identified in this thesis can be 
understood as cutting across many of the definitions proposed above, but 
also pushing the understanding of futures (and their uses in high-risk 
industries) in new directions not discussed in these typologies. They also 
draw upon specific bodies of futures work concerned with issues other 
than categorization. The next three sections examine prior futures work on 
technological development which cut across these two five-part definitions, 
and will subsequently serve as the background to the new high-risk future 
narrative typology proposed in this work. 
 
2.4. Future Narratives 
 
2.4.1. Towards Finite Futures 
 
There is a range of established futures literature on technological 
development, beginning with work which notes the importance of a 
distinct and clear end-goal for a future. Michael (2000) argues that 
technological futures orientated towards a specific and distinct goal can be 
strengthened by that explicit declaration of intent. He emphasizes the 
importance of the distance towards this objective, a theme this thesis will 
return to several times in its analysis – many programmes in high-risk 
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industries take years, whilst others may even take decades. Elzinga (2004) 
has also explored how temporally distant futures of this sort are designed 
to reinforce a message and maintain a consensus across such potentially 
substantial periods of time. In designing such lengthy futures, their authors 
construct amongst themselves a full ‘repertoire of promises and 
expectations and strategies’ (Jørgensen et al, 2009:84) with which to 
encourage other stakeholders into a programme. They also serve as ‘taken-
for-granted’ frameworks and perspectives to act as the foundations for 
understanding the programme (Wynne, 1983:15) – they ensure that 
everyone is ‘on the same page’, or at least close, in order to sustain 
collective discipline and movement towards potentially temporally distant 
shared goals. A collectivization of goals keeps all actors focused upon a very 
distinct objective with a fixed endpoint. With so many stakeholders in a 
programme and a clear set of objectives, the potential technology becomes 
an ‘[object] of widely shared speculative promise’ (Brown, 2003:16; cf. 
Borup et al, 2006:29), and it is this sharing of promise that such futures aim 
to ensure.  
 
High-risk futures in the literature above (e.g. Galison, 1997; Kinsella, 1999; 
Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Lakoff & York, 1989) are presented as being far more 
distant from the present than many other futures for ‘mundane’ 
technologies explored by SCOT. This type of very long-term prediction 
relevant to high-risk industries has been examined by Adam (1995:118, 
2004:87), who argues that it becomes increasingly challenging to accurately 
predict effects as future predictions move into decades and beyond (cf. 
Nordlund, 2012). Futures that predict over such a temporal range have to 
produce convincing outcomes for a wide range of actors who are all tied to 
the success or failure of the programme, but in a scenario where the 
outcome may be years or decades ahead. At the same time, such 
programmes do still have a distinct end – once stakeholders have been 
involved for some of the programme, the existence of a distinct endpoint 
serves to discourage a premature departure from the programme. 
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Although existing scholarly work acknowledges the importance of both 
keeping those within a programme on the same page and the value of a 
distinct and clear end goal, little has been written on how these aspects 
play out over programmes that are highly risky and take a long time to 
completion, beyond this acknowledged potential inaccuracy and the 
importance of maintaining long-term consensus. 
 
The concept of the finite future narrative that emerged from this research 
builds upon this work. The term finite was selected as a label for this type 
of future due to both the distinct conclusion and ‘cut-off’ for the 
programme, and also the emphasis on a clearly-defined step-by-step 
process towards that promise and the lack of flexibility within this defined 
path. As the thesis will show, this path serves to both bring actors into 
these high-risk development programmes, offer intermittent points or 
milestones where the ongoing success (or failure) of the programme may 
be measured, and to maintain their commitment throughout the process of 
technological development. Its objectives and goals are designed to offer 
compelling benefits to a wide range of actors, all of which stem from the 
central objectives of the programme’s dominant frame. This is the closest 
of the three forms of future narrative to existing work on futures – within 
the categorizations discussed above, the conception of futures from Smith 
et al (2005:1506) as fundamentally designed to ‘stabilize technical and 
other innovative activity’ is highly relevant to the study of finite futures, 
along with the work of Michael (2000) on the temporal distance of future 
planning. These will both be drawn on in Chapter 4’s analysis of finite 
future narratives. 
 
2.4.2. Towards Normalized Futures 
 
As with the finite future narratives above, all technological futures are 
designed to mobilize other actors (Jørgensen et al, 2009), seeking to bring 
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them into a programme and discourage departure. However, such actors 
outside a high-risk industry may not necessarily be interested in the 
technical specifics of a programme, but are instead assessing potential 
future value of the programme’s outputs. This can be understood as a shift 
in language away from that used in Big Science to denote change, progress 
and discovery, and towards universal and mundane terminology to enhance 
the applicability and ease of understanding of a programme (Hilgartner, 
1990). In futures of this sort, outside actors are not concerned with the 
specifics of a new technology being used, but may be more likely to 
appreciate the value of the programme in terms of profit or service 
coverage. Within Michael’s typology these would be process-orientated 
futures (2000:28) concerned with purely instrumental outcomes, rather 
than the bolder objectives described in the above section. 
 
For any high-risk industry this would mean a reorientation of how a 
programme’s goals are expressed. New futures must contain compelling 
messages to bring in these new actors, but not offer too much innovation 
or discontinuity with existing technology. As Geels and Smit (2000) argue in 
their study of futures, this results in a balancing act between promising 
enough to entice, and sufficiently little that the inevitably more down-to-
earth outcomes – communication coverage instead of space telescopes – 
do not disappoint. This interplay between the bold promise and the more 
‘realistic’ prediction is echoed by Elzinga (2004), who suggests a second 
balancing act exists between the ‘reality’ of the claim – derived from 
concepts of scientific or technological objectivity and therefore predictive 
reliability – and the promise of a future which, by definition, is only an 
extrapolation from current reality. These works argue that constructed 
futures must be simultaneously able to promise enough to entice actors 
into a programme, but not show too much disjuncture with the present 
that they are considered implausible. Although these works emphasize 
these points, little has been written on making a change towards such 
pragmatic futures in an industry long established as producing bold and 
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dramatic futures that denote clear disjuncture with the present. What (if 
anything) is unique to producing these forms of ‘mundane’ future when 
they are within a technological industry that is innately associated with 
cutting-edge science and high-risk technology? 
 
The normalized future narrative emerged from the research as the answer 
to this question and a continuation of this body of futures work. The 
normalized future is a type of narrative that positions itself in explicit 
contrast to the rationales of Big Science – the advancement of ‘abstract’ 
knowledge via massive state-sponsored financial and technical 
commitment – and instead attempts to sell space technology (or any other 
high-risk equivalent) by attempting to reposition the technology as an 
ordinary part of everyday life. This attempted repositioning of such 
technologies as ordinary parts of social or economic life is reflected in the 
kinds of promises normalized futures make. These normalized futures are a 
clear shift towards promising more ‘mundane’ future objectives, and the 
above authors provide us with an initial understanding of the interplay 
within futures between the scope of the promised outcome and the 
believability of the future. A mundane promise, or a promise ‘close’ to the 
present, is a future more likely to prove accurate (Michael, 2000). These 
futures herald a reorientation of some aspects of the space sector away 
from innovation and towards a more conservative and ‘plausible’ outlook 
(Smith et al, 2005:1506). This thesis argues that normalized futures do not 
promise extreme discontinuity with the present day, but instead offer 
services that are incremental enhancements, not major shifts, in what type 
of service is currently available, such as phone communication or 
broadband. The term normalized has therefore been chosen because this 
second type of future narrative is used to promise standardized market or 
service outcomes. Within this form of future, ‘technical’ descriptions of the 
programme’s aims are less useful than service-orientated equivalents, and 
this second type of proposed future narrative will mark a significant 
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departure from the promises and assumptions from earlier iterations of 
high-risk industry futures (Blankenship, 1974; Kinsella, 1996). 
 
2.4.3. Towards Adaptive Futures 
 
As discussed in the previous two sections, I have proposed the applicability 
of two bodies of futures work to high-risk technologies – that on long-term 
planning and objective-setting, and that of instrumental or pragmatic 
benefits (as a reorientation of high-risk technology agendas). However, 
there are three significant other bodies of prior futures work which possess 
clear relevance to high-risk technologies, and each poses a question for our 
understanding of future narratives within these industries. 
 
Michael (2000:22) explores the relationship between the future and the 
past within futures. He argues that a research programme both makes 
statements about the past – how the current state of affairs was reached, 
what technologies have been mastered, what the context is – as well as the 
future. Examples of this phenomenon can be seen in other STS research: in 
Brown and Kraft’s (2006) exploration of blood stem cells, they argue that 
the current expectations on such cells are historically constituted from 
engagements with blood and medical innovation. The work of Tutton 
(2012) reinforces this importance of understandings of the past to 
conceptions of the future, showing how past medical history is carefully 
positioned as part of articulating a vision for future personalized medicine. 
What does the mastering or understanding of previous technologies in the 
space sector or any other high-risk industry do for future programmes that 
might build upon that technology, and how is this reflected in the futures 
they produce? 
 
Futures can also be a method for extending the lifespan of an existing 
programme. Winner identifies the phenomenon where a programme that 
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seems to be coming to the end of its lifespan or original remit will also 
‘[seek] a mission to match its technological capabilities’ (Winner, 
1977:244). Even if the intended use has been concluded, the system will 
have gathered (if successful) commitments of manpower, expertise and 
financial resources, and may not wish to go ‘gracefully into oblivion’ (Ibid). 
The programme will then attempt to align itself with new objectives, new 
uses and new developments, and try to stress the importance of taking on 
a new task. Within the space industry, for example, NASA’s post-Moon work 
with human astronauts has sometimes been derided as being a result of 
NASA having little else to do with all the infrastructure and expertise 
required, and instead its searching for new roles and new programmes 
(Ibid:245). The system tries to adapt and influence the ‘needs it also serves’ 
(Ibid:246) to extend its own lifespan. Are there aspects of this adaptation 
process distinct to high-risk industries where the existing lifespan is likely to 
already be significant? 
 
The third piece of current futures literature with questions for high-risk 
technologies is that which is focused on the deployment of expertise and 
the authority granted to experts. A convincing and authoritative narrative 
backed up by experts will have much more impact than the same narrative 
deployed by other actors (Rip, 2003; cf. Sjöberg, 2008). This is what French 
and Raven (1960:262) call ‘expert power’ and which Hilgartner (1990:520) 
considers the ‘gold standard’ of epistemic authority. This chapter has 
already considered the importance of proposing convincing and compelling 
promises, but ‘expertise’ is an important part of the process that goes into 
creating these promises, and making these promises appear realistic and 
credible. Given the length of testing and development regimes within the 
space industry and other high-risk sectors, what forms of expertise are 





The third and final future narrative in the three-part typology presented in 
this work, the adaptive future narrative, was developed from my original 
research data and answers these questions. It marks the furthest 
theoretical move away from existing scholarly work on futures. Adaptive 
future narratives are not focused on a specific programme or mission, but 
rather on a physical component. Rather than having a distinct end, they 
instead emphasize the successful functioning of this component in a 
potentially infinite number of possible future programmes. This form of 
future narrative is termed adaptive because it is focused on creating a 
component that can be trusted in any range of possible future programmes 
across an indefinitely large temporal range, and on minimizing the 
limitations placed on what this component might be used for in the future. 
Although a future narrative of this sort may seem to challenge much of the 
existing scholarly work on futures – which as we have seen emphasize the 
importance of offering futures with a clear temporal end – there is 
nevertheless a rich theoretical background explored above that we can 
draw on for beginning to understand this third unusual form of future 
narrative. This background is the importance of the past as evidence of the 
correct functioning of the component, the desired continued development 





This chapter has summarized existing work relevant to this research and 
proposed the concept of the future narrative. It began by isolating the gap 
within existing scholarly work in STS that this concept aimed to fill – the 
question of how high-risk technologies are developed, and what is unique 
about these technologies compared to other, more ‘mundane’ 
technologies. The chapter summarized the key points in the Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT) relating to technological development, 
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and emphasized the importance of the ‘technological frame’. A 
technological frame is a way that a particular social group interprets an 
artefact, and often takes the form of a narrative for the intended use of 
that artefact – there may be many such frames each held by different 
groups, and these frames compete for acceptance and dominance during 
the development of the artefact in question. However, the chapter 
subsequently argued that the concept of the technological frame, and the 
associated ongoing competition towards the emergence of ‘dominant 
frames’, does not adequately describe high-risk development. This is due to 
the SCOT assumption of an open-market circulation of frames and the rise 
and fall of multiple dominant frames throughout technological 
development, whereas prior scholarly work into high-risk industries 
showed that neither of these is the case within these sectors. Once 
resources have been committed, the interpretive flexibility of the 
programme lies in perceptions of whether or not it will succeed, not in 
what form the technology will take. This chapter identified from the 
literature a strong (but not absolute) level of stability in programme 
objectives over these long time spans, although from this prior work it does 
appear that the potential for minor changes still remains.  
 
In light of this period potentially stretching over many years or even 
decades and the need for a dominant frame to make promises about a 
future that that remains distant, the chapter then proposed looking 
towards the field of ‘futures’ research to help understand how such 
programmes are developed in the absence of ongoing frame competition. 
This led to the conception of the term ‘future narrative’ – a form of 
narrative unique to high-risk industries and specifically orientated to 
produce a compelling story for a programme’s future development that will 
maintain interest from actors over a significant length of time. A future 
narrative consists of statements designed to sell the predicted success of 
the dominant frame. Future narratives do not compete with other frames 
once development has begun, but they do compete for acceptance or 
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rejection based on how convincing and compelling they are able to make 
the dominant frame appear. 
 
Thus, in proposing the concept of the future narrative to fill the gap within 
STS literature, we can identify a break from traditional work on narratives – 
this form of narrative is located in the future, not the past (cf. Deuten & 
Rip, 2000; Elzinga, 2004). There is also an important distinction between 
futures and future narratives. Futures are normally focused upon specific 
markets or industries (Georghiou, 1996; de Laat, 2000; Sans-Menéndez & 
Cabello, 2000), whilst future narratives are concerned with much broader 
ranges of stakeholders including governments, militaries, scientific 
communities and ‘the public’, as well as commercial enterprise. Future 
narratives are constructed to tell a story (Akrich, 1997) about the value of 
the planned development of a technology – this is an act which imbues the 
development and subsequent use of that technology with far broader 
social and political meaning (cf. van Lente, 2000, Elzinga, 2004) than one 
confined to market dynamics or technical specifics. The concept of the 
future narrative proposed by this thesis is therefore designed to marry 
future predictions with narratological meaning outside the confines of the 
high-risk industries they are developed within – within the case study of 
the thesis, this context was found to include a wide range of ‘non-space’ 
actors who are now involved with the space industry. 
 
In addition to the overall research question focused on the construction 
and utilization of future narratives, the chapter identified more detailed 
and specific sub-questions drawn from existing futures work which refined 
my interview questioning. Do high-risk technologies utilize promises and 
detailed plans as in other futures, and if so, how? How do they represent 
instrumental (Michael, 2000) or ‘plausible’ (Smith et al, 2005) futures? 
Identified in prior work as important determinants of successful or failed 
futures (e.g. Winner, 1977; Michael, 2000; Rip, 2003), what roles (if any) 
are played by the past, the desire for programmes to continue into 
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perpetuity, and expertise and expert knowledge? Although unknown at this 
juncture what (if any) answers to these sub-questions would be found in 
the space industry, issues and questions about technological futures 
already raised by futures research were a valuable starting point for this 
investigation. Having established over the past two chapters both the 
theoretical underpinning of the research and the existing literature which 
formed my investigation of futures, narratives and the space industry as an 































This chapter covers the research design of the thesis for the exploration of 
future narratives. It begins by discussing the selection of semi-structured 
interviews as the focus of the research design and the reasons behind this 
choice, before then listing the interviewees who took part in this study, 
their points of origin and the demographics within the space industry to 
which they belonged. The chapter then outlines how sampling was carried 
out to attempt to ensure a representative cross-section of the UK space 
industry, and the importance of grounded theory in the research design. In 
keeping with grounded theory the three-part typology of future narratives 
for high-risk industries the thesis proposes – finite, normalized and 
adaptive futures – was created without any prior assumptions about the 
forms of narrative the research would identify. The final section of the 
chapter then covers appropriate ethical considerations for research 
involving human participants, before concluding with a summary. 
 
3.2. Research Method: Semi-Structured Interviews  
 
Interviewing is the primary source of data for this thesis. Interviewing was 
selected in order to understand the use of future narratives from the 
perspective of those who directly create and deploy them as part of their 
roles within the current UK space industry. Hermanowicz (2007:629, 
emphasis original) considers interviews to be a method for asking ‘what do 
you think about what you do?’. It directs our attention to the experience of 
work instead of questions that may only get information about self-
presentation (Veroff et al, 1993) or the ‘official line’ about a development 
programme. In this regard studying the official line from distributed media 
such as press coverage or official documents would only have yielded a 
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sanitized version of any future narratives. This choice of interviewing also 
allowed the interviewees to define their own roles within the space sector 
and expound on how important they felt future narratives were. Actors 
themselves should be allowed to define and describe their social world 
without any interaction from the analyst at all (cf. Vikkelsø, 2007). Once 
they have finished describing their world, sociologists can then understand 
how they define their lived experience (Hermanociwz, 2007) and what 
takes place within their social worlds (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999). This 
perspective stresses the importance of how the actors themselves interpret 
their settings, their parts in events, and how they have gone about their 
jobs and roles. Interviewees may in this case describe how they perceive 
the roles of future narratives (if any), which may be hidden within 
documents that (as noted in the previous chapter) are unavailable for 
public access, or only exist temporarily in discussions, meetings or debates 
within the industry itself that are closed off to outsiders. 
 
This type of semi-structured interview can thus be used to ascertain and 
examine individuals’ ‘interests, attitudes, relationships, roles, power and 
influence’ (McBride, 2003:270). Whereas a documentary analysis may fall 
foul of retrospective constructions of events and narratives, or documents 
being made significantly after a contested event and only recording the 
eventual stabilized outcome, semi-structured interviewing of those 
involved allows for a first-hand appraisal of what went into the construction 
of a narrative or a programme of technological development. These 
interview techniques allow for issues to be studied that cannot be directly 
observed by the researcher. Points of interest may have happened far in the 
past, or lack physical records, or be closely related to the interpersonal 
dynamics within an organization (Bryman, 2008:466-468). They also reduce 
intrusion compared to an ethnography, allow for a retrospective 
longitudinal study – appropriate when none of the space programmes 
interviewees worked on either began or concluded within the three-year 
period of my research – and give the potential for a greater breadth of 
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coverage by engaging with those in different ranks and positions in the 
studied group (Ibid).  
 
In interviews the narratives that interviewees provide are considered to be 
of particular importance when relating past events of how their world 
came to take on the configuration it currently has (Bryman, 2008:388). The 
narratives presented would show how those within the space industry 
understood their own work. Researchers must not misattribute or 
misreport the statements of interviewees (Venturini, 2010) but instead use 
the understandings put forward within the research, not those generated 
beforehand by the researcher. The thesis therefore sought to listen to the 
‘voices’ of actors above the researcher’s assumptions – for example, 
interviewees were categorized according to their own self-definitions of 
their jobs and their positions in the space sector, and this is the key used 
throughout the thesis to denote the origins of the interviewees. As Bryman 
(2008:375) puts it, ‘the social world must be interpreted from the 
perspective of the people being studied’, and it is from this perspective that 




A total of 26 people were interviewed for the research. 28 were contacted, 
but one was unable to make meetings for which I was available and the 
other did not reply. The first nine interviewees were all from the UKSA. This 
was via permission from the Chief Executive of the Agency (at the time of 
first contact – this position has since shifted to another individual) and 
through the Chief Executive these interviews were arranged. Individuals 
such as this who allow or restrict access to research settings are known as 
gatekeepers (Rubin & Rubin, 1995:65-67). In this case identifying the initial 
gatekeeper in the UKSA was very simple and there were no significant 
issues or disagreements with either the then-Chief Executive or subsequent 
interviewees. Although I made contact directly with all interviewees, many 
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were also contacted by earlier interviewees and encouraged to take part in 
the study. Some interviews were concluded by asking for recommendations 
about who to talk to in order to gather a broader and more holistic image 
of the space industry, which was coupled with my own investigations into 
relevant UK space organizations. This process next moved the research in 
the direction of the Technology Strategy Board (TSB), a UK public body that 
works on developing and marketing new and emerging technologies. As a 
link between the public space sector and many private actors, from this 
point onwards the range of interviewees broadened out significantly to 
include those in a range of private companies. One interviewee was an 
individual who had previously worked in the Ministry of Defence’s space 
operations; one was a senior member of the British Interplanetary Society, 
the UK’s primary space advocacy body; whilst one interviewed at a 
conference was from ESA and dealt with the UK’s interests within the larger 
space agency. Twenty-five of the interviews lasted between 60 and 120 
minutes and were carried out within interviewees’ places of work, whilst 
one was conducted by phone when a physical meeting could not be 
arranged. In this case a slightly different informed consent form (Appendix 
B) was emailed to the interviewee, rather than the standard form 
(Appendix A) I used in person for all other interviews. 
 
Permission to tape record the interviews was gained as part of the consent 
form, which detailed their ability to decline, to withdraw at any time, and 
what the research would be used for. The semi-structured interviews began 
with a small number of introductory questions about the interviewee’s past 
and career progression in the space industry, and then moved on to 
questioning about the substantive topics of the research. Within the 
interview situation most interviewees were very free with their time and 
offered detailed responses. A small number of interviewees only offered up 
‘official line’ responses, replying to my questions as if I was a representative 
of a news outlet or a potential investor to whom they needed to provide a 
pristine image of the space industry. In these instances the interviewees 
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were asked to expand and elaborate on their comments, but further details 
were rarely forthcoming if an interview began in this manner. At several 
points in some interviews, notes were made on issues to return to later in 
the interview or to add to the list of interview questions for future 
interviewees. The questions asked in the interviews were developed 
iteratively over time, with an initial broad focus on future narratives which 
was later narrowed down to attempt to identify more detail about 
emerging trends in earlier interviews. Interviews began with introductory 
questions about the career in the space industry of the interviewee, before 
then moving onto the substantive topics. 
 
Table 1 (overleaf) shows the breakdown of interviewees. Each one has been 
assigned an anonymous identifier ranging from 001 to 026, and has been 
listed next to their company or affiliation and the categories into which 
they fall. In assigning these categories, I have sought to use the definitions 
that those within the space sector adopted and to let the interviews speak 
for themselves, rather than trying to organize the interviewees according to 
a separate metric. As discussed earlier in this chapter the only ‘lines of 
social demarcation’ which should matter in social research are those that 
the actors draw or perceive (Klein & Kleinman, 2002:32) and the definitions 
assigned below follow this rationale. The categories are public (primarily 
the UKSA, but also a number of other governmental bodies such as the 
TSB), private (those from for-profit space industries or companies), science 
(those who work in ‘abstract science’ missions such as space telescopes or 
planetary landers), technology (for those who defined themselves as 
working in technology development, innovation, or similar), engagement 
(with the public), ‘growth’ (a term used by the interviewee in question 
when questioned about their job, which primarily entailed finding and 
developing new markets for the space industry), comms (for those who 
worked in the communications industry) and EO (for Earth Observation, 
such as remote sensing and weather satellites). We can therefore note that 
interviewees drew a clear distinction between the ‘scientific’ and 
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‘technological’ aspects of the space industry (Pinch & Bijker, 1984; Hughes, 
1986; Faulkner, 1994), and this is reflected in the categorization. There 
were a total of seventeen interviewees involved in the public side of space, 
twelve from the private sector, twelve involved in various forms of 
technology development, six concerned primarily with space science, four 
who worked in the communications side of the industry, two involved in 
earth observation, one involved in engagement and one in growth. Where 
necessary for reasons of space, the following abbreviations have been used 






001 UK Space Agency Public, Engagement 
002 UK Space Agency Public, Science 
003 UK Space Agency Public, Technology 
004 UK Space Agency Public 
005 UK Space Agency Public, Science 
006 UK Space Agency Public, EO, Technology 
007 UK Space Agency Public, EO 
008 UK Space Agency Public, ‘Growth’ 
009 UK Space Agency Public 
010 Technology Strategy Board Public, Technology 
011 Technology Strategy Board Public, Technology 
012 Technology Strategy Board Public, Priv., Tech., Comms 
013 Technology Strategy Board Public, Priv., Tech., Comms 
014 Reaction Engines Limited Private, Technology 
015 Reaction Engines Limited Private, Technology 
016 Reaction Engines Limited Private, Technology 
017 Reaction Engines Limited Private, Technology 
018 Ex-MoD (Space) Public 
019 International Space Innovation Centre Public, Science 
020 British Interplanetary Society Public, Private, Science 
021 European Space Agency Public, Science 
022 EADS Astrium Private, Tech., Comms 
023 Qinetiq Group Private, Science 
024 Global Invacom  Private, Comms 
025 ABSL Space Products Private, Technology 
026 COM DEV Europe Private 





Throughout the thesis all interviewees will be referred to according to their 




When sampling interviewees the ‘information richness’ of the data is 
considered a key goal (Denzin, 1998), and from the outset I sought to 
interview a representative sample of the UK space industry. There are 
several different methods by which sampling may be done. ‘Extreme’ 
sampling involves contact with those who ‘exemplify characteristics of 
interest’, ‘intensity’ sampling focuses on those who have experienced the 
phenomenon for a long time and have a deep knowledge of it (both non-
random samples), while ‘maximum variety’ sampling is used to assess 
generalised traits (Ibid:73). As the study progresses, sampling can be 
returned to in a reflexive process to study ‘confirming or disconfirming’ 
cases (Ibid:74) that will have a critical impact on the theories proposed. 
Since the characteristics of interest for this thesis’s interviews are 
perspectives and opinions from those involved in widely heterogeneous 
modern space programmes, maximum variety sampling was the primary 
method used to interview as wide a range of individuals as possible. In this 
regard some potential interviewees were not pursued if their job 
descriptions and backgrounds closely mirrored those already interviewed, 
whilst a greater number of interviewees were generally pursued from 
larger and more important organizations in the space industry to reflect the 
significance of these bodies in the space sector. 
 
However, an issue arose in deciding when to consider the range of 
interviewees ‘complete’. Social networks are potentially endlessly 
expansive, and therefore the number of potential interviewees is too, and 
the artificial construction of a limit or boundary then lies with the 
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researcher. The universe of relevant groups can be infinitely expandable 
(Cowan, 1994; Krige, 2000). The researcher will always be able to expand 
any given point of study even further (Levins, 1998), and thus an informed 
decision must be made about where to ‘cut’ the network (Bijker & Pinch, 
2002). This makes the objects of study themselves ‘intellectual constructs’ 
as the investigator chooses the system and the boundaries (Levins, 
1998:559). During the course of the research it became quickly apparent 
that with the unit of study being ‘The UK Space Sector’, this could expand 
to almost any number of individuals. Several interviewees themselves 
highlighted the level of vagueness when defining who and what is part of 
the space sector. Should Sky TV be considered part of the space sector? 
Should those who provide GPS services be considered part of the space 
industry, or only those who manufacture the GPS equipment, or 
somewhere in the middle?  
 
Neither theory nor methodology actually explains how the research 
process should be concluded or at what point interviewing should end 
(Strathen, 1996), so focusing on the specific way the network is cut 
(regarding both intellectual and practical concerns) should be considered 
constructive to good research (Jensen & Zuiderent-Jerak, 2007; Bijker & 
Pinch, 2002). Cutting the research in this case focused on an iterative 
principle of sampling and interviewing until a level of ‘saturation’ of 
information had been achieved. A point was reached where no new 
interviewees could be identified who were employed in aspects of the 
space industry from which I had not yet interviewed anyone, and where 
little new data was being gathered from those I was continuing to 
interview. This occurred once a little over twenty of the eventual twenty-six 
interviews had been conducted; the final few interviews were carried out 
after reaching this point either because of prior arrangements with the 
interviewees, or in order to pursue particular points which had not been 
sufficiently explored in the prior interviews (most other relevant topics 
having been saturated by this point). The resulting selection of 
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interviewees – twenty-six, all with in-depth semi-structured interviews, 
generally lasting between one and two hours but sometimes even longer, 
from a wide range of space sector backgrounds – provides a detailed cross-
sectional image of the space industry, and is more than adequate to 
explore the key questions of this thesis about the creation and role of 
future narratives. 
 
As above, the point at which the research was cut was upon reaching a 
level of theoretical saturation. This ideal of theoretical saturation refers to 
the state when data cannot be reviewed any more to gain new insights 
from it, and no new concepts are appearing from its analysis (Bryman, 
2008:542). It is in this way an ongoing process concerned with ‘the 
refinement of ideas, rather than boosting sample size’ (Ibid:415). A 
judgement that theoretical saturation had been reached was thus behind 
the conclusion of the interviewing for this research after twenty-six 
interviews. However, ‘volunteerism’ can skew interviewees if only certain 
types of people (or those in certain positions) are willing or able to 
participate in the study (Heckathorn, 2002). There is little evidence to 
suggest that much of this happened – as previously mentioned, 26 out of 
28 interviewees contacted both responded and agreed to interviews and 
the twenty-seventh was willing but unavailable, marking a very high 
response rate.  
 
Nevertheless, other issues arise with a ‘chain-referral sampling’ method, 
similar to ‘snowball sampling’, where participants refer the researcher to 
other appropriate participants (Rubin & Rubin, 1995:67-8). This risks 
homophily, a condition where interviewees only refer the researcher to 
those they know or those with similar views, which raises the importance 
of varying the initial sample (Heckathorn, 2002). This was undoubtedly 
possible in this case as those I might wish to pursue for subsequent 
interviews were from time to time recommended by prior interviewees. 
However, due to the significant variation between different parts of the 
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space sector, the fact that it was normally organizations and not 
interviewees that were directly recommended, and my decision to select 
the majority of interviewees entirely independently of any 
‘recommendations’, I believe little of this problem arose in the research. 
Some snowball sampling was conducted, but the final choice to pursue or 
not pursue a potential interview was taken solely by me, with the objective 
of achieving theoretical saturation across a wide range of space sector 
employees. Recommendations mainly served as a useful secondary tool 
and a sometimes very useful way to bypass gatekeepers in other 
organizations. By the conclusion of the research a varied group of space 
industry employees had been interviewed who cut across the public and 
private sectors, a range of different space applications, a reasonable 
balance between sexes (although with a statistical bias towards male 
interviewees) and a range of age groups from early-20s to retired. 
 
3.3. Grounded Theory 
 
The data from the research has been analyzed via a fundamentally 
inductive approach; the ‘concepts are derived from the data’ (Elo & Kyngas, 
2008:109) and prejudgements about views on contemporary future 
narratives in high-risk industries were avoided. Prior reading on futures and 
narratives highlighted detailed questions about the roles of future-
orientated narratives within the space industry (see Chapter 2), but were 
not used to pre-judge answers from the data. This approach is Grounded 
Theory, which involves generating theory from collected data, not slotting 
the data into prior theoretical models (Bryman, 2008:541). Many social 
research epistemologies argue that research should begin with theory 
(Charmaz, 2000), rather than produce theory as the eventual output of 
data in the way grounded theory proposes. Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue 
that the initial development of grounded theory was important as a 
response to the emphasis on grand theories in social research into which all 
73 
 
data was expected to fit, and a concurrent need to make qualitative 
research more systematic as a response to challenges from quantitative 
social research. Using grounded theory the causal chain of research begins 
with data and moves gradually towards theory, whereas a positivist or 
deductive approach would begin with theory and gather data which either 
proves or falsifies initial standpoints (Hodkinson, 2008:82,96). With 
grounded theory the formation of theory is an inductive process which 
takes place during and after the collection of data, as was the case with the 
typology presented in this thesis. Such data must be interpreted by the 
researcher, in this case resulting in the formulation of ‘finite’, ‘normalized’ 
and ‘adaptive’ futures. This is therefore a challenge to ‘grand’ theories or 
high-level abstraction, such as the sort favoured by space industry analyses 
to date which focus on nation-states (e.g. Siddiqi, 2010), militaries (e.g. 
Lachow, 1995), or international agreements (e.g. Lee, 2000). Within 
grounded theory these are irrelevant propositions unless the data explicitly 
supports such constructs (Ibid:84). The questions of this thesis – what roles 
do narratives play in the development of high-risk technologies, and how 
are they utilized within this development process – did not presuppose 
what forms of theory would emerge to answer those questions.  
 
Inductive reasoning and grounded theory both ensure that theoretical 
positions cannot be developed until ‘practices have been researched and 
the relevant local categories and differences have been encountered’ (Gad 
& Jensen, 2010:76). Actors should be ‘given voice in their own categories’ 
and allowed to classify and explain themselves (Ibid). In this way grounded 
theories draw directly from the actors – even if the actors disagree – with 
such information in turn informing subsequent directions of research, and 
all of their ‘voices’ should be represented, however disparate (Denzin, 
1998:173). This is why the categorization of interviewees as displayed in 
the Table 1 was informed entirely by how interviewees described their roles 
within the space sector, not those the researcher might assign to them. This 
also carries implications for the sorts of questions asked by interviewers – a 
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deductive approach would follow structured interviewing where the 
questions and topics are known in advance, while grounded theory 
necessitates open or semi-structured interviews (Ibid:84), as used in this 
research project. 
 
3.4. Data Analysis via Grounded Theory  
 
Data analysis began concurrently with the initial interviews. The process of 
data analysis followed the guidelines suggested by Charmaz (2006), who 
emphasizes the importance of carrying out data collection simultaneously 
alongside analysis of that same data; deriving analytic codes (categories 
and concepts which aid in organizing data) from this process rather than 
preconceived ideas; and that new transcriptions are consistently compared 
back to older transcripts to re-examine any previously-identified codes. This 
means theory was developed gradually and consistently throughout data 
collection, as in a grounded theory model. 
 
The questions posed by prior futures work in Chapter 2 formed the basis of 
my initial questioning. After approximately half a dozen interviews, it 
became apparent that (as discussed in the previous chapter) documentary 
evidence within the space industry would have been scarce and difficult to 
acquire had I pursued such a research design. As time progressed it also 
became clear that very little of the data I was gathering could be 
understood within the Space Race model I’d already examined (in Chapter 
1). Upon concluding the initial dozen interviews at the UK Space Industry, 
several new major themes involving the importance of different forms of 
futures began to emerge and recur. The questions asked in the semi-
structured interviews were also adapted as time went by, causing 
subsequent interviews to be slightly different from those that had come 
before. My questions were adapted over time as themes emerged in the 
early interviews, and the questions asked in later interviews – although 
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similar – sought to pursue theoretical saturation on the themes that had 
emerged earlier.  
 
I transcribed all twenty-six interviews, totalling a little over 100,000 words. I 
elected not to use a third-party transcription service in the hope that 
themes would emerge during the transcription process, and that the 
process of writing would aid me in identifying the connections between the 
comments of different interviewees. Although this process was difficult and 
time-consuming, it was indeed rewarding – many times throughout 
transcription I was able to identify potential codes, or note a theme that 
had come up many times previously, or notice that interviewees were 
talking about the same themes from varying perspectives. There were a 
number of points where in the process of transcription I picked up on a 
small comment or observation which might have been missed had I merely 
read them through after a third party transcription. These initial 
observations formed the foundation of subsequent coding.  
 
At the start of the research I intended to carry out coding activity using a 
software package, likely NVivo. However, I eventually elected not to make 
use of any electronic software for coding. My initial coding was done by 
hand in the transcription files in question, with the intention of shifting 
towards using software once more of the transcriptions were complete. 
However, this initial process immediately yielded concepts that were highly 
interesting and following these up by hand subsequently delayed my 
intended adoption of the software. The further I went with this coding by 
hand, the less I felt a piece of software would enhance the process. After a 
point I became concerned that using NVivo or another software package 
would risk breaking the flow of iterative interviewing and transcription that 
I was building up by hand, and might miss some of the nuances I was 
finding by having to read the transcriptions in more depth to identify 
themes, instead of simply searching for keywords. Instead of a software 
package I therefore closely examined the transcripts I had typed up and 
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began an iterative process of cross-referencing between them. This cross-
referencing was originally based on the broad themes identified during the 
transcription process. I attempted to collate as many interviewees as 
possible who had made similar comments to those identified in a given 
transcription, or who made disparate comments about the same themes. In 
this process I also identified new themes that had not been observed in my 
first reading, and several detailed themes not identified in prior futures 
work (which the analysis chapters will explore). In each subsequent reading 
I continued to carry out this two part process – further reinforcing 
identified themes, and attempting to discover new ones. That was a 
recursive process where both the codes I listed and the new literature I 
examined in response to these codes fed into one another, and this back-
and-forth proved an excellent way to pursue new avenues for 
understanding. New codes could be both explored in other transcripts and 
in prior scholarly work to verify their applicability to the research. Each 
transcript was read multiple times, approximately five times on average, 
although the densest transcripts were examined several times more and 
those from the interviewees who responded with only ‘official line’ answers 
were studied less. 
 
When creating the codes I was responsible for defining them, deciding 
what fell ‘within’ the purview of each code and what was distinct, and for 
deciding where to draw the line between broader and narrower codes. This 
also meant identifying which parts of the transcriptions had analytical value 
and which did not. There were a number of cases where part of a 
transcription was relevant to a number of codes – in this case I maintained 
that piece of interview in all the different codes, but in the analytical 
chapters I sought to avoid repeating a quote, and instead used them only in 
the sections where they were the most appropriate. This choice aided in 
clarifying and making more explicit the differences in the future narratives 
proposed in the three analysis chapters, but also demonstrated that some 
space programmes use a combination of the three narrative types. In some 
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cases there were lesser themes, such as the reasons for conservatism in the 
space industry identified in Chapter 5, and these were categorized 
separately. When the same theme was visible in multiple transcripts I 
pursued it further. In some cases a single interviewee would produce a lot 
of information on a topic, and in some cases a topic would be discussed to 
a lesser extent but by a large number of interviewees. Often it was issues 
relating to the role of scientific research in the space industry that were 
focused on a small number of transcripts, and observations about wider 
changes in the industry that were repeated across many interviewees. The 
codes identified also shifted as time went by from being primarily 
descriptive to more analytical in nature, resulting in the three-part typology 
this thesis presents.  
 
A period of approximately six months was spent examining the transcripts, 
developing codes, reading appropriate bodies of literature and beginning to 
write down and analyze my own thoughts. This resulted in a detailed and 
rigorous examination of the data in terms of both prior work on the space 
industry, futures and narratives, and also new bodies of work that the 
themes pointed towards. After an early iteration several dozen codes were 
identified, but by the final iteration most codes could be understood as 
belonging to one of three categories – ‘Planning’, ‘Mundanity’, and 
‘Credibility’. These three areas were very prominent across both a breadth 
of transcripts, and in significant depth in some particular transcripts.  
Chapter 4 is based on this first theme, Chapter 5 on the second, and 
Chapter 6 on the third. ‘Mundanity’ contained the largest number of 
smaller codes, whilst the other two consisted of a smaller number of sub-
codes. 
 
The three core concepts of finite, normalized and adaptive future narratives 
were thereby generated during the research as the most comprehensive 
and complete way to analyze the future narratives that predominate within 
the contemporary space industry. They also have significant potential 
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applicability across other high-technology domains. The initial development 
of this three-part typology throughout the interviewing process allowed for 
its verification against existing and future data, whilst also pointing towards 
potentially useful subsequent lines of enquiry in later interviews. Existing 
theories or ideas were either elaborated or challenged by incoming data, 
and in this way all theory was grounded and also frequently and 
meticulously examined in the light of prior work (Denzin, 1998:159). 
Theoretical preconceptions about the forms of future narrative that would 
be uncovered were avoided altogether by generating them from fresh data 
(Hodkinson, 2008:83). This thesis was begun with no preformed notions 
about future narratives in high-risk technological industries, nor the ways in 
which these narratives were used. As the data progressed, the central three 
tenets of the analysis – of the importance of planning and promises, the 
interplay between conservatism and innovation, and the importance of 
credibility – emerged, each with a particular form of future narrative 
associated with it. These were found to be related to not just the areas of 
futures work identified in Chapter 2, but also a number of other additional 
unanticipated fields. These additionally relevant fields included the 
quantification and qualification of scientific data and the concepts of spin-
off and scientific ‘inspiration’ (Chapter 4), the importance of internal 
working cultures and the unique nuances of the space environment 
(Chapter 5), and the roles of testing and standardization (Chapter 6). 
 
3.5. Ethical Considerations  
 
There were also a number of ethical considerations appropriate to the 
study due to its use of human participants rather than documentary 
evidence. When considering core ethical obligations to research 
participants, Diener and Crandall (1978) state that avoiding harm, ensuring 
informed consent, ensuring against invasions of privacy and preventing 
deception are the four most important cornerstones of ethical research. 
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Informed consent involves giving participants as much information as 
possible about the study before asking if they consent or not to be part of it 
(Kvale, 1996:112). Informed consent forms for the research stressed the 
voluntary nature of the study, the ability to refuse or withdraw at a given 
subsequent time from the study (BSA, 2004), that they will be recorded and 
transcribed, and the actual recording would be destroyed after 
transcription (Bryman, 2008:123; Kvale, 1996:114-5). Consent forms should 
also explain the research in terms which are ‘meaningful to the participant’ 
(BSA, 2004, my emphasis), not to the researcher, which I endeavoured to 
achieve. Some participants are likely to be unaware of academic 
conventions which may need imparting.  
 
Anonymity, another core of ethical research practice, should ensure 
participants cannot be identified (Bryman, 2008:11). However, Bryman 
follows on by suggesting a researcher cannot guarantee anonymity, and 
therefore should not claim they can, but rather promise to do everything 
realistically possible to ensure anonymity (Ibid:124), which was verbally 
expressed to interviewees. Similarly, the BSA Ethical Framework stresses 
not to give ‘unrealistic guarantees’ of confidentiality to interviewees (2004). 
There is also a practical reason for trying to ensure anonymity and 
confidentiality, even if interviewees may be talking to each other: if the 
researcher does not ensure privacy, who will be willing to be interviewed in 
the future if such a researcher reputation becomes known (Eysenbach & 
Till, 2001)? Kvale (1996:116) also states the importance of informing 
participants about the consequences and outcomes of the study and where 
and how their data will be used. The BSA Ethical Framework agrees (2004) 
and says that researchers have responsibility for ‘the use to which their 
data may be put’ and what effect this could have on participants. As all 
fieldwork intrudes on established relationships (Stacey 1991), interviewees 
may insist on privacy at times or on certain issues (Garforth, 2011), and this 
must be respected. Although the number was small, there were several 
topics that particular interviewees were unwilling to talk about, even ‘off 
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the record’. Whilst interviewees were more willing to discuss certain topics 
than to provide documentary evidence about those same topics, certain 
programmes or information about stakeholders in particular programmes 





The research was carried out via 26 semi-structured interviews with a range 
of individuals within the space sector. Interviewing was chosen primarily in 
order to ascertain first-hand appraisals of the creation of future narratives 
in the space sector and the roles they play, rather than waiting for the 
‘official line’ in subsequent documentary evidence produced about the 
same events. Whilst this was the primary reason for the selection of this 
methodology, the appropriateness of this choice was further strengthened 
by: a commitment to grounded theory and building up a typology based on 
data direct from individuals within the sector, not prior assumptions or 
official reports; the ability to examine actors within the space industry at 
different ranks and stations, and different stages in their careers; and lastly 
due to the paucity of documentary evidence available for an alternative 
textual analysis. The sampling of interviewees was carried out primarily via 
maximum variety sampling in order to pursue as representative a cross-
section of the space industry as possible. In some cases snowball sampling 
via organization also took place – I was sometimes recommended an 
organisation or private company whose members would merit study. In 
most cases, however, contact would be made with individuals or 
organizations that I had not been recommended, but had identified myself 
as representing a segment of the space industry that I had not yet 
examined. My selections of which potential interviewees to pursue, and 
which risked being too similar to prior interviews, resulted in a distribution 
of interviewees across all the key demographics of the space industry (as 
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defined by my interviewees) – public and private sectors, scientists, 
technologists, and those who worked in communications, industry ‘growth’, 
and Earth Observation. The last two of these were scarce, and few potential 
interviewees were identified in these areas, especially ‘growth’ where only 
a single employee appeared to be defined, or self-defined, as such. All 
interviews were informed by a strong ethical code of conduct that stressed 
anonymity and informed consent (to the greatest extent possible within a 
research design). The subsequent analysis of the next three chapters was 
carried out via inductive reasoning from the data gathered, and the three 
forms of future narratives conceptualized and explored in these chapters – 
finite, normalized and adaptive futures – were generated from the data 
gathered, and serve to illustrate the unusual forms of future narratives 





















Chapter Four: Finite Future Narratives:  




This chapter is the first of three analysis chapters in this thesis, and 
develops the concept of the ‘finite future narrative’. The finite future 
narrative is the first of three forms of future narrative – termed finite, 
normalized and adaptive – developed from the interview data to fill the 
theoretical gap identified in the first two chapters of this thesis: the role of 
future narratives in high-risk technologies, and how these are constructed 
and utilized. A finite future narrative consists of two parts. The first is the 
creation of a number of intermittent stages throughout the future narrative 
which allow actors to either yield interim benefits or track that the 
programme is proceeding accordingly (or both). This ‘roadmap’ is a 
construct which is designed to keep actors within the programme once 
they have joined, reduce the rate at which they may leave a high-risk 
development programme, and potentially entice actors who are not 
interested in the eventual goal but may be interested by a midpoint 
objective. The second part of a finite future narrative is the identification of 
a temporally specific conclusion for the programme, and an objective (or 
set of objectives) to go with it. This end-point is designed to bring to a close 
the substantive part of the programme – it should be completed by this 
date and the resultant technology functional – and also to conclude the 
temporal part of the programme by delineating a clear date beyond which 
the programme will not continue, no further resource inputs are required, 
and most importantly, the reward for contributing to the programme will 
be available. The objectives were also found invariably to be connected to a 
range of concepts beyond the ‘core’ goals of the specific programme, such 
as inspirational value, national pride and spin-off potential, which will also 
be assessed. The roadmaps and the eventual promised outcome(s) form 
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the two-part structure of a ‘finite future narrative’ which this chapter 
explores; these narratives were found to be focused primarily on mitigating 
the lengthy timescales of space programmes with only minimal reference 
to the risks of such programmes. The subsequent analysis draws on prior 
work identified in Chapter 2’s literature review of futures including that by 
Smith et al (2005), Michael (2000), and Jørgensen et al (2009), as well as a 
range of other literatures whose relevance emerged during data analysis. 
 
Having defined the finite future narrative and its constitutive elements, this 
chapter now proceeds to examine the research data gathered which 
supports this new definition. The roadmapping and planning section of this 
chapter begins by exploring the process of roadmapping and prediction 
within the space sector, summarizing the literature around technology 
roadmapping before then considering what precisely this process entails 
and what role it plays for a high-risk technology. The second part of the 
chapter then explores the predicted benefits and outcomes of space 
missions, the value of making these promises, and what they contribute to 
the construction of a finite future narrative. This is broken down into 
scientific benefits, concepts of ‘inspiration’ and national pride, and 
promises of ‘spin-off’ technology – the claim that technologies used in 
space missions, scientific or otherwise, will inevitably trickle-down towards 
commercial products and other non-space uses. The chapter then 
concludes by summarizing these functions of roadmaps and promised 
outcomes within finite future narratives, and how this concept helps 









4.2. Roadmapping and Planning 
 
4.2.1. Space Industry Roadmapping 
 
Throughout the research it became clear that ‘roadmaps’ were crucial to 
the success of high-risk industries such as the space industry, and in the 
subsequent analysis became classified as one of the two core parts of a 
finite future narrative. Roadmaps are documents or plans used to identify 
areas of ‘high potential promise’ (Kostoff & Schaller, 2001:132), generate 
long-term plans for a particular technology or area of industry by 
‘extending planning horizons’ (Phaal et al, 2004:6), and then to map out the 
steps required to bring those plans to fruition (Galvin, 1998). From this 
prior work it is immediately apparent that roadmaps are closely connected 
to long timescales of technological development, by specifying the 
temporal distance over which the programme needs to be planned, and 
then mapping out the steps towards the programme’s completion. This 
kind of planning seeks to overcome the uncertainties of distant futures 
(Michael, 2000). As Williams (2006) argues, if the future is accepted as 
being in any way uncertain or nondeterministic, this generates uncertainty 
in any programmes which project themselves far into that future, and the 
further the future is (Adam, 1995) the less certain it appears. Many 
interviewees argued for the value of roadmaps to the space industry when 
planning distant programme objectives: 
 
‘Any sector that’s worth its salt needs a roadmap.’  
(010, [Public, Technology]) 
 
‘Every time we were asked to fund – every time there is a big 
funding demand – I always ask to see the roadmap. For me it’s 
essential.’  




‘[Roadmaps are important because the space industry] is long-term 
and high-risk, but also because you need to bring a number of 
developments together, it’s not just one person building an 
instrument.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
Despite these statements of the integral importance of the roadmap, this 
praise was not universal. Whilst many acknowledged the importance of the 
roadmap and agreed that they were required for space programmes, there 
was a strong vein of cynicism and doubt about their accuracy and efficacy. 
Although interviewees generally argued that a roadmap was a way to 
document the process by which the programme can be achieved and that 
this documentation has a range of potential uses (explored in the following 
sections), there was equally an appreciation of the uncertainty inherent 
within future predictions: 
 
‘The only thing you ever know about any roadmap is that invariably 
it’s wrong.’  
(025, [Private, Technology]) 
 
‘I am constantly aware that exercises to try and completely scope 
and predict what you need to do in the future always fail.’ 
(015, [Private, Technology]) 
 
‘I don’t know of an accurate [roadmap]. I cannot think of a roadmap 
in my career that has got it anything like what actually happened.’  
(015, [Private, Technology]) 
 
To explore these apparently conflicting themes – that roadmaps are vital 
and essential, but may be acknowledged by all actors as being uncertain, 
fluid or simply incorrect – we turn to the work of Kostoff and Schaller 
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(2001:132). Their work on roadmaps argues that there are four ways in 
which roadmaps are designed to navigate the lengthy timescales of some 
technological developments – they argue that a roadmap ‘provides 
essential understanding, proximity, direction, and some degree of 
certainty’. Note that ‘accuracy’ – just as the above interviewees noted that 
roadmaps rarely turned out to be accurate – is not present within this list. 
According to Kostoff and Schaller’s work a roadmap is designed to achieve 
clarity and mutual consensus across a range of actors, to make the 
programme (or intermittent steps within the programme) appear 
proximate and less distant, to give a clear direction and focus to the 
programme, and to give a degree of certainty which can generate 
consensus and agreement, even if that same certainty (as the research data 
showed) may not necessarily be borne out as the programme continues. 
Accuracy, although beneficial and desirable, is not essential. This section 
will now cover the interview data that pointed towards the appropriateness 
of Kostoff and Schaller’s description for roadmaps in the space industry 
context, and will conclude by showing how roadmaps are designed around 
these four factors in order to negotiate long timescales, and in turn 
contribute to a finite future narrative for a high-risk programme. 
 
4.2.2. Roadmaps as ‘Understanding’: Frameworks for Achieving 
Consensus 
 
Interviewee data showed that roadmaps are designed to make the 
objective of the dominant frame in a high-risk technology appear as clear, 
transparent, and unambiguous as possible. This, in turn, was a method for 
achieving a level of consensus between actors within the programme, 
ideally ensuring that this clear single image of the technology is shared 
between all actors and that there is neither any confusion over this 
objective, nor confusion over what is required from each actor in order to 
make it a reality. One interviewee described the challenge of getting all 
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relevant actors to agree on a vision for a programme, and the importance 
of a roadmap in achieving this successfully: 
 
‘A credible roadmap shows there is a lot of thinking behind it, and I 
think if a company is really investing in something and it’s of 
importance to them, they should roadmap it pretty well, but it’s a 
very difficult exercise. You have 20 or 30 players in the same room 
[or] different types of technologies, [so] it is a very difficult task.’ 
(012, [Public, Private, Technology, Comms]) 
 
This comment shows that a roadmap is designed to reach a middle-ground 
of consensus between all the actors involved. A wide range of 
heterogeneous actors may make the creation of a roadmap a ‘difficult task’, 
but a successful roadmap should be one that takes account of all those 
involved. As Brown (2003) argues, developing this kind of consensus 
roadmap aims to prevent the departure of actors by tethering those actors 
to the fate of the programme so that all will share in its success or its 
failure. It stabilizes technical activity (Smith et al, 2005) by creating a 
roadmap in which all relevant actors have a part to play, defining their roles 
and stressing the importance of each and every role to the programme’s 
success. In addition to the number of actors, interviewees also commented 
on the significance of recruiting a variety of actors when creating 
roadmaps. One echoed the importance of working across disciplinary and 
industrial boundaries as the above quote implied, and ensuring that a 
roadmap is something where all relevant actors can ‘concentrat[e] effort’: 
 
‘[A roadmap] isn’t something we sit in a cubicle and invent. We work 
very closely with industry and academia in agreeing those 
roadmaps, so we have areas where we know we are likely to require 
a level of concentration of effort.’ 




Similarly, another stressed the importance of settling upon agreed 
objectives at the start of the programme’s development and subsequently 
codifying this appropriately into a roadmap, otherwise it will be a challenge 
to achieve meaningful consensus later in the programme’s development 
between so many different actors. The Ministry of Justice and the Home 
Office are mentioned in this quote due to the example the interviewee 
used being one focused on the concept of using satellite technology to 
track offenders who have been electronically tagged: 
 
‘You then look at the procurement contracts coming around defining 
what the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office need, what their 
requirements are, and if you don’t influence those requirements at 
the right time, it’ll be a right job to get them to change what that 
requirement is to fit the technology you’ve designed something to 
solve their problem. Similarly, convincing them to write the 
specifications for their future programme about something you 
haven’t even done yet is equally challenging.’ 
(011, [Public, Technology]) 
 
Both of these quotes emphasize the importance of constructing consensus 
– or as Kostoff and Schaller (2001) might put it, generating a shared 
understanding – for the programme. This consensus must be achieved 
given both the significant number and significant variation of involved 
actors. The first quote of the above two shows the roadmap designers’ 
attempts to create a strong and resilient programme by connecting it to a 
wide number of actors (Deuten & Rip, 2000). The wider the range of actors 
involved the more robust the programme’s scenario of future development 
will be, and the more resources and interests can be rallied to its support 
(Borup et al, 2006:290). The second quote emphasizes the importance of 
creating roadmaps at the start of a programme (as part of creating a finite 
future narrative) in order to line up the objectives of the developers and 
customers of the technology – the later this process is left, the more 
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challenging consensus becomes after resources and effort become 
committed in other directions. This returns us to Elzinga’s (2004) 
observation previously noted in Chapter 2, that futures – in this case, 
roadmaps – can be used to build consensus within a programme involving 
disparate actors. A roadmap is used to create consensus over the shared 
vision of the future (Brown, 2003), gather as wide a range of actors into the 
programme as possible, and tie those actors into the success of the 
programme. 
 
4.2.3. Roadmaps as ‘Proximity’: Codifying Steps towards Completion 
 
Achieving roadmap consensus across those involved in a roadmap and 
agreeing upon the roles they will play was identified above as the first stage 
in the creation of a successful roadmap. This was in turn found to lead to 
the creation and explicit highlighting of intermittent goals and milestones 
on that path. High-risk roadmaps are designed to outline and codify the 
steps required to reach the programme’s eventual goal. Kostoff and Schaller 
(2001:133) argue that technology roadmaps can be seen as consisting of 
‘nodes and links’ which take the form of a step-by-step process which the 
programme is expected to meet, and this is a concept supported by two 
interviewees. The first interviewee described the path of nodes and links as 
a series of ‘credible milestones’ which all the actors should agree on as part 
of the consensus described above, whilst the second echoed this sentiment 
and the importance of milestones to those investing in a space programme: 
 
‘The roadmap there, the whole idea behind it is exactly to give it the 
kind of credibility, to put credible milestones into the trajectory to 
get us to the target we already had.’ 




‘Confidence for investors: at each milestone that’s key, as it builds 
confidence in the overall programme.’ 
(016, [Private, Technology]) 
 
As a part of a finite future narrative, roadmaps lend certainty to a 
potentially uncertain aspect of the programme – how will we get from our 
present position to the programme’s objective? A roadmap quantifies and 
codifies the interim steps of the temporally lengthy programme. These 
steps have not yet taken place, but can be ‘reliably’ predicted. The 
objective here is the creation of a ‘taken-for-granted’ framework (Wynne, 
1983:15) which acts as a shared vision of the steps of a programme’s 
development. Much as the roadmap emphasizes consensus over the roles 
of those involved, it also emphasizes the trajectory (cf. Balmer, 1993:473) 
that needs to be followed for a successful development. Many of these 
steps will be within only weeks or months of the programme’s 
development, allowing for initial positive feedback that the programme is 
on track, and by placing intermittent goals, the distant eventual goal of the 
entire programme appears more feasible and less distant (cf. Michael, 
2000:32). Equally, as the second interviewee argued, each new milestone 
brings with it confidence that the programme is proceeding as expected, a 
confidence generated by the programme’s continued adherence to the 
step-by-step process laid out in the initial roadmap.  These interim steps 
could take many forms – conclusion of a particular test, the acquisition of 
new funding, or most importantly a ‘meeting’ with another technology at 
an explicit point in the future, which the next section explores. 
 
4.2.4. Roadmaps as ‘Direction’: Meeting up with Future Technologies 
 
While many of these points will be metrics of money committed, 
components finished or support acquired, other milestones may be the 
acquisition and use of other technologies which are expected to reach a 
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particular state at some point down the line. The research showed that 
high-risk technological developments are sufficiently long-term that it 
becomes vital to consider what other technologies may appear during the 
programme’s development. These are technologies ‘outside’ the high-risk 
development programme, but which – if their developments are completed 
on-time – will be of use in the high-risk programme at some point in the 
future. Several interviewees elaborated upon this point: 
 
‘You’ve got to do things in the right order and with the right degree 
of confidence, and you’ve got to make sure the brick in the wall 
below the one you’re building is firm.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
‘Roadmapping when you’ve got a specific goal is an exercise to 
make sure you’ve got all your technology ducks lined up to meet 
that specific goal.’ 
(015, [Private, Technology]) 
 
Predicting the order of future technologies and what other technologies 
will be available in the future to be added to the programme is highly 
challenging due to the difficulty of generating accurate predictions over 
large temporal distances (Nordlund, 2012). If there is a particular 
technology which will be required at a late stage of the programme’s 
development, those running the programme are faced with a difficult 
decision. If they do not plan to use predicted future technology, their 
programme may lose out to a competing programme that does organize 
itself to use future technologies not yet developed; alternatively if they do 
plan to ‘meet up’ with the future technology, they must acknowledge the 
possibility of that technology’s failure and the subsequent problems their 
own programme would run into. A space programme might begin in the 
knowledge that one particular component cannot yet be flown, but on the 
assumption that the other company or industry working on it will have it 
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finished within X years, the programme goes forward to ‘meet’ that 
development at the predicted time. Not only must the high-risk programme 
be planned, but other technologies or processes that may lead into it at 
later stages must also be accounted for, and in turn, the roadmap directed 
towards those which may be of use. Seeking to understand the likely 
creation of other future technologies is therefore essential for the 
roadmapping stage of a high-risk programme. If the future can be 
accurately stated, products and technologies can be developed now to gain 
an advantage in that future (Brown, 2003), and the roadmap’s direction can 
be set to take full advantage of these predicted future technologies. 
 
Crucially, by having a roadmap that handles the uncertainty of future 
technologies or processes required for the programme by predicting them 
in the roadmap, a significant source of uncertainty in a high-risk 
programme is ‘removed’. The roadmap, consisting of a series of interim 
steps upon which consensus has been reached, serves to reassure actors 
that many potential stumbling-blocks within a programme have been 
planned for, assessed, and found to be negotiable when the time comes. 
This positions the context of ‘the future’ as being exogenous (de Laat, 
2000:179) to a given programme, simultaneously acknowledging that the 
future cannot be controlled, but arguing that it can nevertheless be 
anticipated. A particular component or process may not exist yet, but it 
will, and it can be planned and moved towards. A major negative impact of 
the significant temporal dimension is mitigated, though not fully negated, 
by the use of a roadmap in this way. The roadmap is made to look focused 
and directed rather than at the whim of an unknown future, and the actors 
are tied into a consensus about the nature and accuracy of this predicted 
future trajectory. In this way roadmaps handle the long timescales of high-
risk developments by attempting to assess the future changes of other 
technologies, decide whether any of those will be of use in the future, and 
then reduce the perception of long-term future uncertainty by including 
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these predictions within the roadmap as milestones that give direction to 
the programme’s development. 
 
4.2.5. Roadmaps as ‘Certainty’: Accurate Prediction and Backup Options 
 
Last of Kostoff and Schaller’s four observations about the value of 
roadmapping is the generation of ‘certainty’ (2001:132). As we have seen 
above, roadmaps serve three other purposes. They are used to build 
consensus across a range of actors which helps to maintain the programme 
over many years; to codify a number of intermittent steps so that there is a 
clear and distinct sense of progress, and offer interim milestones that may 
be important to different actors; and consider the future, assess the 
technologies that may arise in that future irrespective of the programme’s 
development, and attempt to account for some of the programme’s future 
uncertainty by predicting and promising ‘meetings’ with these other 
technologies further down the line. The third of these points brings us onto 
the fourth identified value of the roadmap – using these predicted 
meetings to emphasize a level of certainty in the roadmap's future by 
stressing the technologies that will be in place in the future for the high-risk 
programme to use, a concept which builds upon the ‘direction’ concept 
explored in the previous section. 
 
As we have seen, a roadmap can attempt to ‘meet up’ with a technology in 
the future, thereby bringing actors surrounding that other technology into 
the programme and tethering them, at least in part, to its success or 
failure. However, what happens if that other technology fails to be ‘ready’ 
in time for use in the high-risk programme a year or a decade down the 
line? Several interviewees argued that roadmaps contain a level of 
flexibility in order to deal with this issue, and this section will show that 
such flexibility is actually designed to increase the level of certainty of a 
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roadmap. Interviewees had the following to say about the kind of flexibility 
worked into high-risk roadmaps:  
 
‘Your roadmap is useless unless you’re constantly tuning it. You do a 
twenty-year roadmap because you need to, but you’re not going to 
believe the world is actually going to be like that in twenty years. It’s 
just a guide to make sure you’re moving in the right general 
direction.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
 ‘There are some products which have a longer development cycle, 
and there you can see the roadmap, and there’s others which are 
perhaps a bit easier to develop and bring to market, there the 
roadmap exercise needs to be a bit looser.’ 
(012, [Public, Private, Technology, Comms]) 
 
‘We give guidance, but I usually leave a loophole that [future 
technologies] are not exclusive, so if someone’s got a good idea, it’ll 
come in.’ 
(005, [Public, Science]) 
 
These quotes demonstrate that a sufficiently flexible roadmap helps 
negotiate the long timescales of high-risk programmes, allowing a 
programme to adjust and reorient itself if a given technology fails to 
materialize, or if something entirely unexpected changes the market or the 
range of available technologies. For example, one interviewee mentioned 
the Skylon spaceplane currently in development in the United Kingdom 
(the case study of Chapter 5) in this context. Much of the Skylon 
programme has been sold on its promise to launch satellites far faster and 
significantly cheaper than traditional chemical rockets. From the 
perspective of customers manufacturing satellites for future deployment, 
Skylon appears to be one of these technologies that can be ‘met’ and 
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utilized in the future. However, this interviewee argued that satellite-
builders are hedging their bets and developing flexible roadmaps that could 
incorporate Skylon, or ignore it, as appropriate to Skylon’s status in the 
future: 
 
‘Skylon might be viable [in 5-10 years] – let’s assume it is. But do 
you take the risk and design your spacecraft for Skylon, and then 
Skylon’s delayed, or do you make sure that at the very least you 
have a backup and it can fly on the Ariane 51?’ 
(021, [Public, Science]) 
 
They may prefer to meet up with Skylon’s development further down the 
line, but if Skylon’s development slows, they will nevertheless be able to 
launch on existing rockets. These roadmaps thus adopt something akin to a 
lay notion of STS into roadmapping – that the successful technology is the 
one which changes and adapts to the shifting context (cf. Smith et al, 2005). 
If the potential technology is in place at the correct time, advantage may be 
gained, but there will ideally remain a ‘future proofed’ fall-back option that 
can be pursued if the desired outcome is not met. In the case above, 
therefore, even if an actor wants to use Skylon they will nevertheless 
future-proof their programme by making sure the same mission can 
function with existing chemical rockets in case Skylon fails to come to 
fruition, lending a degree of resilience to the programme.  
 
Future-proofing is therefore an important aspect of high-risk futures not 
anticipated in the initial literature review. Whilst currently lacking an 
explicit definition among scholars (Georgiadou et al, 2012), future proofing 
is best understood as the process of attempting to protect or prepare for 
unexpected future events. Anderson (2008:561) argues that although the 
future is not fully predictable, it is far from being ‘completely unpredictable’ 
                                                 
1      Standard European launch vehicle (a chemical rocket). 
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and current technology and practice can offer ‘powerful hints’ about what 
may be true in future years or decades, and these hints can be used to 
future-proof technologies and systems for what may arise in the future. 
This kind of future-proofing is designed to reduce the risk of technological 
obsolescence (Woolley, 2003) by constructing technologies or particular 
infrastructures with a level of flexibility that can readily adjust to new 
developments. Future-proofing has been identified as being increasingly 
relevant the longer the timescales that are being assessed (Georgiadou et 
al, 2012), as we see here with space programmes – the longer the 
programme, the greater the requirement to future-proof the programme in 
terms of what other technologies may arise in the increasingly uncertain 
and distant future (cf. Adam, 1995; Nordlund, 2012). It is also useful to note 
the emphasis in future-proofing on accepting future changes, rather than 
resisting them. Lucquiaud et al (2011) explicitly state the importance of 
future proofing to be ready to incorporate future developments, not merely 
to continue the status quo in light of the future, or to respond to the 
future. It is this role that roadmaps adopt for the space industry: they 
attempt to position themselves so that future technological developments 
may be incorporated, regardless of what eventual forms those 
developments take.  
 
This ‘flexibility’ therefore actually translates into an unusual form of 
certainty. The flexibility emphasizes that a future technology of some sort 
will be ready when it is needed, rather than stating that a specific 
technology will be ready. A high-risk programme that relies on a specific 
technology being available in the future will look far less certain than one 
with a range of similar technologies to choose from when the time arises. 
By utilizing other predicted technologies via future-proofing, a high-risk 
programme appears certain despite its long timescale, and any uncertainty 
is instead shifted onto other actors who must strive to complete their own 
developments on time, or risk being left behind. Therefore, in returning to 
the work of Brown (2003), we see this as a method to tie these actors into 
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the success of the programme, whilst not in turn tethering the programme 
to the success of these other actors. If the technologies are met, the high-
risk programme appears to have accurately predicted the future; if the 
technologies are not met, the high-risk programme appears to have 
prudently hedged its bets and kept its options open. Either way the future 
of the programme appears certain whether or not the ‘first choice’ 
technologies and components are ready on time.  
 
In this way roadmaps can bring other technologies and other actors into 
the programme by promising them a form of certainty, as roadmaps are 
designed to hedge their bets and ensure that there are backups and 
redundancies if specific technologies are not ready for use at the right time. 
Roadmaps are able to take some of the inherent uncertainty of a 
programme that may take years or decades to complete and, in a clever 
narratological manoeuvre, define this uncertainty by building a level of 
expected flexibility into the roadmap. This reinforces the certainty of the 
finite future narrative – uncertainty is acknowledged but contained within 
clear, delineated and finite boundaries. Rather than treating the 
uncertainty of the programme’s future as an issue, high-risk technology 
roadmaps instead reposition the uncertainty as an expected and ordinary 
part of the programme, and one that can actually be predicted and planned 
for. A good roadmap is therefore designed to use these future promises to 
both encourage contributions from actors over a long timescale and reduce 
the perceived uncertainty of that timescale, whilst keeping the high-risk 
programme secure if these other actors fail to meet their obligations. 
 
4.2.6. Summary of Roadmapping and High-Risk Technology Timescales 
 
Roadmaps are a formalized form of future planning, condensed into 
detailed documents and plans, which are distributed throughout all those 
involved in a programme. They possess a clear step-by-step sequence of 
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goals rather than a single end-point objective. They are designed to carry 
out four activities – to establish multi-actor consensus over the 
programme’s development, establish the proximity of desirable interim 
objectives, reduce uncertainty by promising the development of other 
future technologies which can then be used in the programme, whilst 
simultaneously seeking to future-proof the high-risk programme itself by 
ensuring a range of possible solutions to these requirements. As Garcia and 
Bray (1997) note, roadmaps vary in length from anywhere between a few 
months to many decades, and the interview and literature analysis above 
shows that the roadmaps of the space industry are specifically designed for 
navigating the longest of possible timescales via the above methods. 
 
These roadmaps (both on their own and as an element of the finite future 
narrative this chapter proposes) are concerned with the long timescales of 
high-risk programmes, not the perceived risk of these programmes. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, this temporal dimension was a regular theme in the 
high-risk literature explored at the beginning of this research, but a topic 
that rarely came to the foreground when compared with the dominant 
discourse of high-risk as the most important factor in complex and tightly-
coupled (Perrow, 1999) technologies. From interviewee comments it 
became clear that roadmaps were designed with the timescales of high-risk 
programmes as their primary concern and little reference to ‘risk’ was 
made. This analysis therefore marks the first point in the research at which 
the temporal dimension appeared to be just as important as the risk 
dimension, and as research continued the importance of temporality only 
became more prominent. 
 
Although a roadmap does conclude with the final objective(s) of a 
programme, the two are analytically separated within this chapter. This is 
because the concept of the finite future narrative is distinct from a 
roadmap in one core way – it is equal parts outcome and intermittent 
promises. Whilst a roadmap must naturally make an eventual promise for 
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the conclusion of the programme, as the second part of this chapter shows 
there are many aspects of these promises which cannot be seen simply 
from examining a roadmap, and a roadmap focuses specifically on the 
process of reaching the goal, not necessarily the goal itself. A finite future 
narrative is the combination of the promises – and any external factors and 
concepts that accompany them – and the roadmap that leads towards 
them. Just as Michael (2000) argues that orientating technological futures 
towards clear and specific goals is strongly beneficial to their success, so 
too is the construction of an explicit path to those goals in the form of the 
roadmap. With the discursive construct of the roadmap described and its 
temporal orientation examined, we now turn to the range of promises 
identified in the research as predicted outcomes for space programmes. 
 
4.3. Predicted Benefits and Outcomes 
 
The second part of finite future narratives are the predicted benefits that 
come with the programme. Although roadmaps do possess a clear 
conclusion beyond which the roadmap does not extend, their focus is more 
on maintaining interest and commitment from a range of actors, managing 
future technologies and developments that may be relevant to the 
programme, and future-proofing such long-term developments by 
rationalizing future uncertainty as an expected and managed part of such 
programmes. A programme’s selection of promised benefits (Jørgensen et 
al, 2009) were found to extend significantly beyond the roadmap 
associated with a technology, and form the second element of finite future 
narratives. Many of these are connected to concepts or societal 
developments outside a specific programme, whilst others are designed to 
recruit the support of actors new to the space industry. 
 
Most of these predicted benefits are specific ways of presenting the 
dominant frame of a programme: rephrasing or repositioning the 
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programme’s objectives to appeal to a range of interested parties. An 
objective to study the surface of Mars, for example – an outcome which at 
first glance may appear to have only abstract scientific benefit – may be 
presented as a way to demonstrate a nation’s technological supremacy, as a 
method for testing new scientific equipment, or pushing a certain 
technology forward which may later have use in other industries. New 
technologies can thereby be linked by their proponents to desirable social 
and political outcomes (Laird, 2003) as well as desirable technological ones, 
even if the roadmap may only make explicit mention of the technical. 
 
This section will now outline some of the promises offered by space 
missions, and seek to understand how these promises are created and used 
within finite future narratives. It begins by exploring space science missions 
and how the scientific ‘value’ of these missions is defined. Whilst the focus 
of the UK’s space policy is explicitly commercial, the UK contributes to a 
wide number of ESA space science programmes. A number of interviewees 
worked either primarily or only on science missions, whilst others who 
were not directly involved also gave valuable input. The discussion then 
moves onto other benefits promised in the space industry. The first of 
these is inspiration – the claim that high-risk technologies have an 
unquantifiable inspirational value – and the chapter explores how this 
claim can be an important part of a finite future narrative for such 
technologies. The chapter then moves onto exploring the role of national 
pride in such programmes, focusing on the extent to which such a concern 
remains an issue of contemporary relevance for decision-making in high-
risk sectors. It then considers the fourth and final identified promise which 
supports finite future narratives: the concept of ‘spin-off’. This is the claim 
that some processes and technical knowledge gathered or developed in a 
high-risk programme may find a use elsewhere, primarily in consumer 
products or more ‘practical’ applications. The research data showed that 
spin-off is understood within the space industry through the theoretical 
lens of ‘basic science’, and that it is subsequently deployed as a method for 
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gaining interest from commercial and private actors. The chapter then 
summarizes the use of these predictions in finite future narratives, and how 
they are combined with roadmaps and plans to aid the development of 
high-risk technologies. 
 
4.3.1. Space Science Programmes 
 
Scientific benefits of space technology have been a central justification for 
state investment into the sector since the beginning of the ‘Space Age’ 
(Swaminathan, 2005). For example, NASA has used a rationale called 
‘discovery-driven’ exploration (Cornelius, 2005:42) in which ‘compelling 
scientific opportunities’ are supposed to be the primary drivers behind 
assigning investment and development. Similarly, ESA carry out science 
missions to pursue a ‘thirst for knowledge’ (IBP USA, 2011:18) and 
international collaboration (ESA, 2014), whilst the UK pursues missions that 
will ‘increase understanding of space science and its practical benefits’ 
(UKSA, 2014). This perspective on the importance of scientific progress in 
space technology was strongly reiterated by several interviewees: 
 
‘You should be funding the things […] that expand the intellectual 
environment as much as possible.’ 
(011, [Public, Technology]) 
 
‘Then you get back into the noble science debate – if we don’t do it, 
it’ll never happen – so let’s get on and do it. In general [science 
missions] are done for the benefit of science itself.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
When I sought to explore the process by which science missions are 
selected and how those which ‘expand the intellectual environment as 
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much as possible’ are chosen, one interviewee provided a detailed 
explanation of how they perceived the process: 
 
 ‘[Missions are] very much selected on a science basis. So there are 
calls for ideas and you find industry and academia working together 
to submit those proposals, but those proposals in the end are 
selected for the scientific impact. And they are ranked in that way, 
so there’s a committee of scientific big-bods that are brought 
together at a European level, and they decide and they rank those 
missions, and that ranking is then presented to the board that I go 
to, and we’re then told you have to agree with this, or you disagree, 
but we never disagree.’ 
(006, [Public, EO, Technology]) 
 
In this example the interviewee argued that science missions begin by 
recruiting scientists, who upon deciding on an objective are then able to (in 
an apparently unproblematic manner) garner political and economic 
support. In this way the interviewees argued that an eventual objective of 
new scientific knowledge was the key factor for recruiting those who would 
be part of such programmes. Scientific objectives are described and ranked, 
and despite the difficulty of producing objective predictions or summaries 
(Schatzberg, 2004; Adam, 1995; etc), such ranking carries significant 
weight. As the above quote shows, even if those on the political side of 
decision-making might not agree with the scientific objectives set or the 
value of those objectives, they are expected to defer to the scientific 
judgement. The goal of scientific excellence should, by this logic, be 
sufficient to garner political support, and be a compelling objective for a 
finite future narrative. Similarly, another interviewee raised a number of 
interesting points not just about the process of scientific selection, but how 





‘If you disagree with the scientific recommendation, then each and 
every one of us will be bringing in their national wants and it would 
be mayhem around the table. Imagine twenty of us with different 
priorities. So you have to rest and be guided by what the scientific 
committee is recommending in terms of the highest science impact, 
because that’s the nature of the programme, then you take that 
forward. There’s a huge scientific review behind it.’ 
(006, [Public, EO, Technology]) 
 
This passage makes two very specific points – firstly, that if political factors 
were allowed to influence a mission (‘political’ taken here to mean non-
scientific) there would be ‘mayhem’ and an inability to reach consensus. 
Secondly, it implicitly posits that there can be no disagreement over the 
scientific value of a mission. This apparently unproblematic assessment 
brings both a level of security and reassurance to political or economic 
actors initially involved, whilst also allowing them to deploy these same 
promises of scientific neutrality and accuracy to recruit future actors in 
subsequent stages of the programme. According to this model, the agendas 
for space science missions are determined solely by the scientific 
consensus, and the scientific community will indeed reach a clear 
consensus every time it comes together to arbitrate on future missions.  
 
However, other interviews countered these perspectives on space science, 
and significant debate and uncertainty was identified in the research data 
in terms of the value of science and the methods of selecting the ‘best’ 
possible science. Despite the emphasis on scientific rationality and 
objectivity (cf. Rip, 2003) displayed in the above four quotes, all future-
orientated debates contain implicit goals and conflicts (Laird, 2003) and 
scientific debates are no different. This was observed by another 
interviewee, who emphasized that there are internal scientific rivalries with 




‘You have interdisciplinary rivalries. So the solar system people are 
arguing for their missions rather than the astronomy one or the 
fundamental physics one. So there is always a healthy process of 
debate, put it that way. And most often it is healthy…’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
This situation occurs because different scientific missions are ‘essential’ for 
different groups, but not necessarily to the scientific community as a 
whole. Speaking of NASA’s priorities, Cornelius (2005) raises this issue, 
echoing the above quote: 
 
‘[Agencies must make] decisions in subjective and uncertain 
environments about the relative long-term value of different kinds 
of scientific discoveries that are seen as equally important to 
different groups. In this capacity, the agency's leaders will find 
themselves arbitrating between the desires of various scientific 
communities that cannot easily generate consensus on objectives or 
priorities.’ (Cornelius, 2005:44) 
 
Those who decide on the objectives of space science programmes will be 
forced to choose between the equally ‘pressing’ needs of different 
scientific communities who may not be able to reach an overall consensus. 
Two groups may both feel their programmes are of equal importance to 
their disciplines, but selecting a single mission that is of the greatest 
importance to ‘science’ as a whole is the far more challenging task. It 
therefore appears that the selection of space science programmes may be 
a more complex task than it first appears, and a significant volume of 
comments from other interviewees supports such an assertion. 
 
Two forms of scientific promise were identified in the research data which 
are used to arbitrate between multiple different scientific communities. 
These are whether the science carried out will be of ‘breakthrough’ quality, 
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and whether it will produce a large number of publications and citations. 
The scientific promises made by science missions – and therefore the 
promises by which science missions are selected – within the space sector 
break down into these two key categories which will now be analyzed, and 
each is a powerful driver towards supporting high-risk space technologies 
as part of a finite future narrative.  
 
4.3.2. Scientific Impacts, Breakthroughs, and Citation Metrics 
 
Interviewees described a two-part system of scientific benefits, whereby 
the benefits of space science are quantified – by tracking the number of 
scientific papers produced by the development programme – and qualified 
– by the designation of scientific research produced by such programmes as 
‘breakthroughs’, and therefore of benefit to human knowledge (be it 
‘practical’ or ‘academic’). It is these two ‘pure’ scientific benefits of space 
science we look to first as major promises deployed by the space industry. 
 
Interview data showed that the value of scientific research from such high-
risk technologies is quantified by the number of papers published. 
Although in the case of the space industry one might expect these papers 
to be limited to physics or astronomy, the outcomes of space science may 
range in fact across many different domains, and include interdisciplinary 
thought. Asked about how the benefits of space science are understood, 
one interviewee said the following: 
 
‘For scientific missions there’s a very specific way you measure the 
impact.’ 
(002, [Public, Science]) 
  
This statement referred to the publication of scientific papers, and the way 
in which this is used as a distinct promised outcome in high-risk 
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technological development requires unpicking. The use of the word 
‘measure’ stresses that the impact can be quantified, rather than qualified. 
Most natural sciences value quantitative data over qualitative (Ezzy, 2001) – 
there is a shared perception that quantitative data is more valuable, more 
detailed, and more scientific than qualitative, which is seen as being more 
down to judgement and opinion than objectivity and rationality. As above, 
this perception of quantitative data – in both planning and predicted 
outcomes – is essential to recruiting disparate actors into such lengthy 
programmes. As we have seen in the earlier examination of roadmaps, a 
compelling argument for objectivity bolsters the apparent realism of the 
goals, and therefore the potential value of the programme. Following on 
from this assumption that qualitative assessments are subjective but 
quantitative assessments remain objective, the idea that the impact can be 
measured is an attempt to objectively prove that space science does have 
value, and also serves to deflect any criticisms that the impact of space 
science might be subjective and is only really of use or interest to scientists 
working on a given programme. In turn, it simultaneously means such 
programmes can offer clear quantitative goals in their future narratives in 
terms of predicted publications. Another interviewee expressed it thus: 
 
‘So with really big missions like XMM2 […] it produces a new peer-
reviewed scientific paper every working day. Someone somewhere 
around the world is using that data, so literally thousands of 
scientific papers have come out of it and it has been very impactful, 
whilst smaller missions might produce fifty or a hundred scientific 
papers. So that’s for science where you measure the impact through 
the citations in the scientific press.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
                                                 
2       ‘X-Ray Multi-Mirror Mission – Newton’, an X-Ray observatory satellite 







The quantification of scientific value through papers and citations is clear 
from this quote. It also makes an important assumption – that the ‘best’ 
science or the most significant breakthroughs will automatically rise to the 
top. If the only way of measuring scientific impact is through citations, this 
assumes a perfect system where the number of citations directly correlates 
to the value of the scientific work. Numerous works (e.g. Peterson, 1988; 
Aaltojärvi, 2008) have shown this to not be the case; citations are heavily 
dependent on the names of those involved in a piece of work, the countries 
in which the work is carried out (or in this case where the scientific team is 
based), the discipline of the work in question, and a number of other 
agendas and external factors. Nevertheless a citations-based approach 
gives the impression of objectivity, and as above, attempts to clearly and 
objectively quantify the value of the programme. The number of 
publications and citations are key elements of understanding the impact, or 
perceived impact, of scientific missions in the space sector. In turn, the 
promise of citations and publications is a strong driver for those promising 
primarily scientific benefits from high-risk development, as within the 
space industry the concept of ‘science’ has become ‘enshrined in papers’ 
(Balmer & Sharp, 1993:474) whose eventual quantity is considered an 
important measurement of programme desirability. By the conclusion of 
the roadmap for a finite future narrative the predicted approximate volume 
of publications should have been met, and these promised publications 
promise significant value for promoting careers, future missions and future 
lines of scientific enquiry. The promise of publications and citations is thus 
a core promise for the development of certain high-risk technologies, and a 
way by which the value of the programme may subsequently be 
‘measured’. 
 
However, qualifying the value of scientific output was also found to be 
important. A key method for describing key events in science, the 
‘breakthrough motif’ is used to lend a level of importance, credibility and 
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lasting impact to a particular scientific development or discovery (Brown, 
2000:88-89). Along with citations, it forms the second method identified in 
the research that is used to define the impacts of space science. However, 
to understand breakthrough and examine the interview data that 
supported this analysis of the qualification of scientific data, it must first be 
positioned in contrast to the ‘discovery’. Woolgar (1976:400,414-419) 
argues that a ‘discovery’ contains a level of uncertainty about the narrative 
of what actually took place – who was responsible? How was it 
‘discovered’? Was it luck, skill, some combination, and were external 
factors involved? The concept of the breakthrough, by contrast, is implicitly 
problematized (Brown, 2000). It posits a particular challenge that was 
known beforehand – a problem that needed a solution – and that one was 
subsequently found. It presents nature as not something that is unknown 
and needs to be explored in order to discover how it functions, but rather 
emphasizes the role of human agency. For a high-risk technological 
programme, breakthrough is presented in this way: those supporting the 
programme have identified a problem, and identified how to deal with the 
problem. The objective and the way to reach that objective are both 
carefully planned, examined, and finite. It lacks the uncertainty of the 
‘discovery’ which may have been accidental or tangential to ongoing 
research, or the result of a more abstract, unfocused investigation (which, 
as we have seen, have fallen out of favour with the increasing need to 
justify the societal and economic value to high-risk technology 
development). As Brown puts it: 
 
‘[Breakthrough is] probably the most powerfully future oriented 
metaphor within the current disclosure repertoire of science and 
science journalism. In other words, it lends itself to the construction 
of a future in a way that other forms of disclosure representation, 




The breakthrough motif proposes a distinct single point in the future which 
will herald a significant change or development, rather than the more 
nebulous promises of a predicted discovery. Breakthroughs also tie easily 
into grander and broader narratives (Lyotard, 1984) of societal progress and 
advancement and serve to signify disjuncture – these are not just the 
normal gradual, iterative development of science nor the uncertain 
exploration that may lead to a ‘discovery’, but rather demonstrate either a 
move forward that was greater than usual, or a move into an entirely new 
area of scientific enquiry. The appeal of this is clear – actors may seek to 
become the first to take advantage of a breakthrough, to exploit its 
financial potential, or be best positioned to carry out subsequent 
development of the technology in question once it is considered viable. 
These are all highly compelling promises for actors considering supporting 
the development of a high-risk technology. 
 
When considering the role of breakthroughs within high-risk industries, one 
interviewee closely involved with the technologies involved in science 
missions (though who did not self-define as being involved with ‘space 
science’) made a number of comments stressing the importance and place 
of breakthroughs in space science missions, also specifically using the word 
‘breakthrough’ multiple times: 
 
‘They are breakthroughs, scientifically, they are breakthrough 
missions, and very important, we can build new applications.’ 
(006, [Public, EO, Technology]) 
 
‘Because each science satellite has got a very specific mission that’s 
never been done before, you expect a level of breakthrough.’ 





‘From a science perspective [space science] has given us significant 
scientific breakthrough, and that’s recognized.’ 
(006, [Public, EO, Technology]) 
 
Each of these quotes expresses the idea of the breakthrough and its 
relation to the mission slightly differently. The first quote of the above 
three stresses the perceived importance of these missions, suggesting 
these breakthroughs are not just abstract ones, but that they were 
presumably breakthroughs directed towards ‘new applications' – a distinct 
and finite objective. They are missions upon which new applications can be 
built, once the appropriate breakthrough has been achieved. The second 
goes further and argues that not just are scientific missions generally 
pursuing a breakthrough, but that one is actively expected. By this 
rationale, a space science mission that did not produce a breakthrough 
would be considered a failure. Space programmes of this sort must both 
promise breakthrough, and then position their outcomes as a breakthrough 
in order to show the accuracy of the initial prediction. In turn, the third 
quote emphasizes the recognition of the value of prior space science; this 
can produce a strong historical narrative for use in justifying future 
missions. This was a concept another interviewee concurred with when 
considering the historical precedents for space science: 
 
‘In terms of trying to persuade people of the longer-term benefits, 
you really have to review what’s happened over the last ten to 
twenty years.’ 
(001, [Public, Engagement]) 
 
The scientific breakthroughs of previous missions can be pointed to in 
order to show the value of the planned scientific mission – the logic being 
that because past scientific missions are seen as having achieved so highly, 
one can safely assume this mission will too. By ordering history (Deuten & 
Rip, 2000; Law, 2002; Elzinga, 2004) in this way and proposing an 
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understanding of the past (Michael, 2000:22) within which breakthroughs 
were achieved regularly via the use of space science, these quotes suggest 
that the future outcomes of space science can be predicted (Williams, 
2006) to be in line with past outcomes, namely the generation of 
breakthrough that is ‘expected’ to come with science missions. The finite 
narrative states: fund and support the mission, and by its conclusion, you 
will have a breakthrough (just like all other space science missions in the 
past).  
 
However, despite these assumptions a breakthrough is obviously not an 
objective measure, whether defined by the number of publications (how 
many is enough?) or by some other means (how significant must new 
knowledge be to be a breakthrough?). Merely claiming that a breakthrough 
will occur is not sufficient, whether backed up by past examples or not; the 
claim of the promised breakthrough must be compelling, and convincing, 
otherwise the endpoint of the finite future narrative falls away. 
 
To understand how convincing breakthrough narratives are created, Brown 
(2000:103) suggests seeing scientists as ‘authors of breakthrough’. This 
argument posits that knowledge gains the moniker of the ‘breakthrough’ 
only due to the work of scientists who produce a narrative in which the 
new knowledge merits the term. This understanding appeared appropriate 
to the space industry based on comments from two other interviewees: 
 
‘How does science come to be defined as cutting edge? It’s the 
networks. The TSB, us [the UKSA], people in the research councils.’ 
(008, [Public, ‘Growth’]) 
 
‘You have to remember people are devoting their lives to some of 
this, and they would not do that if they weren’t passionate, and we 
see that in all walks of life, passionate people are right, sometimes 
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they’re wrong, but it’s what drives them forward. And that’s a good 
thing. The ones that succeed just play the politics right.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
The first of these two quotes is the clearest – this interviewee was asked 
about the nature of cutting edge science, and replied as above. This answer 
emphasized the people involved – the Technology Strategy Board, the UK 
Space Agency, and people within research councils. All these organizations 
are heavily involved in science missions, and this interviewee argued that it 
is the people within those institutions who go about identifying and 
defining cutting-edge and breakthrough science. The second quote, 
however, also supports this perspective. This interviewee was discussing 
the long timescales of space science missions which may take up to a 
decade or more, and explaining why people are willing to devote so many 
years to these endeavours. They stated that those who are successful in 
these long-term missions are those who play the politics right – is all 
scientific data that comes back from space science therefore truly 
fundamentally new, or has this impression been created by those with 
interests in the mission results being seen as such? It seems clear from the 
quotes in this section that the latter is the more accurate interpretation, 
and that assigning such value to space science is a social and political 
process (Shapin, 1995). This may be carried out by the individuals in 
relevant organizations, or by the individual scientists who have committed 
large volumes of time and effort to space science missions. 
 
There is also a further point worth making about the legitimizing work the 
breakthrough motif does, not just for the specific mission and the value of 
space science but also for wider discourses of scientific knowledge. In 
relating the outcomes of space science to the concept of the breakthrough 
it serves to further stress the concept of science as an activity 
fundamentally focused around the solving of problems (Gibbons, 1994). 
Whereas the rhetoric of the discovery is something much more idealist – 
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that something brand new has been ‘uncovered’ – the idea of the 
breakthrough reads as the struggle of the scientist or technologist to make 
progress against the hidden nature of the natural world. The term almost 
implies that the natural world rallies against the scientist, who is forced to 
work at their peak to ‘break through’ its defences and uncover the truth 
within. Shown in this way as an instrumental activity, it also serves to 
legitimize and justify the scientific process; scientists are not always seeking 
‘discoveries’ that may be ‘blue-skies’ (Brown, 2000:104) and with little 
practical applications, but rather they are seeking breakthroughs in specific 
areas with clear, applicable goals, and to overcome limitations to current 
scientific understanding. This therefore once more emphasizes the 
appropriateness of the finite term for this kind of future narrative – a 
breakthrough is a single distinct acquisition of new knowledge, compared 
to the much more ambiguous and temporally uncertain ‘discovery’. 
 
Scientific benefits are strong and compelling promised outcomes for a high-
risk finite future narrative. These benefits can be of two sorts – that the 
science developed will be quantifiable by a significant number of 
publications produced, or that the science will be of ‘breakthrough’ quality. 
In contrast to the more open idea of the ‘discovery’, each of these puts 
forward a predicted and finite end-point for the programme. The 
conclusion of the programme comes when sufficient papers have been 
published or the promised breakthrough has been reached. They both offer 
carefully-defined finite conclusions to the programme – it cannot stretch on 
into perpetuity and the goals are clear from the outset. Although scientific 
benefit in both of these forms is a core promise for many high-risk 
technological development programmes, there are many other predicted 
outcomes which can be coupled with these, or used in place of these, to 







Scientific outcomes are not the only promises offered in finite future 
narratives. Whether in its nature as a breakthrough or its number of 
citations, scientific excellence is commonly no longer enough by itself to 
justify the development of high-risk technologies (Whitten, 1996; 
Kauffman, 1997). As Behn (1995) somewhat sardonically notes when 
discussing the value of this ‘abstract’ scientific research: 
 
‘Experimental physicists need high-speed accelerators to break 
down stable particles into these predicted elementary particles so 
that they can be observed (or so that some phenomena predicted 
by their existence can be observed) and thus verified. In this time of 
budget deficits, a lot of us, and particularly those of us in the U.S. 
House of Representatives, did not think that answering this 
question warranted building the Superconducting Supercollider.’ 
(Behn, 1995:314). 
 
Chapter 1 covered some of the changes in technological funding in recent 
decades away from the purely scientific promises of ‘Big Science’ (Kinsella, 
1996) and towards goals that enlist and interest a wider range of actors 
(Autio et al, 1996; Wall & Wood, 2005; Vuola & Hameri, 2006) – as this 
chapter has shown, some of the goals in high-risk industries do still remain 
entirely ‘scientific’ in nature, but others also exist. Within the space 
industry there is a lot of evidence to support this assertion. Outcomes 
other than scientific excellence are known to be highly valued in many 
space programmes (Cornelius, 2005; Goehlich et al, 2005; Jakhu, 2006), 
and another major justification for space technology is the idea of 
inspiration. This outcome is seen as having value to the wider public rather 
than the scientific or technical community. There was a very common 
perspective amongst those interviewed that space programmes had many 
other benefits, one of which was the ability to inspire people in a number 
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of different ways. Interviewees stated the following about the inspirational 
value of space programmes in general, and space science specifically: 
 
‘You have to trace it back and say we’re going to get people 
interested in science and inspire people, give people something to 
hope for. […] I’ve seen a study that said Apollo has more than paid 
for itself from the benefits to the economy.’ 
(009, [Public]) 
 
‘I think you only have to see the fascination that young people have 
for space exploration, or going to Mars or whatever, or looking at 
pictures of the Hubble Space Telescope to see that it has an 
inspirational benefit.’ 
(002, [Public, Science]) 
 
‘The general population is enthused by exploring the solar system 
and studying the universe.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
‘The only bit of data out there is the surge in doctoral applications in 
space sciences that tracks […] a generation from the moon landing. 
There is an effect there and everyone admits it.’ 
(003, [Public, Technology]) 
 
From the comments of these four interviewees, it appears the inspirational 
argument for the development of high-risk technologies takes three 
interrelated forms. Firstly, that it raises the visibility of such programmes 
and increases public interest; secondly that this increased public interest 
has significant educational value; and thirdly that in turn this education 
translates into a higher number of school pupils and students pursuing the 
physical sciences as careers (with attendant economic benefits). Let us first 
examine the issue of visibility. Ocampo et al (1998:137) argue that the 
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world’s ‘attention, interest and imagination’ is focused on space-based 
technologies more than perhaps any other, although other comparable 
technology programmes like the Large Hadron Collider (the world’s most 
powerful particle collider at time of writing) or Fermilab (another very large 
particle accelerator) also garner significant public interest and their 
proponents argue that the high visibility of such programmes leads to 
greater public engagement with science and technology (CERN, 2014). The 
programmes that will get people interested in science, so the argument 
goes, are those which push the barriers of knowledge or technological 
capability, not directed research which may only have immediate short-
term value for human comfort.  
 
This brings us to the second claim – within the space industry many 
propose that this visibility and public interest in space technology 
correlates with technical education in members of the public (Cornelius, 
2005), and that it also improves general scientific literacy (Crawford, 2001). 
In turn, the claimed direct benefit of this kind of education is the idea that 
space technology can encourage people into jobs in science and 
technology. Ocampo et al (1998) argue that knowledge gained from a space 
programme – such as learning about Jupiter’s atmosphere – may not 
generate income or help towards alleviating economic austerity, but it has a 
significant educational value, specifically for motivating students towards 
achievement. This is the transition from the second into the third 
inspirational claim identified in the above quotes – that not just do visible 
high-risk technologies generate interest in and understanding of science 
and technology, but that this leads to more students pursuing Science, 
Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) subjects. Such pursuits 
are conceived as being an inherently desirable outcome, for the promise is 
potentially economic in nature (cf. Sclove, 1995). It posits that by pursuing 
such high-risk technologies, citizens will be inspired into STEM subjects, and 
thus towards greater economic productivity (Elzinga & Jamison, 1995). By 
this rationale, programmes that promise this inspirational benefit are 
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economic investments for the future. For space science specifically, the 
Apollo landings are often cited as instrumental in inspiring a generation of 
space scientists and technologists (Jones et al, 2007) who have since ‘paid 
for’ the Apollo landings via their economic contributions, and the first and 
fourth above quotes make explicit reference to this commonly-held notion. 
 
However, a question remains about the temporal dimension to these 
promises – at what point are people ‘inspired’? Is it the single event of the 
breakthrough or the landing on another world, or is it all that leads up to 
the development of the technology that interests people? I argue it is the 
conclusion that is seen as providing the public interest, not necessarily the 
‘lead-up’ – in this way although it may take many years for effects akin to 
Apollo rekindling interest in STEM subjects to be felt, the outcome ‘begins’ 
at the moment that the programme ‘ends’ and achieves its objective. The 
outcome is not ‘instantaneous’ like a breakthrough (Brown, 2003), but 
nevertheless has a distinct beginning. The promise of public impact and 
inspiration is thus not something that is generated immediately, but starts 
accruing – if the predicted breakthrough or achievement comes to pass – 
from the moment the programme is concluded (or perhaps a week or two 
in advance when news outlets begin to run stories about an impending 
landing on Mars, for example). In this way it can contribute to a finite 
future narrative: although the inspirational benefits are not necessarily 
time-limited, the programme remains finite and promises that such 
benefits will begin when the programme itself ends. Inspiration is thus a 
potentially valuable promise for a high-risk technology to make during its 
development (cf. Ocampo et al, 1998; Crawford, 2001), and one that 
appeals to many actors outside scientific communities, focusing especially 
on the pedagogic benefits to education and public awareness and the 





4.3.4. National Pride 
 
Connected to the inspirational value of space programmes is the claim that 
as well as inspiring citizens in certain ways, they also generate pride and 
interest on an international level. To understand the claimed international 
benefit of a nation possessing the clear ability to carry out high-risk 
technological developments, we can look to Bourdieu’s (1975:19) 
understanding of ‘symbolic capital’. He identifies scientific and technical 
work as generating symbolic capital – resources based on prestige and 
recognition – and argues that scientific authority is ‘defined inseparably as 
technical capacity and social power’. This kind of symbolic capital is what 
the national pride argument proposes may be gained by supporting high-
risk technologies – upon the completion of the programme, a key beneficial 
outcome of the programme will be an improvement in international 
standing, increased respect for a nation’s domestic science and technology 
capabilities, and potentially future investment and interest based on this 
demonstration of capability. Several interviewees argued that increasing 
national pride via the accumulation of this symbolic capital was a third 
major promised outcome of finite future narratives within the space 
industry: 
 
‘So there is a prestige factor that comes into space activities, 
specifically the human space activities. […] There is often a national 
flag element.’ 
(002, [Public, Science]) 
 
‘Some states that probably can’t afford space see [owning a 
satellite] as a statement of national prestige. […] ‘There’s always a 
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huge prestige value in having up stream capability3. It’s sexy and 
people like it.’ 
(003, [Public, Technology]) 
 
The generation of this kind of pride is intricately tied to the way in which 
pursuing high-risk technologies is presented to the public. Much like some 
interviewees quoted in the previous section argued that the specifics of a 
programme were almost secondary to the promise of inspiration it could 
bring, one interviewee suggested a similar trend for the generation of 
prestige – that the specifics of the programme did not matter as long as it 
was ‘grand’: 
 
‘These are grand projects – it doesn’t matter what they do. The 
politicians in Brussels just want a project, a grand project, so they 
can say ‘We’re finishing Galileo’4.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
A sense of pride in space programmes – or at least the belief that space 
programmes generate pride – remains even fifty years after the Apollo 
programme. From these comments it appears that despite the shift 
towards more pragmatic or instrumental forms of space technology (such 
as communications satellites), many nations – especially those developing 
early space capabilities (Peter, 2006:109) – have either adopted the 
concept of space as symbolic, or that the symbolism of space technology 
has simply never left. The ability to ‘do space’ is therefore perceived to be a 
signifier, much akin to the possession of nuclear weapons, of importance 
upon the international stage (cf. Launius, 2000). Within the EU context 
which the UK operates in, this is a federal formulation of national pride – 
                                                 
3      This means the ability to launch and develop space technology; 
‘downstream’ space technology refers to the services and uses of space 
hardware from the ground. 
 
4      European counterpart to the US-owned GPS system. 
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some international standing from successful programmes goes to ESA as a 
whole, but also to individual nations who may have contributed 
components or capabilities to a broader mission. Indeed, for nations with 
existing spaceflight experience, space technology is increasingly 
collaborative (Peter, 2006), and such a sense of internationalism and 
international achievement is particularly strong in Europe’s space 
programmes (Horneck et al, 2010).  
 
However, there will be fallout from this kind of objective if unsuccessful. 
Just as a successful programme designed to showcase national 
technological capabilities may bolster position on the world stage, a failed 
programme will not have a neutral outcome whereby the promise merely 
didn’t occur, but rather a negative one – it will show a technical inability to 
complete space technology, or a flaw or weakness within the economic or 
bureaucratic structures behind the programme. The promise of 
international prestige is thus something of a double-edged sword for high-
risk technologies, but remains a key promised outcome from high-risk 
technology identified by the research (cf. Lakoff & York, 1989; Mackenzie, 
1990; Mort, 2008). This promise is not directly related to the roadmap or 
plan that comes with the programme; there will be no steps in the 
roadmap that explicitly denote the generation of national prestige (if such a 
thing could even be defined or measured), but the promised prestige will 
supposedly accrue at the conclusion of the development. This is once more 
a promise that is distinct from the roadmap that will lead to it, and further 
shows the importance of proposing the finite future narrative as a way to 
acknowledge both the separation of the roadmap and the eventual 
objective in high-risk technologies, but also the importance that both 






4.3.5. Spin-off Benefits 
 
We have thus far looked at three categories of promise identified within 
the space industry – scientific benefits, inspirational benefits, and the 
generation of national pride. Each of these is understood as taking place at 
the end of the roadmap, and we have noted that the roadmap, focusing on 
technical, institutional and organizational factors, does not necessarily 
‘display’ the benefits which are promised upon the end of the programme. 
It is focused upon the path, not the destination, even though the desire to 
reach the destination is what necessitates the creation of the roadmap. In 
this way the roadmap and the promise(s) at its conclusion are two distinct 
factors, and brought together under the concept of the finite future 
narrative, showing that both the eventual promise and the gradual steps to 
reach that promise are equally important for high-risk technologies. There 
is one further type of promised benefit identified in the research data for 
space programmes, which is similarly explicitly positioned as only ‘starting’ 
upon the conclusion of the roadmap and the completion of the 
programme. 
 
The fourth form of promise is the concept of the ‘spin-off’. This is a 
common goal proposed within finite future narratives and the programmes 
they support, although it is never the sole promise. Spin-off refers to a 
particular technology or process that has an original purpose in a high-risk 
development programme, but can later be ‘spun off’ into other applications 
or other markets. Within the space sector this means taking technologies 
from esoteric space programmes, predominantly space science, into 
terrestrial consumer markets. One oft-cited example of spin-off is that of 
the satellite TV business: 
 
‘Satellite TV and things like that have all come because space tech 
has taken steps and gone into commercial, but it’s on the ground 
you get the real spin-offs of satellite dishes.’ 
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(023, [Private, Science]) 
 
Whilst another interviewee expounded at length on what they argued was 
the origin of modern camera technology, in this case from spy satellites in 
the early days of the Space Race: 
 
‘Say you’re ESA. I’m bidding to put a scientific piece of equipment on 
your satellite. Part of that bid would include a section on potential 
exploitation beyond the mission. Obviously you would look to exploit 
that on future missions, and I would attempt to say there would be 
spin-out apps for terrestrial use. As an example, the camera 
technology we have on mobile phones was a space technology. The 
reason we now have quite cheap CCD cameras, they only came 
about because of satellite technology, it was the Russians that did 
this. They wanted to spy on the US, early spy satellites were film-
based, and we had the crazy situation of satellites de-orbiting, 
parachuting to earth with canisters of film in them, and the Russians 
had to intercept these parachuting satellites with aircraft to collect 
the film, because if it touched the ground it could be intercepted. 
This was seen as an unrealistic and crazy situation so they needed a 
camera that doesn’t rely on film… so there’s an example of how we 
massively benefit from original satellite technology.’ 
(025, [Private, Technology]) 
 
In the case of spin-off any science the mission does is not the aspect which 
provides this benefit (nor the concomitant inspiration or pride), but rather 
the technologies or processes involved in creating the new mission. In this 
way a mission to another world might pioneer a new form of high-
resolution camera, and that technology could then gain an application in 
the consumer market or for other technologies that were not originally 
envisaged in its manufacture. In this way the space industry understands 
spin-off from a theoretical orientation of ‘basic science’. In turn it is only by 
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emphasizing this orientation that spin-off may be considered a valuable 
promise for space programmes focused on the acquisition of scientific 
knowledge, not the development of terrestrial or consumer technology. 
 
The concept of ‘basic science’ posits that ‘doing science’ has value even if 
no specific purpose for it yet exists (Blume, 1974:276), either because 
scientific knowledge is considered inherently valuable or because there is 
an unproblematic assumption that scientific knowledge will one day 
‘trickle-down’ into longer-term instrumental or practical benefits. Basic 
science is therefore generally expressed as the assumption that all scientific 
research will one day have a use, even if that use is not initially or readily 
apparent. In turn, therefore, new scientific knowledge will be able to create 
economic benefits for the country that has invested sufficiently heavily in 
basic science. Despite having been in decline for several decades (Salomon, 
1996; Baskaran & Boden, 2004) basic science continues to be relevant 
within the space industry (Jasentuliyana, 1995; Ocampo et al, 1998; 
Cornelius, 2005; Davila et al, 2007). Just as the specifics of science missions 
were shown in this chapter to be only semi-relevant when considering their 
perceived potential inspirational and prestige value, a similar motif that 
‘basic science’ automatically generates benefits regardless of the specific 
research is strongly apparent here in the comments from one particular 
interviewee: 
 
‘It actually doesn’t really matter what you’re doing – as long as 
you’re pushing the boundaries – to get economic benefits.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
‘The scientific questions are getting harder and harder, and so the 
technical challenges are harder and harder, and that creates 
capability which then has, you know, multiple applications in 
broader areas.’ 




 ‘The cutting-edge instrument to get the signal from the furthest 
reach of the universe […] that’s an advance in technology that will 
then spill over into other areas.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
As all these quotes show, the promise of spin-off is tied most closely to 
scientific missions. Programmes led by space scientists often conduct ‘basic 
science’ (Jasentuliyana, 1995; Ocampo et al, 1998; Cornelius, 2005; Davila 
et al, 2007) and interview data demonstrates that these missions are seen 
as having spin-off potential. In some cases this is made codified and explicit 
– for example, ‘first-class science’ in the European Space programme is 
touted as essential to European interests because it imparts ‘drive’ to 
developing technology and industry via spin-off (Worms & Haerendel, 
2004:73). In this model any new technologies or processes developed in a 
space programme are seen as a method for producing other products or 
services (Walsh, 2004) after the mission’s completion. These products are 
understood as having clear economic benefit, and it is here that the value 
of space science missions to private actors becomes clear. 
 
Ordinarily space science missions may not appear to have significant 
economic return (Schwarz, 1979). However, the idea of spin-off is that 
technologies developed or processes mastered during a science mission 
may have subsequent unanticipated economic and consumer value beyond 
the confines of their original mission. Private actors are concerned about 
the return on investment when committing to the development of any new 
technology (Petrik & Echols, 2004), and so making the promise of spin-offs 
is designed to encourage commercial and private finance into high-risk 
developments. Natural science and technological research is often 
subsumed into economic imperatives (Elzinga, 2004) – in this case business 
and industry may not be especially interested by the main objectives of the 
dominant frames of these programmes, but are interested in turning a 
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profit from the technologies or processes developed along the way (Autio 
et al, 1996; Elhefnawy, 2004). Within the space industry this comes as a 
result of the ‘increasing commercialisation’ (Swaminathan, 2005:256) of 
the space sector as covered in the first chapter. Interviewees who put 
forward this benefit argue that missions can bring the countries or 
companies that build them direct economic advantages in addition to 
whatever the ‘core’ promise of the programme may be. However, unlike 
the quantification of anticipated journal articles in science missions, these 
space programmes do not explicitly state what spin-offs are anticipated. 
Interviewees argued this was instead a rather more organic process, and 
spin-off promises were defined in terms of the potential for spin-off into 
certain areas, rather than explicitly codifying any specific anticipated spin-
offs: 
 
‘Missions are a good pathfinder for technology – they force the 
engineers to do things they haven’t done before.’ 
(002, [Public, Science]) 
 
‘Say we want to go to Jupiter. There’s a huge amount of technical 
challenges to be resolved in that. […] Once you’ve got all that and 
you’ve got the technology you’ve developed, you say ‘Actually, I can 
use that somewhere else’, and technology transfers within the sector 
start coming.’ 
(011, [Public, Technology]) 
 
‘It makes investors feel good that there are clearly spin-off to what 
we are doing.’ 
(015, [Private, Technology]) 
 
‘People have to aspire to [spin-off]. You have to build a business 
case, and you can’t build a business case on a circular argument 
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saying ‘If you invest in this for space it will give me the money to do 
something else for space!’. That won’t work.’ 
(023, [Private, Science]) 
 
This is therefore similar to the future-proofing explored in the first half of 
this chapter in relation to anticipated future technologies. The above 
quotes show that spin-off is never expressed in terms of specific 
predictions (cf. Worms & Haerendel, 2004), instead emphasizing a public 
image of space science as an area ripe with spin-off potential. If no spin-off 
occurs, it was simply a science mission which failed to produce potential 
spin-off, a situation which is sometimes to be expected; if spin-off does 
occur, this reinforces the perception of ‘basic science’ within the space 
industry, a perception which will be leveraged in future space science 
programmes. Spin-off is therefore another promise that is not explicitly 
codified into a space programme’s objectives, but one which has potential 
to bring in a significant amount of private money and interest from 
commercial actors who identify potential overlap with their own interests 
and the technologies being developed for a space science mission (Goehlick 
et al, 2005). Those who may know little about the intricacies of the space 
sector can be recruited into space programmes not by stressing the space-
based benefits of that programme, but by emphasizing potential terrestrial 
technological benefits that the programme might yield. 
  
However, one query remains about the value of spin-off. If those 
supporting a mission are seeking subsequent development of a technology 
for terrestrial or ‘downstream’ (Carayannis & Alexander, 2001; Kleeschulte 
& Büttner, 2008) applications, this raises an obvious question – why would 
they develop it via a method as expensive and lengthy as space 
technology? Why support a programme that promises spin-off technologies 
down the line rather than simply developing the potential new technology 
itself? Whilst it may seem strange to prototype a technology in such a way, 
there is a significant benefit to it. The stresses of the space environment – 
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such as high radiation, extreme ranges of temperatures, pressure and 
vibration during launch – set a very high bar for a technology (Underwood, 
2003; cf. Chapter 6). If the technology or component can survive in the 
difficult environment of space it should be well-developed and ‘mature’ 
enough to survive without difficulty in a far kinder terrestrial environment 
(Bach et al, 2002). This is particularly the case for new technologies whose 
developers might be worried about its survival under vibration or impact. If 
a new camera technology can survive the shaking of a rocket launch, the 
logic goes, it can surely survive being dropped on the floor when it later 
becomes part of a new mobile phone. This process allows spin-off to yield 
not just a new process or technology, but its reliability and quality as well; 
the challenging requirements for the technology in its original high-risk 
context will lend credibility to its use outside that context. Additionally, 
private companies may lack the resources to prototype new technologies, 
but by supporting a space programme that needs to develop that 
technology, significant support will be committed to the programme from 
other sources in addition to their own (Peeters, 2002). Spin-off is therefore 
the fourth of the promises identified in the research data that are used to 
support finite future narratives. It is designed to encourage private actors 
into long-term and high-risk programmes by promising potential for 
rigorously-tested and cutting-edge technology which may, after the 
conclusion of the space programme, find application as ‘mundane’ 




‘Finite future narratives’ are one of the three forms of future narrative 
proposed by this thesis. They consist of two elements – roadmaps, and a 
selection of promises. Both of these were examined within the social 
constructivist framework of this research, seeking to examine how these 
roadmaps and promises are constructed by those within high-risk 
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industries and how they are utilized as the constituents of future 
narratives. The chapter began by exploring the discursive construct of the 
roadmap, which is designed to trace out the process for a given programme 
from inception until completion. The chapter showed that roadmaps were 
considered vital to high-risk technological developments, and yet many of 
those interviewees acknowledged that roadmaps could be at best 
uncertain, and at worst entirely inaccurate, whilst still stressing their 
importance. To explain this apparent contradiction the chapter explored in 
depth the four ways in which roadmaps are used as identified from the 
interview data.  
 
The first of these was as a tool for ‘understanding’, whereby roadmaps are 
used in order to ensure a wide range of actors – private, public, academic, 
industrial, state, military – share a single image of the programme’s goals. 
In this way a roadmap also ties all these disparate actors into the 
programme by distributing appropriate roles and tying them all into its 
success or failure (Brown, 2003; Smith et al, 2005). The second was the use 
of roadmaps to generate a sense of ‘proximity’ across the lengthy 
development times of high-risk programmes by stating a series of interim 
steps (cf. Wynne, 1983) that both give meaning to the years or decades of 
development, and allow regular ‘feedback’ to actors who may be unused to 
working across such timescales. The third use of roadmaps was as 
‘direction’ – roadmaps also allocate room within a programme for 
technologies or processes which have not yet been developed, but will be 
needed further down the line in the programme's development. These 
other technologies are then worked towards. By outlining future 
technologies or processes that will be used in the programme’s 
development, the potential lack of direction or certainty over a long 
timescale (Adam, 2004; Nordlund, 2012) is rationalized, quantified, and 
made into an understandable and relatable part of the programme. Rather 
than leaving the future of the programme open if a technology which 
doesn’t yet exist will be required, roadmaps make judgements about when 
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such technologies will be available and how they will be used in the 
program. This was connected to the fourth purpose of roadmaps – creating 
a sense of ‘certainty’ within the programme. This was achieved by making 
some of these future steps of the roadmaps more flexible by proposing a 
range of potential future technologies or processes the programme can 
meet up with, not just one. This ‘future-proofing’ (Woolley, 2003; 
Anderson, 2008; Lucquiaud et al, 2011) acknowledges uncertainty on one 
level, admitting that future contexts are not easily predictable, but then 
circumscribes the space of possibilities by trying to account for them all. To 
outside actors, therefore, this aspect of the roadmap makes it appear as if 
the programme has considered all appropriate future possibilities and 
made allowances for them. Roadmaps are therefore able to reduce the 
perceived temporal uncertainty of a high-risk programme, create a 
consensus for different actors to align themselves with, and present a plan 
which appears to lack any of the uncertainty expected from such long-term 
programmes. 
 
The other constituent of the finite future narrative is the range of promises 
made for the conclusion of the programme. Whereas a roadmap traces an 
ongoing future between the start- and end-points of a programme, these 
futures are only positioned at the completion of a programme. Four 
different forms of promise were identified for high-risk technologies. The 
first of these was the scientific, which broke down into two categories – a 
measurable number of publications derived from a programme and the 
claim of anticipated ‘breakthrough’. This pairing of scientific benefits 
fundamentally underpins the continued existence of many space 
programmes without immediate economic outcomes (by contrast with, for 
example, communications satellites). These two forms of scientific promise 
are potentially applicable to other high-risk sectors, especially those 
focused on the pursuit of ‘abstract’ science which may struggle to sell their 
practical value (Behn, 1995; Whitten, 1996; Kauffman, 1997). The 
emphases on the quality and especially the quantity of science produced 
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are highly effective methods for presenting the value of high-risk science 
and technology.  
 
The second type of promise proposed in finite future narratives is that of 
inspiration. The chapter explored the claim that high-risk technologies can 
inspire citizens, and identified a three-part logic to this argument: that 
high-risk programmes raise public interest in science and technology, that 
this increased interest leads to more educated citizens, and that this in turn 
leads to a higher number of those citizens pursuing careers in the natural 
sciences or engineering (cf. Elzinga & Jamison, 1995; Jones et al, 2007). This 
promise is designed for different actors – those in policy, government or 
education. These promises operated within a framework of perceived 
economic benefit from directing students and employees into science and 
technology: that such jobs inherently benefit the economy, and therefore 
encouraging citizens towards them is a desirable policy decision. 
Interviewees mentioned the belief that the Apollo programme had ‘paid for 
itself’ in this way due to the inspirational value of the moon landings, and 
used this is an exemplar of the inspirational value such programmes could 
generate. Related to the idea of inspiration was the third benefit, the 
generation of national pride. National pride is best understood here as 
symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1975), and interviewees argued that by 
supporting high-risk technologies, a key outcome of the programme would 
be a boost to international standing (Peter, 2006) and potentially increase 
potential for future collaborative technology developments (Horneck et al, 
2010). The ability to take part in space programmes or other high-risk 
programmes is seen as a signifier of both international stature and 
domestic technological skill, and national pride must thus be understood as 
the third category of promise offered by such development programmes. 
 
The fourth type of promise was the spin-off. This posits that high-risk 
technology developments often develop technologies or processes that can 
later be used in other applications. In this way some programmes are 
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conceptualized by those within the space industry as being within the 
theoretical framework of ‘basic science’ (cf. Blume, 1974) where the 
programme itself is not the objective (for some actors), but rather the 
technologies and capabilities that will be developed under the challenging 
environment of a space programme (Walsh, 2004). High-risk technology 
programmes were thus seen as promising ways to pursue potential spin-off 
technologies before attempting to sell them on the market. In these ways 
high-risk developments promise the potential for spin-off outcomes that 
may not be the programme’s primary objective, but appeal to a range of 
private and commercial actors who may seize upon this perceived 
opportunity (Autio et al, 1996; Elhefnawy, 2004). 
 
The analytic concept of the ‘finite future narrative’ is thus now clear. A 
finite future narrative consists of these two elements – the promises of 
desirable outcomes at the conclusion of a lengthy and high-risk 
programme, and a roadmap that proposed a sequence of steps and interim 
objectives towards reaching the eventual goals. These combine to create a 
form of narrative that promises enough to bring actors into a programme, 
and has sufficient detail to reassure those same actors and keep them 
committed for years or decades into the future. In this way, as with the 
other two forms of future narrative explored in the next two chapters, the 
finite future narrative draws on both our understandings of ‘futures’ and of 
narratives. Much like traditional narratives it is a story, a set of steps and 
statements about the state of a programme and the steps towards its 
completion. Finite future narratives tell a story of a programme that has 
been carefully planned, that is able to overcome any stumbling blocks in its 
path (for these have already been predicted), and that will offer rewards to 
all actors involved. This narrative is just as specific and codified as any 
retrospective narrative, but instead presents conclusions about the future 




Essentially, by promising post-roadmap objectives that appeal to a wide 
range of actors, it imbues what might otherwise be a purely technical and 
scientific programme with a sense of meaning relevant to those on the 
outside. This is important for high-risk programmes with dominant frames 
that emphasize objectives which may be considered important only within 
specific communities (Behn, 1995). From the interview data that 
emphasized this range of benefits it is clear what type of high-risk 
programme that the careful roadmaps and broad promises of finite future 
narratives are designed to support – programmes seen as being focused on 
scientific research, not technological development. These are close to the 
cutting-edge ‘Big Science’ missions of the Space Race era, but distinct due 
to all the new interests and agendas explored in this chapter. Pure science 
is no longer sufficiently compelling for many high-risk programmes 
(Whitten, 1996; Kauffman, 1997) and instead a wider range of actors must 
be promised valuable outcomes in order to enlist their support into high-
risk programmes (Autio et al, 1996; Wall & Wood, 2005; Vuola & Hameri, 
2006) across the long timescales they require for development (Lakoff & 
York, 1989; Kinsella, 1996; Galison, 1997; Knorr-Cetina, 1999; etc). This 
form of narrative and the analysis proposed here have significant potential 
applicability outside the space industry to other lengthy science-orientated 
programmes such as supercolliders and particle accelerators (Galison, 
1997; Knorr-Cetina, 1999), nuclear fusion research (Kinsella, 1996, 1999), 
and indeed the ongoing contemporary research at CERN. Finite future 
narratives support science-orientated high-risk programmes via a focus on 
overcoming the negative aspects of long-term developments – noted in 
Chapter 2 as being explicit, though rarely explored, in previous work on 
high-risk sectors. As such the finite future narrative is proposed as an 
analytic tool that foregrounds the importance of this temporal dimension, 
explains the socially constructed future narratives that support a significant 
number of contemporary high-risk programmes, and demonstrates the 
ability for high-risk industries to convince outside actors and the general 
public of the broader value and feasibility of lengthy scientific research. 
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Chapter Five: Normalized Future Narratives:  




The previous chapter introduced and explored the finite future narrative, 
one of a three-part typology of ‘future narratives’ designed to elucidate the 
development processes of high-risk technologies. It consisted of two parts 
– a set of objectives to be met by the completion of the development 
programme, and a detailed plan or ‘roadmap’ that lists a step-by-step 
process for reaching those objectives. The finite future narrative serves to 
make promises that will entice a wide range of potential stakeholders and 
keep already-committed actors in the programme until its completion. 
Those promises go beyond the purely scientific benefits for space 
technology, emphasizing the potential for inspiration and national pride, 
and the possibility of spin-off. This chapter introduces normalized future 
narratives which are also designed to recruit and retain non-scientific 
actors into the contemporary space industry, but go about this in the 
opposite way. Whereas finite future narratives displayed continuity with 
the public image of the space industry as a sector concerned with the 
pursuit of scientific research (Ocampo et al, 1998; Cornelius, 2005; 
Swaminathan, 2005; Entradas, 2011) – albeit research that can now benefit 
a wider range of actors – normalized future narratives are specifically 
designed to challenge and change this image, and move the perception of 
the space sector towards that of an ordinary, mundane and normalized 
technological industry. 
 
Finite future narratives are designed primarily to manage and reduce 
negative connotations of their temporal length of long-term development 
programmes. By contrast, normalized future narratives were found to be 
focused on the mitigation of risk. To do this, normalized future narratives 
134 
 
are positioned as promises that are explicitly not seeking to generate 
breakthrough technology, inspiration, national pride or spin-off 
technologies. Instead these future narratives try to present space 
technology as a part of everyday life: as something increasingly ordinary, 
expected, integrated into social life, and therefore normalized. ‘Mundanity’ 
was identified as one of the three high-level codes present in the research 
data, and this chapter is drawn from the data assigned to that code, and 
the case study of the ‘Skylon’ spaceplane that was integral to bringing that 
data together. These future narratives present their technologies as either 
ordinary in their own right, or as instrumental ways to provide ordinary 
services such as broadband, mobile phone communications, and television 
signals. 
 
The finite future narrative discussed in the previous chapter is codified into 
roadmaps and written objectives. The normalized future narrative 
embodies a different approach, is a more abstract concept, and relates to 
the overall choices of language, terminology and image through which 
space programmes present themselves. Within these service-orientated 
programmes any claims about radical or innovative new technologies are 
routinely toned down or edited out altogether, an unusual trend when 
most technological industries hold innovation to be an essential mandate 
(Feenberg, 1999; van Lente, 2000:56). A normalized future narrative will be 
shown to emphasize low levels of risk, the age and tried-and-tested nature 
of components, confidence in service provision, and minor iterative 
improvements from previous programmes. Normalized programmes are 
presented as being mundane, predictable, and in line with existing 
expectations for the technology in question.  
 
To understand these narratives the chapter begins by examining the 
relationship between risk and reliability within the space sector. This is a 
theme that a large number of interviewees discussed in detail, and is 
integral to the analysis of the reasons identified in the research for the 
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greater contemporary emphasis placed on safety and reliability of space 
technology. The space industry has always been risky, but the specifically 
contemporary and post-Space Race disinclination to engage in riskier 
programmes and preference for mundane and ordinary (predictable and 
reliable) programmes was found to stem from three sources. These are the 
changing customer base of the space industry and the growing importance 
of service provision; the strong preference for the use of older components, 
reinforced by long-established employees of the space industry; and a 
three-part concern focused on the cost of satellite launch, the inability to 
retrieve satellites, and the required length of survival for modern satellites. 
The chapter explores each of these in turn, drawing heavily upon interview 
data to analyze the causes behind this increased concern with risk, 
reliability, and the subsequent necessity for the creation of normalized 
future narratives.  
 
Having discussed the three themes identified in the research that 
encourage risk-reduction in the space sector, the chapter then examines 
how normalized future narratives are used as a method for overcoming (or 
acquiescing to) this conservatism, and ensuring the continued success of 
high-risk programmes in the space industry. It summarizes the impacts of 
these conservative tendencies and considers the implications of defining 
technology within existing norms rather than as disjuncture from the past. 
The chapter does so using the case study of the Skylon spaceplane, 
showing how interviewees ascribe the programme’s success to its ability to 
define itself and its benefits within existing industry parameters;  how the 
future narrative for the Skylon programme has been normalized, despite its 
apparent status as a potentially groundbreaking technology; and how this 
normalization is used to support a high-risk technological development 
programme. The chapter concludes with a summary of the analysis 




5.2. Risk and Reliability in the Space Industry 
 
The focus of this thesis is not on the quantification of ‘risk’, for that is an 
academic field in its own right, and it is instead concerned with narratives 
and futures. However, in keeping with grounded theory, interview data 
showed that the understanding of risk shared by those within the space 
sector should be a core element on which to build our understanding of the 
industry’s conservatism and the need for normalized future narratives. The 
traditional definition of ‘high-risk’ technologies stems from Perrow (1999). 
His work on such technologies – Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk 
Technologies – includes air and marine traffic, nuclear power, dams, and 
chemical plants within this definition. Perrow’s definition focuses on a 
particular type of risk: to individuals or the public. This definition therefore 
includes manned spaceflight, but this is due to the loss of life that may 
occur rather than any particular analytic focus upon the space industry.  
 
By contrast, the types of risk identified by interviewees that the 
contemporary space industry is concerned with are not primarily risks to 
life or public, but technical and financial risk. Risk to the public is 
considered negligible within the UK space industry, lacking as it does a 
human spaceflight element (British Interplanetary Society, 2014). 
Interviewees understood risk as something that limited and ‘restricted’ the 
potential of the space industry to support riskier programmes: 
 
‘The problem is that because the cost of access to space is so high it 
tends to drive everything towards high reliability and conservatism, 
because it’s an attempt to try and minimize the risk.’ 




‘The cost and risk definitely. [Although] the biggest operators may 
have 20 or 30 satellites, small operators may have just one or two, 
and there’s an awful lot at stake.’ 
(022, [Private, Technology, Comms]) 
 
‘[The] risk aversion trickles back down to the space platform 
builders, you are very restricted in your ability to take risk.’ 
(025, [Private, Technology]) 
  
Each of these three quotes identifies a slightly different perspective on this 
very conservative attitude towards risk. The first quote argues that ‘access 
to space’ is the primary issue (which will be explored later in this chapter) 
and that the difficulty in actually getting a satellite deployed means that 
once it is deployed, actors want to feel confident in its efficacy; the second 
quote argues that the ‘cost and risk’ (cf. Ancarani, 1995:661) of the space 
programme is the primary issue, which is to say the cost drives the 
perceived risk up because of the amount of investment at stake; whilst the 
third quote expresses an understanding of the connectivity between 
different space sector actors, and argues that a disinclination towards even 
small risks from those in control of space programmes will then ‘trickle 
down’ to other actors involved in a programme.  
 
However, the space industry has always been a sector producing high-risk 
technology (Elhefnawy, 2004; Sadeh, 2005; Handberg, 2011:171). The early 
Sputnik and Apollo programmes were explicitly positioned as the cutting-
edge of technology whose success was not guaranteed, whilst space 
disasters (Perrow, 1999) only strengthened this impression. As for 
reliability, many early space programmes were one-offs without much long-
term thinking behind them (Ellul, 1964), focused instead upon scoring 
regular geopolitical victories (Ehrenfreund & Peter, 2009) instead of the 
creation of service infrastructure. Nevertheless, this did not prevent the 
overwhelming majority of space programmes being focused around 
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scientific or technical objectives, and accepting high risk and low reliability 
as the price that had to be paid. What, therefore, has changed? 
Interviewee comments fell into three broad themes about the changing 
nature of the contemporary space industry, and why this changing nature 
has led to a far greater conservatism than was present in the early days of 
the space industry (and in turn led to the new-found necessity for 
normalized future narratives). Each of these themes will now be explored. 
 
5.3. Themes in Space Industry Conservatism 
 
5.3.1. A Changing Customer Base and the Importance of Service Provision 
 
The first major theme identified from the research data was the changing 
customer base of the space industry, and the desire of that customer base 
for low-risk, high-reliability space technology. The economic and financial 
liberalization of the past decades (de Montluc, 2009) combined with the 
growth of global communications (Slotten, 2002; Sadeh, 2005) and the 
decline of Cold War competition (Salomon, 1996) has resulted in an 
increasingly privatized space sector. Private expenditure on spaceflight is 
now significantly greater than that of governments (Vedda, 2002:201), and 
several interviewees argued that this shift in the customer base was a 
central cause behind the increased conservatism and risk aversion of the 
sector as a whole: 
 
‘The risk aversion comes from the customer. Commercial customers 
like telecoms operators, they don’t buy technology, they buy a 
service, [or] a product that gives me a service. ‘I’m not interested in 
you flying your latest fancy chipset, your latest computers or your 
latest exotic solar panels. I’m buying from you a reliable platform 
and you will sign a warranty saying that if your platform doesn’t 
work for 15 years, I will sue you’. So that stifles the technology, and 
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unfortunately it’s just a function of the brutal commercial world we 
live in.’ 
(025, [Private, Technology]) 
 
‘[Space has] a customer base that has been quite conservative.’ 
(022, [Private, Technology, Comms]) 
 
‘Basically the customers want exactly the same spacecraft they had 
the last ten times, and it’s very hard to get new tech.’ 
(021, [Public, Science]) 
 
These quotes suggest that the contemporary risk aversion stems at least in 
part from the nature of the current customer base that much of the space 
industry now serves. Taking a historical perspective and drawing once more 
on the literature explored in Chapter 1, we can see that the space industry’s 
customers have changed very significantly over the last half a century. 
Originally they consisted primarily of state actors and bodies associated 
with them – this led to a significant role for both the military and air force 
in the US space programme, for example, due to both the overlap in some 
areas of technical expertise and the fact that space was tied to military and 
geopolitical goals (Ehrenfreund & Peter, 2009). The other customer was the 
state, and early spacefaring states tended to recognize that any space 
technology whatsoever was a very new and very problematic technology, 
and expectations were low. This meant that any space technology that 
could be deployed would be a victory, irrespective of the quality of the 
hardware or the time and cost involved, and the sense of satellites as a 
futuristic technology contributed much to this perspective (Huntley et al, 
2010). These were therefore customers who were both able to invest large 
resources in space technology with (relatively) low expectations on the 
outcomes; who were able to think in long timespans rather than immediate 
cost/profit considerations; and who recognized that the kinds of space 




The contemporary change in the space industry’s customer base away from 
the state and towards the private sector highlights space technology as 
what scholars have termed a ‘dual-use’ technology (Mackenzie, 1990:24; 
Jarritt et al, 2010). This is traditionally a term used for technologies that 
have both a civilian and a military application, and is a term used 
particularly often in research relevant to chemical or biological research 
(Balmer, 2006:693). Although in the early decades of the space industry 
militaries and governments were overwhelmingly dominant actors (Lakoff 
& York, 2006:5; Siddiqi, 2010), since then the sector has opened up to a 
wide range of customers. Some of those may be actors who desire the type 
of finite future narrative discussed in the previous chapter or the adaptive 
future narratives explored in the next chapter, but many instead desire the 
provision of services that were unknown when space technology’s 
development began but which have since become every-day expectations. 
Space technology’s distinct role as a dual-use technology means that a 
range of new customers have emerged driven by profit, service provision 
and the private market, and this changing customer base has been one 
factor behind many of the conservative changes in this chapter. This 
difference between the customers of finite and normalized future 
narratives is comparable to the distinction Balmer and Sharp (1993) draw 
between a ‘scientific’ paradigm and its ‘technological’ equivalent in their 
study of 1980s biotechnology in Britain. They argue that compared to a 
scientific paradigm, a technological paradigm involves a range of industry 
actors, many of whom were closely interconnected, and that the role of 
market forces was considered especially important, rather than the pursuit 
of ‘pure’ unfettered scientific research. New customers from private actors 
and industry have caused a shift within the space industry towards a 
technological paradigm, which in this instance means a reorientation 




One of the causes of the space industry’s increasing conservatism is 
therefore these new private actors who are concerned with reducing risk 
and promoting reliability and predictability. Elhefnawy (2004) suggests that 
private satellites of the sort that provide communications or broadband are 
seen as routine, and a routine mission is never going to be one that is 
expected to bring with it a high level of risk, in contrast to ‘breakthrough’ 
missions that public bodies might fund where a high(er) level of risk is more 
acceptable. In addition to highlighting the effects and implications of this 
changing customer base, a number of interviews delved deeper into the 
nature of this change, and explained that the concepts of the ‘failure rate’ 
and the attendant sense of ‘reliability’ that went with a low failure rate 
were integral metrics for this new low-risk perspective. Interviewees 
emphasized the need for reliable space technology rather than scientific 
advance given the shift in focus towards service provision: 
 
‘There’s a clear cost/reliability relationship – as things become more 
reliable, the cost has to go up, which is why aeroplanes are so much 
more expensive than cars, because they’re so much more reliable.’  
(017, [Private, Technology]) 
 
‘Space has to be very conservative in its use of technology and 
materials because of the need for reliability. For example the 
electrical system in a spacecraft tends to be quite primitive and uses 
components that are not by any means state of the art because they 
have to have proven reliability, be radiation-hardened, et cetera.’ 
(016, [Private, Technology]) 
 
‘We’re in a bit of a vicious circle at the moment. We have a question 
about reliability because even though they are very reliable, we still 
have quite large failure rates. Something like one in fifty. So one in 
fifty is still not particularly good, and basically what happens is that 
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you make sure you over-engineer, so that when it goes up, if it gets 
up fine, it’s going to work.’ 
(021, [Public, Science]) 
 
A programme with a low failure rate will be perceived as reliable, and a 
programme with a high failure rate will be perceived as risky. This failure 
rate is presented numerically – as the third of the above quotes states, the 
generally-agreed average figure for the space industry is 1  / 50. This denotes 
the portion of all space launches which are expected to fail, whether due to 
an unsuccessful launch where the satellite is destroyed in the process, a 
failed deployment once in space, a technical fault after deployment, or a 
satellite which ceases to function before its intended lifespan has 
concluded. Defining a failure rate and thereby making a statement about 
future reliability is one strategy among many for constructing a successful 
programme (Sørensen & Levold, 1992). This is not just presented as an 
analysis of the viability of the programme but also crucially as an aid for 
actors to make informed judgements about the future. A reliable satellite 
will be able to continue the provision of services into the future, whilst a 
satellite with a high failure rate lacks the potential for confidence and 
reliability that private space actors require. 
 
In this way we can also identify the particular form of failure that the failure 
rate reflects. Failure within the science-orientated missions of the previous 
chapter can be understood as ‘heroic failure’, a phrase familiar to those 
who followed the aftermath of the failed Beagle II Mars landings (Jeffries, 
2003; Briggs, 2004). This is a type of failure where the mission was very 
specifically striving (or presented as striving) for a goal that was conceived 
as inherently risky, distant, and at the cutting edge: a failure is therefore 
clearly not desired, but if it takes place it is quickly defined as the type of 
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failure necessary for science and technology to advance5. This is similar, for 
example, to Richard Nixon’s undelivered speech for a scenario in which the 
Apollo 11 astronauts did not survive the journey (Redd, 2014) which 
emphasizes the ‘nobility’ of failure, and the risk of death, in order to 
attempt bold scientific advance. By contrast, the failure for these more 
conservative missions is merely ‘service failure’ – not that the programme 
was aiming to do something new and fell tragically short, but that a service 
might cease to be available, or that a service might not function at the 
quality expected for the duration of time expected. It is a form of failure 
only relevant to the space industry in recent decades as a result of this shift 
towards increasing privatization and the provision of services. This shift has 
been explored here as the first of the three identified themes behind the 
increasing conservatism of the industry, and in turn the necessity of 
creating normalized future narratives. 
 
5.3.2. Old Components and Established Employees 
 
The second major theme identified for the growing conservatism of the 
space industry was the importance of older components, and the related 
role of long-established employees within space companies and space 
agencies. This section explores these two issues and shows that whilst the 
changing customer base is an ‘external’ pressure upon the space industry, 
these two issues have a significant ‘internal’ dimension to them, and are 
related to both the unique nature of space-based technologies and the 
personal preferences of those within the space industry.  
 
                                                 
5       Interestingly, the recent discovery of Beagle II’s remains in January 
2015 has led to it being rebranded as a ‘great success’ (Kelland, 2015) due 
to the fact it landed on Mars (although it was too badly damaged in the 
process to function). Within a framework of necessary or sometimes 
‘expected’ failure, this has been touted as the programme’s success ‘in 
getting to its target, landing, and inspiring scientists’, and that Beagle’s 
status does not represent a complete failure of the mission as a whole. 
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Interviewees described a strong preference for using older components 
rather than allowing new components to be flown. They argued that the 
reliability described above can stem from the deliberate use of older 
components rather than newer, and that the risk involved in a programme 
may be reduced by the use of components that are not at the cutting-edge 
of space technology: 
 
‘[Space programmes generally use] old-fashioned technology which 
you know to be reliable rather than cutting-edge tech, and 
deliberately so.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
‘Generally the chips used on satellites are really antiquated 
compared to what’s used in your phone, and the reason for that is 
that they’ve had to undergo a lot of space qualifications, so they 
know their responses to space radiation and things like that.’ 
(017, [Private, Technology]) 
 
This does not mean there have been no ‘new’ components in the space 
sector for years or decades and thus they are forced to rely on older parts – 
there have of course been developments, iterative improvements and 
entirely new components – but that those are generally very deliberately 
not chosen for these types of programme. Instead, older and well-trusted 
components are selected in their place. This is common to other high-risk 
sectors. Failures in nuclear technology, for example, are often attributed to 
failure of new technologies – that recent technologies are either not 
sufficiently tested, or the human personnel in question are inadequately 
experienced with them (Sovacool, 2010). Similarly, Mackenzie (1990:238) 
notes that despite the pressure to use ‘the latest thing’ in high-risk 
technologies purely because it is cutting-edge and new, it is not always 
appropriate to the context. Just as there were niches where ‘less advanced’ 
mechanical gyros remained more useful for nuclear missile guidance 
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despite the development of more complex equipment, so too have older 
components remained highly relevant in the space industry. Newer 
components bring both a level of technical uncertainty and the 
requirement of extra learning for those who staff the technologies, whilst 
older technologies are seen to be easier to use because of the experience 
already gathered on their operation and use. Interviewees agreed on this 
extra level of trust granted to older components due to their ‘proven’ 
reliability: 
 
‘For example, the electrical system in a spacecraft tends to be quite 
primitive and uses components that are not by any means state of 
the art because they have to have proven reliability, be radiation-
hardened, etc. So it takes a lot of time and is quite expensive to 
demonstrate this, so for example with computer chips and things 
like that you tend to find very old versions of computer chips.’  
(016, [Private, Technology]) 
 
‘Most of the big space observatories and big space missions are 
using, for example, processor technology that is at least ten years 
old, as it takes you ten years to develop it, and also it’s something 
that’s robust, tested, you know for sure how it’s going to act. It 
might not give you the cutting edge performance, but that’s less 
important than it working.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
This claim is therefore that older components are trusted above newer 
equivalents both due to whatever testing they may have undergone (see 
Chapter 6), but also due to the mere fact of the temporal distance involved. 
The first interviewee’s statement that ‘it takes a lot of time […] to 
demonstrate this’ suggests a level of perceived inevitability to the process. 
A component needs time to be tested and proven, so by giving it that time, 
it will emerge from the process reliable and trusted. The second quote 
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agrees by stating it takes ‘ten years to develop [a component]’, and then it 
becomes something that is ‘robust, tested, you know for sure it’s going to 
act’. These quotes show that time serves as an important method and 
concept for getting a component widely accepted – newer components 
which may simply be an ‘upgrade’ of the original, rather than entirely new, 
can still struggle to find acceptance against their well-tested predecessors.  
 
Crucially this means that the time committed to the development and prior 
use of a component becomes a method to reduce the perception of risk in a 
later programme that subsequently uses it. It is a trade-off – the more time 
that went into the components before any given programme begins its 
development, the lower the perceived risk of that programme. ‘Degrees of 
danger are socially mediated’ (Balmer, 2006:693) and the time spent 
developing the component in the past is thus mobilized to sell its low risk in 
the present day. The claim of increased reliability and reduced risk comes 
from the time that has gone into the programme’s components, and by 
using components which already exist, the programme both appears more 
reliable and does not have to spend any time developing those 
components itself. By emphasizing this separation between the 
components and the eventual programme, the development of the 
components is discursively positioned outside and prior to a particular 
programme, and thus is not considered within the timescale of the 
programme. This is another reason why normalized future narratives are 
primarily concerned with the mitigation of risk, not the management of 
negative perceptions of temporally lengthy programmes: service-led 
programmes take less time because they will primarily, or sometimes 
exclusively, use hardware that has already been developed.  
 
What this illustrates is that wherever possible ‘off-the-shelf’ technology is 
preferred for as many of the components of a given mission as possible. 
Using such ‘ordinary’ components helps a future narrative to appear 
normalized and mundane, and therefore low-risk and high-reliability. Off-
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the-shelf technology is a term used to denote components that are 
designed with ideals in mind of ‘low cost, ready availability, high 
performance [and] low power [demands]’ (Underwood, 2003:193). It is the 
second of these to which we look for understanding of this use of older 
hardware in such missions – the ready availability. The development of 
normalized space programmes does not have to include the time, 
resources or expertise required to develop new components; instead such 
programmes are able to utilize components that have already been 
developed, and due to having been developed and used before the 
programme begins, are likely to be well-trusted within the sector. The 
emphasis within the sector on older components being inherently more 
desirable encourages the sector towards their use, whilst this very use of 
older components can then be used as a method for demonstrating the 
reliability and low-risk of a normalized programme as we shall see in the 
examination of Skylon later in this chapter. Skylon uses many components 
the sector has used before which have become normalized (whilst playing 
down the role of its major new and ‘innovative’ companies), and this use 
epitomises this more conservative preference for the choice of utilized 
components. Creating such ‘off-the-shelf’ components will be explored in 
depth as the primary focus of the next chapter on adaptive future 
narratives. 
 
There was also a second reason I identified behind the strong preference 
for older components, which was a technical factor unique to the space 
industry. This was the claim that using older circuitry in space technologies 
is preferable due to the effects of extra-atmospheric radiation. In addition 
to preferring tried-and-tested hardware for all the rationales already 
explored, this interviewee suggested that even if modern space-based 
technology was as normalized and trusted as older components, they still 
would not be as desirable due to a quirk of the space medium and what 




‘In the space scenario where you have charged particles flying 
around without the atmosphere to protect you, the very high 
velocity particles can go straight through a circuit board, and if the 
tracks are close together… whereas big technology with big old-
fashioned boards, with tracks further apart, it’s actually more 
robust.’ 
(022, [Private, Technology, Comms]) 
 
This interviewee was one of the last interviewed so the potential to pursue 
this avenue further with other respondents was limited, but it does raise 
interesting questions about both the future of the space sector and the 
position of advancing technology within it. According to this interviewee 
the sophistication of space technology for certain components may be 
limited due to the nature of the space environment, much as airspace or 
aquatic environments will impose limits and requirements upon their 
equivalent high-risk technologies. This claim therefore undermines 
traditional technologically determinist assumptions (cf. Williams, 2006) 
about the ‘progression’ and ‘improvement’ of technology as being 
inherently, and universally, desirable. However, it is worth noting that the 
above comment refers only to circuitry, not any of the other components of 
a satellite or other space technology. Whilst this impacts upon the uptake 
of new components, I believe this space-specific issue for circuitry remains 
a small concern. There was only a single interviewee who mentioned it, and 
the comment said little about the simultaneous development of other 
space technologies – for example those which may protect against radiation 
and particle damage – which could be coupled with improved circuits to 
offset the issue with smaller circuit tracks. 
 
In summary, the preference for older technology – primarily due to the 
social construction of older technology as reliable and well-trusted (but 
also the claimed circuitry issue for space components) – is a form of trade-
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off between the high-risk and long-term natures of the space industry. I 
propose that this trade-off can be expressed as a rule: 
 
The longer the development that went into the components before 
the start of a programme, the lower the perceived risk of the 
programme itself. 
 
However, these two reasons – both of which draw upon the temporal 
distance of the component’s development as a way to sell its value for 
normalized service provision – were accompanied by a third factor relating 
to the use of older components. This was the decision-making process of 
long-established space sector employees who give preference to these 
components for their own reasons, rather than only considering the value 
of presented trusted and normalized programmes to service-orientated 
private actors. Two interviewees argued that the sector’s conservatism was 
in part due to most of the influential individuals within the space industry 
originating from one generation of scientists and engineers, and that this 
generation had become predisposed to supporting conservative 
programmes. This was one of the only pieces of data acquired which 
focused specifically on the individual human actors rather than the 
interrelation of many different actors involved in the contemporary space 
industry. The two interviewees who raised this topic were both amongst 
the older interviewees in the research, worked in the private sector, and 
raised several interrelated points about the role of human actors with 
particular experiences and histories within the space sector: 
 
‘I think it’s going to change as our generation, if you can call it that, 
retires. Everyone in this industry knows everyone else… and since we 
all started at the same time and everyone knows everyone, there’s a 
bit of a comfort zone thing. I suspect in the next few years that will 
change. Because one big problem we have in our industry is that… 
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there’s not a new field of people coming through. We all came out of 
the big Marconis [a British space electronics company].’ 
(024, [Private, Comms]) 
 
‘So it’s very much that there are built in ways of thinking, people are 
used to handling them, people are used to working with them and 
they know how it works.’ 
(023, [Private, Science]) 
 
In these quotes the interviewees argued that the group to which they 
themselves belonged – of older space scientists and technologists – 
discouraged the space sector from pursuing programmes outside a certain 
sort. The idea of the ‘comfort zone’ in the first quote is much the same as 
the conservatism described in this chapter, but in describing it in this way 
the interviewee sought to argue this was more due to preferences and 
opinions amongst space engineers, not a function of minimizing quantified 
risk and maximizing reliability in order to recruit external support for the 
programme. Although these two are very ‘personal’ perspectives on the 
nature of space sector conservatism that emphasizes the human actors and 
de-emphasizes the interactions between corporate or technological actors 
in the industry, such a concept is not without prior scholarly work to 
support it. 
 
In his study of the subatomic particles known as quarks, Pickering (1984:10-
12) coined the term ‘opportunism in context’, arguing that scientific careers 
can be significantly advanced by taking advantage of certain contexts – in 
this case, the massive state funding that the early space industry was 
granted (Fisk, 2008; Hill, 2012). The careers of many scientists, 
technologists and engineers were enhanced significantly by the emphasis 
and support many states placed on the space industry during its first few 
decades, a context specific to a particular ‘time and place’ (Hermanowicz, 
2007:629). These quotes support the assertion that many of the higher 
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echelons of the sector contain a specific ‘generation’ of individuals who saw 
significant potential in the early space industry, and whose perspectives are 
strongly determined by what the space sector was when their careers 
began. These interviewees were the only ones to mention this perspective 
on the people involved in the space industry (and acknowledged that they 
were part of this generation themselves) rather than citing the other 
rationales in this chapter for the normalization of much of the space 
industry. Whilst the sample size of the interviewee set was too small to 
draw any such demographic conclusion, the average time spent within the 
industry of those who worked within well-established parts of the space 
industry tended to be high in comparison to those working in more 
innovative technologies. This is not to say that youth guarantees innovation 
(nor that age is a guarantee of conservatism) but rather that the 
development of the space industry over the last fifty years may have led to 
a level of socialization within its human actors. Socialization is a 
phenomenon by which those within organizations and other social settings 
‘commit themselves to a distinct way of life’ (van Maanen & Schein, 
1977:209) according to the unwritten and learned rules of that setting. For 
the space industry’s senior staff, this assertion of socialization from these 
two interviewees is supported by the work of King and Sethi (1992) who 
describe the creation of a ‘custodial’ role that employees within high-
technology industries can take on, focused around the maintaining of the 
status quo. As these individuals are more likely to be in senior positions – 
the longer the employment, the higher the likely rank and the higher the 
likely degree of socialization – this leads towards a preference for 
programmes using older and safer components. In this chapter’s later 
discussion of chemical rockets (5.3.3) we shall see another way in which 
norms and routines within the space industry from its early days have 
become ‘entrenched’ and enforce their continued relevance upon the 




This is therefore a push towards conservatism and the mitigation of 
perceived risks that is entirely ‘internal’ to the space industry. This 
preference away from innovation is driven by those who are well-
established within the industry, not by a deliberate and planned agenda 
focused on recruiting outside actors. According to these interviewees 
normalized future narratives may be preferred by those who are secure 
within the space industry and see little value in disrupting the status quo 
too far. As well as the concept of socialization, we can look to the work of 
Wynne (1983) to understand the importance of this human element in 
high-risk development programmes as a whole. Wynne argues that 
commitment to a technological development programme is as much 
personal and intellectual as it is material. Wynne stresses the importance of 
producing ‘taken-for-granted’ frameworks for human actors within a 
programme (Ibid:15), and those within a programme may wish to push for 
a more conservative outcome that can use such frameworks, rather than 
the development of new rationales to go with new and innovative 
programmes. An internal working culture (cf. Chompalov & Shrum, 1999) 
within the space industry or any high-risk sector may be one that values job 
security, reliability and ease of programme development over pushing the 
boundaries of the technology with the attendant risk.  
 
It is also interesting to note that what these actors may support now, 
currently considered conservative, would at some point in the past of the 
space industry have been perceived as deeply innovative. This therefore 
points towards potential future research into the extent to which human 
actors within high-risk sectors come to regard what was once bold and 
innovative research as normalized, and what drives this reorientation of 
interest from the new and untested to the older and trusted. A more 
mundane, normalized narrative for a programme’s development may be 
promoted as much for the comfort and preference of those inside the 
space sector as to promote interest and investment from those outside, 
and due to the age of the space industry such a preference for older 
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components could only have arisen within the past decade or two – 
immediately after the Second World War there were, by definition, no well-
established and well-trusted space components. The older generation may 
remember that these components were the result of more risk-laden 
innovative or experimental work in that era, but they have now become 
normalized and ordinary, and therefore safe for regular use.  
 
This four-fold preference for older components is thereby the second of the 
three themes identified for the growing conservatism in the space sector. 
Older components are strongly preferred due to their perceived reliability 
and low-failure rate; their development times in the past being seen as 
desirable characteristics for a contemporary programme; the claim that 
older circuitry may be more desirable in a space environment; and because 
long-established members of the space industry promote, deliberately or 
otherwise, an institutional culture that privileges the classic over the 
contemporary.  
 
5.3.3. Satellite Launch, Retrieval, and Lifespan 
 
The third major theme identified in the interview data for increasing space 
sector conservatism also consisted of three interrelated issues. These three 
issues are the high cost of launch via chemical rockets, the impossibility of 
retrieving or altering a satellite once it has been launched, and the 
subsequent required length of satellite survival in the space environment 
given these restrictions on satellite technology. This section will explore 
each of these three issues in turn, and then summarize the interrelation 
between them and why they too encourage a more conservative space 
industry. 
 
The first of these issues is the high cost of launching satellites via chemical 
rockets. Two interviewees stressed the high cost of launching satellites as 
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the price for launch by chemical rocket remains relatively inflexible, and 
down to a price-per-kilogram calculation: 
 
‘Getting something into space, the price per kilogram is huge, and in 
terms of innovation that’s now become the main barrier. So if you 
have someone like SSTL saying we can produce you a reliable, cheap 
satellite around the £20m mark but it costs £50m to launch it… it’s 
not worth you going much smaller than that until it becomes 
cheaper to stick something into space.’ 
(007, [Public, EO]) 
 
‘Launching space assets, they’re expensive, you need them to work, 
and that drives conservatism.’ 
(010, [Public, Technology]) 
 
At the time of writing the only reliable and regular method for launching 
satellites remains the chemical rocket (Spaceflightnow, 2015). Such rockets 
are iconic primarily for launching the Space Shuttle, but they remain the 
only means of ground-to-space conveyance for any space programme. 
These are rockets powered by the chemical reactions of propellant fuel, 
producing thrust which carries the rocket and whatever cargo it contains 
from the launchpad. Existing chemical rockets must be booked well in 
advance, are extremely expensive, cannot normally be reused and require 
significant resources to build (e.g. Walker, 1993). These quotes argue that 
the high cost which comes with chemical rockets encourages the space 
sector towards more conservative programmes that are seen as having a 
higher chance of success, in order to minimize the chance that the cost and 
effort of investing in the launch will have been wasted. 
 
Just as we saw that several interviewees emphasized the importance of the 
preferences of space sector incumbents in the use of older components, 
similar comments were made about the history of the space industry being 
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an important factor for understanding the chemical rocket monopoly and 
the high costs of launch that come with it. Two interviewees particularly 
stressed this historical dimension to understanding space industry launch 
vehicles:  
 
‘What Apollo did was to commit to a single short-term objective 
which was put a man on the Moon. It didn’t worry about the cost, or 
create infrastructure. It didn’t worry about follow-on technology, 
and essentially what we’re got now is a consequence of those 
things. Because when you start off you can do anything, but when 
you’ve been through a generation you tend to do things that 
logically follow on from what you’ve done before.’ 
(020, [Public, Private, Science]) 
 
‘That sort of evolution to gradually get into space with reusable 
aircraft never happened, and instead we got into space very quickly, 
but with these expendable rockets. And it’s been very hard to – I 
think people have written alternate histories for this in science 
fiction – imagine an alternative line of development. It’s very hard to 
change the direction and everyone’s still stuck on these expendable 
rockets.’ 
(002, [Public, Science]) 
 
From these comments we can see that the launcher industry is perceived 
as having unintentionally become a black box. Black boxing is a social 
process by which a particular technology becomes standardized in a 
particular form, and is subsequently unquestioned and unchallenged 
(Rammert, 1997). Interviewees argued that the black box of the launcher 
industry, having been the staple launch solution for so long, will actively 
resist changes to launchers (cf. Winner, 1977:244). Those outside the space 
industry who purchase the use of launchers will also be uninterested in a 
potentially more complex technology, and will prefer instead the black 
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boxed launchers they have become comfortable with regularly using. The 
black box of the existing launcher paradigm thereby restricts the types of 
space programme that may be launched. Due to the price of this ubiquitous 
launcher paradigm it is the most reliable, trusted and conservative satellites 
and components that stand by far the best chance of making it onto the 
launchpad. However, this high cost of launch and the resulting 
conservatism is only one issue of three interrelated concerns raised in the 
interview data.  
 
The second issue of the triumvirate explored in this section is the inability 
to retrieve satellites. Although chemical rockets are currently the only 
method by which satellites may be regularly and reliably launched, retrieval 
is significantly beyond their current remit. The impossibility of repairing or 
otherwise physically accessing satellites after launch was identified by a 
number of interviewees as a concern for the space industry, and one that in 
turn is driving its contemporary conservatism: 
 
‘One of the features of launching something into space is that rarely 
can you go up and fix it when something happens to it, so generally 
space instrumentation does have an inherent level of conservatism.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
‘Space is certainly very technically conservative, and the reason for 
that is that if something goes wrong out there, you can’t do 
anything about that.’ 
(017, [Private, Technology]) 
 
‘It just has to work. Once it’s up there, you can’t say ‘Bugger, I forgot 
to tighten up that nut’, it just has to work. And so the degree of 
product assurance, QA, testing, retesting, recording, provenance of 
components, it’s a very high level, it’s just inherent in the business.’ 




The use of the word ‘inherent’ in the first and final quotes is interesting 
because it shows a high level of acceptance in the familiar procedures of 
the space industry and, crucially, a conflation of ‘this is how things are’ with 
‘this is how things have to be’. These procedures have become normalized, 
and in turn high levels of reliability have become a key part of normalized 
future narratives which succeed or fail on their ability to demonstrate the 
ordinariness and trustworthiness of the programme. This space industry 
framework where satellites cannot be retrieved and therefore a high level 
of engineering diligence is required has become a taken-for-granted 
understanding which both acts as the foundation for rules and practices 
(Wynne, 1983) and is further strengthened by continued adherence to 
these norms (King and Sethi, 1992; cf. Chompalov & Shrum, 1999).  
 
This returns us to the concept of reliability – a satellite must be reliable 
precisely because once launched it cannot be fixed. This places space 
technology into a unique category of products and components. Other 
high-technology industries such as nuclear power are able to replace 
components despite containing sophisticated and risky technologies, whilst 
other industries where components have to work in extreme or unusual 
conditions, such as submarines, are equally able to return to be refitted 
and modified as long as they do not suffer a critical destructive failure. 
Although the managerial structures surrounding these technologies may 
also be categorized as ‘High-Reliability Organizations’ (Weick et al, 1999; 
Boin & Schulman, 2008), space stands on its own as an industry with a 
point of no return for any given product. This point of no return is the 
launch, and it was identified in the research as a significant driver towards 
space industry conservatism. Whilst a vehicle like the Space Shuttle is 
unique in this regard in that the same physical craft may have been reused 
multiple times, with that exception the space industry never uses the same 
physical pieces more than once. A satellite is launched, it (hopefully) 
completes its mission and survives in space for the intended length of time, 
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and then it is either abandoned or de-orbited, subsequently burning up in 
the atmosphere. If it fails to meet that goal, however, there is little that can 
be done other than cutting losses and moving on. Since the losses may be 
quite substantial, interviewees argued that this generates a high level of 
conservatism in what is launched, selecting components which are well-
trusted (and therefore have a lower level of perceived risk) than any 
potentially ‘better’ but riskier counterparts. 
 
We have therefore now seen two issues raised in the research data – the 
high cost of chemical rocket launch, and the observation that such launches 
are also points of no return, beyond which a satellite cannot be altered or 
repaired. The third is the length of required survival for satellites, which is 
closely related to these above two issues. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, conservative programmes are often those which aim to reproduce 
and improve a service for which components already exist – television, 
radio, broadband, and other communications. It is the provision of a long 
and reliable service that matters for many space programmes, not the 
technologies which provide and produce that service. Two interviewees 
discussed why the length of survival of satellites has become paramount for 
large numbers of commercial actors. They argued that satellite 
manufacturers tend towards components which can give long-term signal 
reliability rather than potentially more ‘advanced’ technology that may run 
the risk of lasting a shorter length of time in space: 
 
‘Right now if you put a satellite in orbit it has to last 10-15 years, so 
you plan for very high reliability parts because of that, the cost of 
putting the sat in orbit, whereas if the cost of putting it in orbit was 
much less you would not necessarily require a very high reliability of 
the component.’ 




‘Spacecraft are expensive and they take a long time to build and 
launch, [so] there is actually a great reluctance to use untried, 
untested new technology. Although space is often seen as cutting 
edge and in many ways it is, it also can be incredibly conservative 
because if you’re building something that has to operate for the next 
five, ten, maybe fifteen years, the last thing you want to do is to 
have a new dodgy bit of technology that breaks down on day one.’  
(002, [Public, Science]) 
 
Whereas half a century ago merely launching a satellite was a great victory 
(Ellul, 1964:145; cf. Jones et al, 2007), the desired survivability of satellites 
has undergone a distinct discursive shift. The repositioning of many space 
programmes towards providing services instead of science or international 
pride has been accompanied by a shift to satellites needing to survive for 
longer and longer periods of time in space. The first quote shows the 
importance for the commercial sector of considering the length of time a 
satellite must survive for. In this way many satellites have become less and 
less akin to impressive symbols and more akin to normalized pieces of 
infrastructure (Levine, 1986) that merit a normalized future narrative. The 
second quote also emphasizes once more that the satellite itself is neither 
the mission nor the selling point, but rather the service it can offer is what 
sells it. A greater predicted length of survival is more appealing to 
commercial actors than a shorter one, and this in turn requires the use of 
well-trusted components, encouraging the industry towards this 
conservative outlook and the normalization of its future narratives. 
 
We can now identify the relationship between these three issues – costly 
launch, irretrievable satellites, and long-term satellite functioning. If 
launches were cheaper or satellites could be retrieved and repaired, long-
term functioning would be far less important. If launches were carried out 
via a different form of vehicle – such as a spaceplane – satellites could 
perhaps be retrieved. As it stands, however, the financial risk of launching a 
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satellite is significant, and the satellite cannot be repaired, resulting in a 
situation where communication and service satellites are only acceptable if 
they can be trusted to provide a lengthy and successful period of service. 
The moment the satellite fails to function is the moment the service the 
satellite provides ceases to be, and since it cannot be fixed and failure is 
permanent, it must be made as reliable and trusted as possible prior to 
launch. These three interrelated factors form the third and final rationale 
for conservatism identified in the space sector. 
 
Having explored these three drivers towards conservatism within the space 
industry – the changing customer base, the value of old components and 
the three-part problem explored in this section – this chapter will now 
explore a case study that illustrates these three themes and how they have 
altered the future narratives proposed by the space industry. This case 
study is the ‘Skylon’ spaceplane. The next section examines Skylon and 
shows how the normalization of space industry future narratives is 
designed to work around this new conservatism, mitigate the perception of 
risk, bolster the perception of reliability, and ensure that space 
programmes remain viable even when faced with the many conservative 
inclinations identified here.  
 
5.4. Defining New Technology within Existing Norms: The 
Skylon Spaceplane 
 
Skylon is a spaceplane currently being developed by Reaction Engines 
Limited which is designed with the intention of providing a new form of 
launcher for the space industry. Instead of the current norm of chemical 
rockets which can only be used once, must be launched from a specialized 
launch-pad, are very expensive, potentially risky and have ‘slots’ that must 
be booked months or often years in advance, Skylon aims to change all of 
these assumptions. Designed as a craft which takes off and lands in the 
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manner of a plane but enters space (hence ‘spaceplane’), Skylon seeks to 
be reusable, able to be launched from existing airstrips rather than 
specialized launch pad infrastructures, significantly cheaper than chemical 
rockets (because it does not have to be built anew after each use), and can 
potentially be booked only months or even weeks in advance of a required 
launch (Reaction Engines, 2010).  
 
Skylon could understandably therefore be seen as heralding a major change 
within the space industry in terms of many of the themes explored in this 
chapter. It is technologically unlike existing chemical rockets, and it would 
also cause a total reorganization of a number of assumptions within the 
space sector to do with risk, time frames and launch expenses, and the 
amount of forward planning required for any given satellite. However, 
much to my surprise it rapidly became clear that the ways the Skylon 
programme are presented and sold to other actors actually play down both 
the technologies involved, the hype and ambition of the programme 
(Launius, 2003), and the changes this would make to the space industry.  
 
Rather than promising such changes, the future narrative for Skylon’s 
development and potential benefits has been normalized. One interviewee 
involved in the programme (though not directly a Reaction Engines 
employee) had the following to say about Skylon’s normalized 
presentation: 
 
‘The cultural outcrop… you come up against is the mad inventor 
motif. It’s a potent symbol and everyone talks about it. And if you go 
too far in that direction most people and socialization dismisses you 
as a mad inventor. So you’ve got to present it as something that 
makes a significant change but not a change that takes it beyond 
the pale of existing space economics. So Skylon, the guys behind 
Skylon, sell it as something that is effectively the next generation 
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launcher, or a competitor to current-generation launchers, in that it 
has significant cost savings.’ 
(003, [Public, Technology]) 
 
Although used somewhat flippantly in the above quote, what the 
interviewee terms the ‘mad inventor motif’ is actually highly relevant to the 
space industry. When trying to sell service satellites, the existing cultural 
assumptions about the scientific innovation of the space industry leads 
space technologists to avoid selling service-orientated programmes as 
heralding a new age of spaceflight, transport or communications. Instead 
they are presented as being in a clear historical continuity with services 
which have gone before. Skylon has to present a normalized future that, as 
the above quote states, denotes a gradual or iterative improvement over 
existing launchers and presents Skylon within currently normal space 
industry expectations, rather than something that is ‘beyond the pale’ of 
what the space industry expects. Even if Skylon can be seen as a shift that 
could potentially affect the entire sector, it is presented in mundane and 
normalized terms – it can make launches a bit cheaper, a bit safer, a bit 
faster – rather than as something which will fundamentally alter the space 
industry. Skylon in this way is not depicted as a new service in its own right, 
but as only a gradual improvement over the technologies that have 
provided that service in the past (i.e. chemical rockets). The technological 
specifics of the programme are edited out of the language used to describe 
it (or at the very least, toned down). As one interviewee put it: 
 
‘Many people tend to be conservative because they have a solid 
business case and don’t want to risk the credibility of that business 
stuff by introducing all this airy-fairy stuff.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
Were Skylon presented using the tools of the finite future narrative of the 
previous chapter – emphasizing disjuncture, new technology, innovation – 
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it would not appeal as a service for launching satellites. The risk of its 
failure would be considered too high to justify any investment or support. 
Just as the scientific advancement of early spaceflight has now taken 
second-place to the variety of service uses of modern space technology 
(Slotten, 2002; Vedda, 2002; Elhefnawy, 2004; Sadeh, 2005) and the wider 
range of actors space programmes are accountable to (Ocampo et al, 1998; 
Cornelius, 2005; Goehlich et al, 2005), so too has the ‘science fiction 
wonderment’ of early spaceflight (Huntley et al, 2010:25) largely faded (or 
been deliberately removed) to be replaced by the much tougher and 
tighter assessments of risk, reward and reliability shown in this chapter. 
Indeed, although Skylon is defined in technical literature as being a 
‘spaceplane’ (e.g. Varvill & Bond, 2004), this quote suggests that it is 
generally termed in sales pitches and when trying to recruit others as 
simply a new type of ‘launcher’. This word signals consistency with the 
space sector’s current reliance on ‘launchers’, and thus reduces the amount 
of change denoted by the Skylon programme. 
 
This rhetorical strategy is important to analyze – even though its mode of 
operation is utterly different to chemical rockets, the use of the term 
launcher places it discursively within existing models of the launcher 
industry. It downplays the level of change in the components and 
technologies at play – and also, crucially, downplays whatever future 
changes in the space industry it would cause were it to be fully adopted – 
and presents it as simply something which launches satellites, the same job 
chemical rockets do now. In this way it is presented as something that does 
the old task better and maintains a service of satellite-launching. The term 
spaceplane is seen to represent too much of a discontinuity with that which 
has gone before, and hints more explicitly towards the changes it would 
herald than the term new launcher. Other interviewees concurred about 
the importance of describing new space technologies within the discursive 




‘One of the sales points we’re having to make with Skylon – and this 
in certain quarters is a very strong selling point – is how much it’s 
like existing launchers. The thing that really works isn’t us showing 
delivering 24 people to the International Space Station, it’s us 
showing a communications satellite being launched into Geo-
Synchronous Orbit and does exactly the same thing and looks the 
same.’ 
(015, [Private, Technology]) 
 
‘For Skylon… the marketing pitch should not be technology-led, it’s ‘I 
can give you a far more reliable, risk-averse, [system]’. You’re 
dumbing down your fantastic scientific breakthroughs because your 
end customers, frankly, don’t give a toss [laugh]. They’re buying a 
service, and they want it to be reliable. You don’t sell technology, 
you’re selling a service.’ 
(025, [Private, Technology]) 
 
Rather than leading with the technology, they lead with the service. Private 
actors have no particular interest in the technical or engineering specifics – 
in this case a new form of launch vehicle – but rather in the outcomes and 
the services it can provide (Jørgensen et al, 2009). Instead of terming 
Skylon as an innovative new launch vehicle that tests certain technologies 
or new components – an objective only of primary interest to the engineers 
working on it – Skylon instead defines itself within the objectives that 
outside actors will recognize, which is to say cheaper, faster and more 
reliable launches, as well as a longer-term objective to potentially make 
satellites retrievable once in orbit. These have all been identified in this 
chapter as issues that encourage a more conservative outlook in the space 
sector, and these methods recruit actors without appearing to upset the 




This form of expressing a programme’s objectives is therefore a 
fundamental method by which programmes which are not focused around 
‘science’ are able to recruit actors into supporting new high-risk 
technologies and developments. Normalizing the future intentions of a 
programme allows for some gradual technological development and 
change because the final product is defined within specific boundaries that 
emphasize its practical benefits, not its new technologies. Reaction Engines’ 
objective to develop new propulsion technology and revolutionize the 
launch industry is, despite the apparent promise of such an idea, not what 
commercial space actors are interested in, and thus it is normalized into 
merely representing an improvement over the status quo in terms of 
quantities – time, cost, risk, etc – that commercial actors are familiar with. 
Skylon is promising significant upheavals, but presents these upheavals in 
terms that actors who do not desire upheavals are also willing to support. 
This creates a juxtaposition of equivalences (Callon et al, 1986a, 1986b) 
between the two actors where the technological innovations of one have 
been presented as service potential for the other, and thus the programme 
is strengthened by the shared interest in Skylon’s success, even if private 
and engineering actors’ reasons for supporting Skylon are entirely unalike.  
 
To return to the three themes of this chapter, it is clear that the Skylon 
programme includes them all. Firstly, Skylon is designed to appeal to a wide 
range of private actors newly investing in the space sector by promising 
improvements in satellite launch services. These affect all commercial 
space actors irrespective of the specific services their satellites provide. 
Secondly, although much of Skylon’s success or failure is believed to come 
down to the viability of one essential new component (Reaction Engines, 
2012), the majority of the spaceplane consists of old components used in 
new ways (Hempsel, 2010) – clear recourse to tried and trusted 
components already used in the space industry. Third and most interesting 
is its relationship to the issues of launch vehicles, satellite survival and 
satellite retrieval. These assumptions have become so ingrained within the 
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space industry that it does not seek to explicitly challenge them, but rather 
to emphasize that it can offer slight, gradual improvement in those fields. 
This is presented as a small development that will improve the space 
industry for all satellite manufacturers rather than a major change which 
will require significant upheaval and re-thinking. Reaction Engines has 
normalized the future narrative for Skylon’s planned development by 
promising improved reliability, speed and safety, and a service-led promise, 
rather than emphasizing bold claims and clear changes from the space 
industry norm. As mentioned at the start of the chapter (and covered in 
more depth below), a normalized future narrative is fundamentally 
terminological in nature. Skylon has produced a successful normalized 
future by acknowledging the three core reasons for the space sector’s 
increased conservatism, and altering the language of its promises to meet 




This research project considers technological development in high-risk and 
long-term technological industries. Where a finite future narrative as 
analyzed in the previous chapter is designed to manage long timescales, 
the normalized future narrative proposed in this chapter is specifically 
designed to mitigate the perceived risk of such programmes, and has little 
to do with their normally significant temporal dimension. As defined in the 
introduction, a normalized future narrative is a less codified or distinct 
structure than a finite future narrative (or the adaptive future narratives of 
the next chapter), but rather refers to a future narrative for a programme’s 
intended development and objectives which has been normalized. By this I 
mean that the terminology describing every aspect of the programme – the 
planned objectives, funding proposals, media appearances, internal 
working documents, government or policy documents – has been altered 
and designed in order to account for the three new conservative impetuses 
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identified in this chapter from the interview data. This conservatism has led 
to the creation of normalized future narratives which emphasize regularity, 
mundanity and ordinariness, designed specifically to reassure potential 
stakeholders about the reliability and low-risk of a given programme.  
 
The first of the three themes was the increasingly commercial and 
privatized customer base of the space industry. Linked to the issues 
explored in Chapter 1 (Sadeh, 2005; de Montluc, 2009; etc), a significant 
number of important actors relevant to the contemporary space industry 
are private and commercial actors, rather than the states and militaries of 
the Space Race era. Just as some private actors in the space industry now 
engage with space science missions in order to pursue spin-off (Bach et al, 
2002; Worms & Haerendel, 2004; Chapter 4), many private actors are also 
now turning to the space industry as a method for service provision. This 
higher number of commercial interests within the space sector means that 
the customer base for the space industry has shifted towards being more 
interested in technical reliability than the generation of new scientific 
knowledge (e.g. Greenberg, 1993; Vedda, 2002; von der Dunk, 2011), and 
the interview data showed that a large portion of the space industry has 
therefore reorientated itself towards the service-led programmes that risk-
averse private actors are more interested in supporting. 
 
The second was the observation that the space industry has existed long 
enough to build up a repertoire of trusted and well-used components. The 
research showed that older components are used because they are 
considered a step ‘apart’ from the rest of a given programme. Whereas 
new and innovative components would require time to be developed and 
tested, components developed before the start of a programme have a 
multitude of benefits. Their development time is separated from that of a 
space programme that will eventually use them, making the temporal 
dimension of normalized space programmes appear far less; they are 
components that have already undergone extensive testing and are 
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therefore considered reliable; and the mere fact of the temporal distance 
between their development and their eventual use is itself sufficient to 
lend them a reduced sense of risk compared to new components. This is 
coupled with the preferences of the human actors long-established within 
the space industry, identifying the importance of interpersonal aspects of 
technology programmes (Wynne, 1983) and internal working cultures 
(Chompalov & Shrum, 1999) that may tend towards the conservative use of 
older components. One interviewee also suggested the older components 
are preferable due to a quirk of the space environment resulting in ‘less 
advanced’ circuits being less prone to radiation damage. 
 
The third consisted of three interrelated issues – the high cost of launch, 
the risk of launching a satellite which cannot be repaired or replaced once 
in space, and the subsequent need for satellites with long lifespans in as a 
response to these other two issues. The very high cost of launch for space 
programmes encourages a level of testing and diligence in order to ensure 
that the satellite in question gives as much value as possible per launch, 
whilst the inability to retrieve satellites means that it is considered 
paramount that they have the highest chance of success once launched. 
These both create the need for satellites that last a long time within the 
space environment, encouraging a preference for only launching tried and 
trusted satellites rather than more innovative alternatives. 
 
These three themes towards conservatism and the subsequent need to 
normalize the future narratives of high-risk technologies were examined via 
the case study of the Skylon spaceplane. In contrast to chemical rockets, 
Skylon is designed to be reused, launched from airstrips instead of special 
launch pads, far cheaper than chemical rockets, and able to have a very 
rapid turn-around time from booking a launch to the launch itself. The 
examination showed that due to the new conservatism and the 
normalization of future narratives, Skylon is presented and sold in a specific 
way. Rather than emphasizing the new technologies and components 
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involved (see Chapter 4) and the disjuncture with present-day launch 
vehicles, Skylon is depicted as being a cheaper, safer and faster type of 
launcher, rather than an entirely new technology. It is presented as 
something that simply launches satellites, which is a task that chemical 
rockets already perform and external actors are used to. Although the 
technical definition of Skylon is a ‘spaceplane’ this term was rarely used by 
interviewees involved in the Skylon programme, who both emphasized in 
the interview situation that it should be thought of as a launcher, and that 
using this definition was itself an important discursive choice as part of 
normalizing the programme. Any sense of major technological change 
within Skylon is played down and replaced by pragmatic assessments of its 
benefits. By using a normalized future narrative Skylon is able to present its 
technical innovation as merely a slight – but still very desirable – 
improvement in service normality. 
 
To conclude, a normative future narrative is highly distinct from the finite 
future narrative of the previous chapter. Instead of providing a story that is 
different from what has come before, normalized future narratives reuse 
and iterate upon past stories of successful service provision. Rather than 
emphasizing the step-by-step process towards its completion and the 
newness and value of its objectives, the normalization of future narratives 
instead seeks to make the programme appear as ordinary, mundane, 
reliable and realistic as possible, and proposes outcomes that are a 
continuation of the services that have come before. Where finite future 
narratives emphasize new technologies and processes as a means to 
generating new scientific knowledge or spin-off products, normalized 
future narratives de-emphasize any new technology in the programme and 
stress that many of the components are old, reliable, and unproblematic. In 
contrast to emphasizing what high-risk technologies can do for national 
pride or citizen inspiration, normalized future narratives reposition high-risk 
technologies as being as close to mundane and everyday technologies as 
possible. Any risk, even risk that brings with it a potentially greater reward, 
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is downplayed in favour of reliability of the components and confidence in 
the programme. The normalized future narrative is therefore best 
understood as an attempt to reposition a high-risk industry seeking to 
remain viable and fundable in an era of privatization and reduced state 
funding. Instead of presenting space technology as the end-goal, the 
technology becomes an artefact which is ‘bought and sold in an economic 
system’ (Balmer & Sharp, 1993:474). For much of the space industry the 
future narratives of a past era are no longer appropriate, so new 
normalized narratives for the new range of actors and customers relevant 
to the sector have been created which reposition space technology in this 
manner.  
 
Beyond the space industry the concept of the normalized future narrative 
stands as an analytic tool for potentially examining other industries or 
technologies that have undergone a similar discursive shift from state and 
military funding into a market environment. Sectors of this sort include the 
Internet, which shifted from a high-reliability organization (Boin & 
Schulman, 2008) designed to ensure communication in a time of nuclear 
war to a public and private marketplace of immense size, no longer 
controlled by a single state (Abbate, 1999); the shift within the aerospace 
industry from military development (Futrell, 1989) into commercial air 
travel (Alic et al, 1992); and nuclear power’s discursive move from military-
scientific research (Rosenberg, 1983; Sagan, 1995) into a leading source of 
global energy production and consumption (Winner, 1986). These are 
presented as ‘services’ – air travel provides a transit service, nuclear power 
an energy service, the Internet a service for information exchange – and 
the technologies which underpin them are toned down or simply excluded 
from the presentation of the service altogether. All the language used 
within these programmes is designed to reflect this new requirement for 
high-reliability and low-risk, and to describe the programme in terms of the 
service it offers, rather than focusing on the method by which that service 
is provided. In doing so a normalized future narrative attempts to make 
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these high-risk technologies appear akin to the bikes and bulbs which SCOT 

































Chapter Six: Adaptive Future Narratives:  




This chapter is the third and final analysis chapter in this thesis, and 
proposes the concept of the ‘adaptive’ future narrative to conclude the 
proposed typology. The previous two chapters have covered the first two of 
the three distinct narrative types that emerged via coding and analysis of 
my research data. The first of these was the finite future narrative. This is a 
future narrative with two elements: a detailed plan or ‘roadmap’ which lays 
out a step-by-step process by which the space programme may be 
completed, and a clear temporal end-point beyond which the programme 
will not continue (and at which point it will therefore cease to demand 
time, money, expertise, commitment, etc). The development times of such 
programmes are often many years or sometimes even several decades, and 
when considered as tool for use within high-risk industries it was identified 
as being a future narrative focused on the temporal dimension, not upon 
risk. The second future narrative was that of the normalized future 
narrative, which seeks to present the space industry as something ordinary 
and mundane. They do this in order to negotiate the many drivers towards 
conservatism within the space industry identified in Chapter 5, including 
the growing presence of private and commercial actors in the space 
industry. This was explored in particular detail using the case study of the 
‘Skylon’ spaceplane, which plays down the new technologies and processes 
going into its development and instead plays up the service potential of the 
spaceplane for faster, cheaper and more reliable satellite launches. In this 
way these future narratives are used to present the space industry as an 
ordinary technological industry which private actors might be keen to invest 
in. This was a future narrative that dealt primarily with lessening the 
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perception of risk, rather than negotiating the timescales of lengthy 
development.  
 
This chapter explores the third future narrative identified by this study – 
what I term an adaptive future narrative. Whereas finite and normalized 
future narratives apply to ‘programmes’ that are seeking to develop space 
science missions, satellites, or fleets of satellites, adaptive future narratives 
are instead designed to aid in the construction and future use of space 
components. This chapter will thus use the term ‘component development’ 
in lieu of the term ‘programme’ to describe the creation and subsequent 
deployment of a component, rather than the equivalent process for an 
entire space programme (which may consist of many thousands of 
components). A small number of interviewees quoted in this chapter did 
use the term ‘programme’ to refer to component development, but I am 
selecting a different term here for the sake of clarity and to aid in 
distinguishing between the creation of ‘programmes’ and ‘components’. No 
particular analytic importance was found in the research data in relation to 
the use of the term ‘programme’, so a minor rephrasing to aid 
understanding is acceptable in this context. 
 
Space components may be circuit boards, solar panels, communication 
equipment, or anything else flown on a large number of satellites. They 
may be designed for initial use on a specific satellite which will be followed 
by wider use, or designed for immediate market distribution without an 
initial mission in mind. Although only relevant to components, this future 
narrative was found to be just as important as the other two in this thesis – 
in some ways more so, since there may be thousands of components for 
any one satellite. Such a future narrative is designed to convey the 
impression that the component being produced may not be used for any 
specific programme or set of programmes, but rather that upon completion 
of the development of the component, it can then be used in any 
subsequent satellite or space programme which requires a component of 
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that sort. It is termed ‘adaptive’ due to the claim that the technical output 
of a component development can be adapted to the needs of any potential 
programme, and because such component developments propose that this 
adaptability and concurrent applicability will be the case for an indefinitely 
long time into the future. A successful adaptive future narrative will be 
used to ‘prove’ that a component is a well-trusted piece of hardware that 
will work reliably and safely when put to any use, and an unsuccessful one 
will leave a piece of hardware appearing unsafe, unreliable, or outdated.  
 
The most important code that emerged in my interview data which pointed 
towards adaptive future narratives was that of ‘Credibility’. Whereas the 
cores of the finite future narrative are the roadmap and its promised 
objectives, and normalized future narratives are focused on recognizing 
emerged and emerging conservative tendencies and demonstrating the low 
risks of the programme, adaptive future narratives live or die on the 
strength of the forms of credibility associated with them. An adaptive 
future narrative consists of a lengthy retrospective narrative about all the 
forms of credibility a component has attained throughout its technological 
development, and then leverages this past to make claims that emphasize 
the component’s universal applicability to future space programmes. 
Components that deploy successful adaptive future narratives are 
therefore readily identifiable as the preferred type of component for 
service-led space programmes, as explored in Chapter 5. 
 
In order to make clear the functioning of the adaptive future narrative, this 
chapter will first explore how interviewees explained the acquisition of 
‘credibility’ for new component developments. The interview data showed 
that credibility may be acquired at three stages: when the component is 
deemed to be in its early or formative phase, when the component is in 
what I will term ‘technical development’ (this period was described as 
taking a component from a ‘concept’ into a completed ‘product’), and 
when many of the technical aspects of the component are complete and 
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there is a planned launch of a satellite using that component. The chapter 
will first examine how credibility is gained in the early stages of a 
component development – this is achieved primarily through accreditation 
by a trusted space body like ESA, or by acquiring government funding and 
interest.  
 
Subsequently the chapter will explore how credibility is managed in the 
‘technical development’ stage of a component development. This is done 
primarily through two methods – the concept of the ‘Technology Readiness 
Level’ (TRL), and the use of complex testing regimes. The chapter will 
consider the TRL system and how each level is used to further lend 
respectability and viability to a component development, a system which 
was found to be comparable to what Balmer and Sharp identify as the 
concept of the ‘technological trajectory’ (1993:473) – a heuristic framework 
which ‘forms the basis for the development of the technology’ and along 
which the developing technology is expected to progress. The chapter then 
explores the crucial roles played by discursive concepts of objectivity, 
neutrality and linearity within this framework, and how these are used to 
bolster the impact of the TRL system. It will then look in more depth at 
testing regimes (which are a key part of mid-range TRLs) and how financial 
investment, the testing processes themselves, and the ideas of standards 
and acceptable margins are used to manage actors outside the space 
industry itself. Although all levels of the TRL system were found to be 
relevant to the accumulation of credibility, the interview data gathered on 
testing and standardization was far greater than that acquired on the ‘early’ 
or ‘late’ TRLs, and these processes were found to be integral to component 
credibility. 
 
Lastly the chapter analyses the final part of the credibility process which 
occurs long after testing. This final stage consists of the twin concepts of 
‘qualifying’ a component or technology for launch, and the concept of 
‘flight heritage’ and the issues it poses for new components. The chapter 
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will then contain a summary of how these concepts of credibility are then 
deployed ‘retrospectively’ after the technical development phase of the 
component development concludes, and therefore how they therefore 
contribute to the construction of adaptive future narratives, and the 
contrasts and relationships between adaptive future narratives and the 
other two forms proposed in this work. 
 
6.2. Early Credibility 
 
6.2.1. Third-Party Accreditation 
 
Analysis of the interview data showed that there were two ways for 
credibility to be ‘gained’ in the early stages of a component’s development. 
This section explores these and how they begin to lay the groundwork for 
the construction of adaptive future narratives. Interviewees argued that 
credibility may be attained via being positively assessed by a large space 
body such as ESA, or by gaining government funding at an early stage. ESA 
was found to be an important contributor to the creation of credibility for 
component developments in the UK. Interviewees explained that ESA offers 
a variety of methods – workshops, exercises and assessments – which can 
be used to enhance the credibility of that component. For example, when 
speaking about attempting to enhance the early credibility of one 
particular component, an interviewee stated the following: 
 
‘We invited people from all over the world to come and hear [about 
the component]. People from NASA, from ESA, from Russia, Japan, 
and allow them to ask any questions they liked. Because a lot of it is 
about giving and enhancing their credibility and allowing peer group 
review, if you like, to challenge, question, allow them to answer, and 
that process gives everyone more confidence. It gives us more 
confidence that if they’re able to answer the questions these guys 
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are asking, they know what they’re talking about, as with any new 
technology there’s a credibility issue.’ 
 (002, [Public, Science]) 
 
Components for space programmes (being high-risk, high-cost and high-
time) may struggle to look like credible investments, particularly given 
public associations with the space industry explored earlier in this thesis, 
and ESA seeks to enhance the credibility of early-stage components that it 
deems appropriate to support. Once this topic became apparent, a 
significant number of interviewees explored the reasons they understood 
as being behind the importance of ESA-granted credibility, the value that 
this credibility had, and the processes behind the creation of that 
credibility. Three interviewees offered summaries of the uses of ESA in this 
regard: 
 
‘Ultimately things like the ESA science programme are a way of 
developing capability in ESA member states and de-risking 
developing technology.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
‘You get a level of credibility by going through the ESA process, and 
the qualification process is really rigorous, so to some extent you 
position the technology at a point where it’s considered to be 
credible, and then your next step is how you transition that into the 
commercial world.’ 
(023, [Private, Science]) 
 
‘If you do some technology and ESA thinks it’s good, then the world 
will say it’s good. Whereas if a country does it, they might say well, 





These quotes show that there are a number of perceived benefits to 
accreditation from a body such as ESA. The first interviewee describes ESA’s 
role as ‘developing capability’ in member states, i.e. assisting in the 
creation of components that can perform important roles in space missions 
by reducing the perception of risk around these new technologies. The 
second suggests that the importance of credibility in the space sector is 
more to do with ‘position[ing] the technology’ – removing a technology or 
component from blue skies research or the realm of possibility, and 
towards a more practical and factual suggestion that will result in use 
within an eventual programme. However, it is the third which points 
towards an important issue about the nature of authority in the space 
industry which is worth exploring in more depth. 
 
Space agencies – especially multinational ones – were seen by interviewees 
as having the capability to make neutral assessments about space 
technologies, and were perceived as arbiters who can assess the purely 
technical aspects of space components without any political sheen. As we 
have seen, the ontology of outer space has shifted – at least publicly – 
towards one of common heritage and cooperation (Peterson, 1997) rather 
than competition (Ehrenfreund & Peter, 2009), and the perception of space 
agencies has followed suit with this change. Space agencies can no longer 
count on automatic, politically-backed support from state governments 
(Salomon, 1996) – this has led to them being seen as comparatively 
apolitical actors, and therefore a good source of knowledge and judgement 
that will not be biased by nations standing behind their own components 
and programmes. Equally, the loss of political influence in space agencies 
leaves them perceived as organizations consisting of only natural scientists 
and engineers free of political oversight. This gives space agencies 
significant discursive power to lend credibility to new components in a 
seemingly neutral manner. One example of the effectiveness of gaining 
credibility via ESA was the Skylon spaceplane programme explored in the 
previous chapter. During the research I interviewed a number of people 
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responsible for the development of the components used in the 
programme, and they identified a number of positive outcomes that going 
through the ESA process had generated. One had the following to say: 
 
‘We’ve worked with ESA to commission a technology review of what 
[Skylon] are doing. So a two or three day engineering review, world-
class experts got together under appropriate non-disclosure 
agreements and so on and did an assessment of the technology, and 
the report at the end said ‘Yes, this is feasible, we can see no reason 
why this shouldn’t work’. Now that piece of paper is worth a huge 
amount when you go and talk to a bank or an investor, and say the 
ESA – you might want one that says NASA instead because an 
investor might have heard of NASA [laughter] – but a global 
authority has said that our system makes sense, and is worthwhile, 
so that endorsement is worth a lot more than the money because it 
enables you to unlock other relationships in other directions.’ 
(011, [Public, Technology]) 
 
The quote from this interviewee identifies a number of benefits of the 
process and also shows several unquestioned assumptions inherent in this 
same process. This interviewee mentions the acquisition of ‘world-class 
experts’ who would be the ones who would get together and establish the 
viability or otherwise of Skylon. This lends credibility to the judgements of 
these bodies (Rip, 2003) by deploying claims of the expertise and 
experience of those carrying out the judgements (French & Raven, 1960; 
Hilgartner, 1990) within the apparently depoliticized space agencies. Other 
interviewees as well as the one quoted above said that deferring to ‘expert’ 
judgement was a key part of the early credibility process (the first part of 
forming an adaptive future narrative). Upon being questioned many of the 
interviewees dismissed the possibility of entertaining any alternatives; 
experts must be involved, and if not, then national preferences would be 




We can’t possibly be experts on everything. But what we can do is 
provide a link. If it’s something serious [we can] involve experts at 
one of our national labs, or in ESA to bring their expertise to bear on 
something to evaluate it, the technical credibility of something.’ 
(002, [Public, Science]) 
 
‘If you disagree with the scientific recommendation, then each and 
every one of us will be bringing in their national wants.’ 
(006, [Public, EO, Technology]) 
 
After this process is complete, the opinions of the experts become the 
assessment that is given out by the body as a whole. Although depicted as 
technical, the process remains firmly social (Shapin, 1995; Rammert, 1997) 
and generated via the interplay between the experts rallied to the 
consultation. The social process of deciding on the feasibility of the 
component amongst the experts becomes quickly inseparable from the 
mark of quality that the space agency as an institution gives the 
component, and this mark of quality is presented subsequently as a purely 
technical outcome. In this case the institution is ESA, but other national 
space agencies with equal global prestige are able to carry out the same 
procedure. The endorsement from a trusted and seemingly impartial 
authority helps to achieve a strong seal of approval that can be used by 
proponents of the component.  
 
This kind of third-party accreditation was found to be an important first 
step in generating a compelling credibility narrative. It relies on the 
perception of neutrality and objectivity on the part of the agencies doing 
the assessing, a perception which flows from the overall depoliticizing of 
the space industry and the loss of unquestioned national funding for space 
technology. However, outside actors are not only recruited through a mark 
of quality from known and trusted space industry actors. Those outside the 
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space industry may not be aware of the significance of such bodies, nor 
fully understand the process behind the endorsement. A key second 
method for recruiting those outside the space industry comes from a 
different form of credibility. Rather than a ‘technical’ assessment by a 
trusted industry expert body, governments – which is to say, governmental 
scientists and technologists – are able to lend credibility to a component 
themselves, a form of credibility which is focused somewhat more upon 
finance than technical feasibility.  
 
6.2.2. Government Investment 
 
The interview data showed that confidence within government circles was 
another important method to acquire credibility for the early stages of a 
component’s development, and in turn contribute to that component’s 
adaptive future narrative. Sans-Menéndez and Cabello (2000) argue that 
future predictions strongly influence policy choices, in this case the choice 
to support a component or to choose another. Interviewees echoed this 
perspective, stating that initial government funding and policy interest in 
the outcomes of a component development were important ways to attain 
initial credibility, instead of or as well as the use of space agency interest 
described in the previous section. 
 
‘Government investment… tends to give authority to the technology 
and validity to the technology that perhaps is not so prevalent in the 
private sector, so it’s important to have the government saying 
basically ‘Yes, we think this is a good idea and we’re prepared to put 
some of our money into it’.’ 




‘That argument about the confidence that the public sector getting 
involved gives the private sector to get involved, especially if it’s 
risky or long-term.’  
(002, [Public, Science]) 
 
These quotes suggest that government interest gives ‘authority’ to the 
technology – which is to say, a government endorsing a technology gives 
the technology a level of credibility as something worth taking seriously. As 
we shall see this form of government-given credibility is focused on a belief 
that funding will continue once the component has a governmental ‘anchor 
tenant’. The interview data yielded a perception that government money 
signals a level of commitment that will not be suddenly withdrawn (Balogh 
et al, 2010; Balogh, 2011; etc). Such funding is seen as less reliant on ‘the 
market’ and therefore less variable or capricious. A number of interviewees 
elaborated upon this role that government investment makes and why it is 
seen as so significant. Two interviewees linked it explicitly to private money, 
and that government money was merely seen as a stepping stone to enable 
the acquisition of private finance: 
 
‘It’s important that the public side makes a clear commitment to 
provide that baseline investment, because that could be used to get 
the private investment from the banks that you can then leverage 
and gear up and be able to make the later investments in the 
programme.’ 
(011, [Public, Technology]) 
 
‘The function of state funding is to de-risk stuff to the point where 
the private sector can take over.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
There was therefore a strong level of agreement between interviewees that 
some credibility for a component must be attained from elsewhere first, 
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and this could be via state funding. Such credibility ‘de-risks’ the 
component and encourages private actors to invest (cf. Collins, 
1998:39,42,67). However, this highlighted an uncertainty within the sector 
about the continuing appropriate role of the state in non-scientific space 
technology, and what exactly the state’s value is (Lambright, 1994) when 
seeking to attain credibility. All interviewees agreed the state still has a role 
in lending early credibility to a component or programme and potentially 
serving as an aid to secure further funding, but there was uncertainty over 
where the line should or could be drawn between government and private 
money: 
 
‘There’s always going to be a role for the state in there, but it’s hard 
to understand when that role finishes… and [when to] be good 
capitalists and know when to give it over to the market.’ 
(011, [Public, Technology]) 
 
Interviewees argued that space technology benefits from early 
governmental funding or endorsement, but there was an assumption that 
at the first possible moment the state could ‘pull out’ from the component 
or programme and allow it to be fully commercialized, it should do so. No 
longer is the state praised as the source of near-unlimited funding, but 
rather merely tolerated as a necessary method by which early credibility 
may be attained. Even this instrumental role of government (Collins, 
1998:41) in the space industry has not just declined, but in some cases may 
be actively positioned as undesirable. Interviewees had little to say on 
whether government interest was used instead of third-party accreditation 
from bodies such as ESA or in addition to that accreditation, but it is likely 
that most components will pursue both routes, especially given that both 
appeared well-established within the space sector as equally valuable 
methods to acquire early credibility. Irrespective of the different values 
interviewees placed on the role of the state and how welcome the state 
was within the space industry, all nevertheless agreed that a major practical 
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benefit of government money at an early stage in a component 
development was to ‘unlock’ significant quantities of private money down 
the line: 
 
‘Once you have government investment, the cost of borrowing and 
the risk associated with it disappears. This is a safe bet, this is as 
good as a government bond, and suddenly you can borrow money 
at a much better rate than if you said 'I’ve got this long-term 
procurement contract which might work out’, so at that point you 
can re-finance and get a much better deal.’  
(011, [Public, Technology]) 
 
‘[Government investment] provides a signal to other investors that 
this is a technology we need to look at.’  
(016, [Private, Technology]) 
 
‘Quite often government coming in at an early stage of a project 
and funding maybe 20% of it just gives huge amounts of credibility. 
There have been other cases where the government has been the 
anchor tenant, and [the project would not] have been viable 
otherwise because that level of investment could not have happened 
without an anchor tenant.’ 
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
A clear network of credibility creation emerges here. A government may 
commission an organization (or use an internal government equivalent) to 
carry out an assessment, which is then endorsed by that government as its 
opinion, and this endorsement is then used as credibility to show other 
actors (e.g. Bonometti et al, 1991). In this model the actors subsequently 
brought into the component development will presumably check over the 
results of whatever initial study was carried out by the government, but it 
remains the government’s faith in the assessment which recruits them, not 
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the actual assessment itself. This merits a little clarification. This is not to 
imply that governments have not carried out the same level of assessment 
as a space agency might and that they are simply investing or supporting 
something for political reasons, but rather that it is the government 
support – crucially perceived as being one step removed from any initial 
scientific/technological assessment – which lends credibility. Outside actors 
assume that the government(s) in question will have carried out their own 
internal assessment and vetting process, and it is this belief that 
governments will not invest in hopeless technologies which lends the 
credibility. The government’s word is what matters, not the specifics of the 
test that gave the government the confidence to give their word. The belief 
in the government’s ability to carry out a good assessment is what is 
trusted rather than the assessment itself. As two interviewees put it: 
 
‘A bit of overnight investment will encourage the private sector 
because it will give them confidence because the private sector 
know the government’s not going to put money into projects that 
just won’t work, as we don’t have money like that at the moment.’  
(001, [Public, Engagement]) 
 
‘[The TSB is] traditionally I guess a little bit wary of endorsing people 
necessarily, particularly new people, but we can make a big 
difference if we do that.’  
(011, [Public, Technology]) 
 
The opinion in the first quote above that the current era of austerity has an 
impact on space funding (Sheldon, 2010; Akiwate et al, 2012) is interesting 
to note in several ways. It ties into the discourse apparent throughout this 
section that much of the space industry is now seen as depoliticized 
(Salomon, 1996; de Montluc, 2009) and standing on its own merits. As 
there is no longer an expectation of government financial backing for space 
technology, this reinforces the belief that all space technology which 
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receives funding and interest must have demonstrated its technical, 
scientific or financial merit, rather than meeting social or political goals. In 
turn this lends more credence to any component that gets past its earliest 
stages.  
 
Thus, the data pointed towards two methods for attaining credibility in the 
early stages of a component development, which will later be used to 
construct an adaptive future narrative. Interviewees argued that credibility 
may be attained via a seal of approval from an acknowledged body, 
generally a space agency; or by getting a government to invest some early 
money which will then reassure private investors – some of whom may not 
know much about the space sector – about the viability of the proposed 
component. However, this early credibility is not sufficient to see a 
component through from inception to completion, nor enough to support 
an adaptive future narrative on its own. As the introduction to this chapter 
noted, an adaptive future narrative relies on many ‘layers’ of credibility, of 
which this early interest in a component is only the first. As the research 
progressed it became clear that there were a number of other systems in 
place to ensure that credibility was maintained throughout a component 
development. As we shall see, upon completing the technical parts of the 
development, these forms of credibility then add up to support an adaptive 
future narrative. Whereas these early forms of credibility make a space 
component appear viable in its earliest stages and thereby help to build the 
necessary support base, other forms later in the process were found to be 
designed for different purposes.  
 
These later types of credibility were identified in the research data as 
belonging to two other ‘phases’ of attaining credibility. ‘Technical 
Development’ credibility is created by the use of ‘Technology Readiness 
Levels’, or TRLs, a structure of discursive statements designed to 
unambiguously quantify the ‘stage’ a technology is at, in keeping with a 
linear model of technological development (cf. Bijker & Law, 1997:17). This 
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is related to the creation of tests and standardized testing regimes in the 
space industry. Subsequently, the final stage of ‘launch credibility’ consists 
of two parts – ‘qualification’, which is a similar process to the attainment of 
early credibility described here, and the subsequent acquisition of ‘flight 
heritage’. Many companies who engage in space programmes refuse to use 
equipment or satellites which have not already been tested in space, 
leading to the obvious question – how is anything new ever launched? To 
answer this question there is a complex selection of processes which 
qualify new equipment for flight that will be assessed towards the end of 
this chapter. The next section will therefore explore technical development 
credibility, the second of these three ‘phases’ of credibility used in an 
adaptive future narrative. 
 
6.3. Technical Development Credibility 
 
6.3.1. Technology Readiness Levels 1-3 
 
Early on in the research a number of interviewees introduced the concept 
of the ‘TRL’ – the Technology Readiness Level – which is a model of 
technology development used in a number of high-risk industries (Krois et 
al, 2003; Sanchez, 2011). This section explores this concept and the work it 
does to generate a narrative of credibility after the initial acquisition of 
government or agency support described in the previous section. TRLs are 
numbers assigned by the component’s developers (not by outside bodies) 
to their components, and are designed to describe what ‘stage’ in 
development a component is at. This is a system that assigns credibility 
throughout a component’s development, and the evidence of carrying out 
this process is later used to create adaptive future narratives. As we will 
see, it became clear from the interview data that these serve a large 
number of rhetorical goals throughout the process of a technology’s 
development, and depending on what the assigned number is they are 
188 
 
used to recruit a range of different actors at different stages in the process. 
Upon the component’s conclusion, they are then used to help form an 
adaptive future narrative by presenting a strong credibility narrative for the 
quality and oversight of the component’s development. The relative 
positions of the nine TRL levels within this system were described as 
follows by one interviewee: 
 
‘TRL 1 is when you’re sat in the bath and have an idea, and TRL 9 is 
when the thing is wheeled out and flown.’ 
(014, [Private, Technology]) 
 
Within this TRLs break down into a number of categories which adhere to a 
very linear model of technological progression. As we shall see, the concept 
of TRLs rest upon a number of assumptions which themselves do significant 
work in convincing others about the accuracy (and efficacy) of the TRL 
system. Foremost amongst these assumptions are the beliefs that 
technological development is linear, and does not go ‘backwards’ at any 
point; that there are no social influences in the progression of a technology; 
that the points between the conception of a technology and its deployment 
in a working satellite or other technology can be quantified; and lastly that 
a given point (on the 1-9 scale) can be usefully compared between wholly 
disparate technologies or systems.  
 
Interviewees argued that TRLs 1-3 are roughly akin to ‘research’ and 
‘creating plausibility’ for a component (Collins, 1992:150), 4-6 are ‘testing’, 
and whilst there is no single word that best describes the concepts 
interviewees described to me as being appropriate to 7-9, ‘optimization’, 
‘taking to market’ or ‘implementation’ all describe aspects of the final three 
TRL levels. Before looking at the kind of work that the TRL concept does, it 
is first important to establish what exactly each of these categories entails 
and how the external presentation of the component changes significantly 
as it ‘progresses’ through TRLs.  A significant number of interviewees gave 
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their definitions of each of the three categories of TRL levels (1-3, 4-6, 7-9) 
and the outcomes of these discussions are summarized here and in the 
following two sections. To begin with, the levels of 1 to 3 are best 
summarized as being ‘research’, or proof of concept.  
 
‘1-3 [are] for initial ideas and you just want to produce that first 
proof of concept, generally that can be a lot cheaper, so you tend to 
find quite a bit of money around for those early-stage projects.’ 
(025, [Private, Technology]) 
 




‘TRLs 2-3-4 you’re clearly still establishing the principles of how to 
make the thing or establish it works.’ 
(014, [Private, Technology]) 
 
The three above show a broad level of agreement across my interviewees 
about the role of the early TRL levels, although the third interviewee 
defines these stages slightly differently. The first interviewee states there is 
‘quite a bit of money’ at these early stages where the component is largely 
hypothetical, although this comment does seem to contrast somewhat with 
the earlier comments about acquiring early-stage component investment. 
This chapter has showed that such money is primarily from governments 
for the majority of space components and programmes (bodies that 
accredit, like ESA, do not necessarily always fund), though it will also be 
from private actors for more commercial technologies such as the creation 
of routine satellite components. A component development at this point 
will only be able to recruit very specific kinds of actor and in very certain 
ways – industries putting in small investments in the hopes of large returns, 
or government agencies wanting to push new components. Assigning TRL 
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numbers at this stage means denoting that a component is at a very early 
stage, and should be treated by other actors as such. Too high a TRL 
number at this point may generate false hope, but a low TRL assessment at 
this stage fails to convey a level of credibility and trust that the component 
is viable to subsequent development. 
 
6.3.2. Technology Readiness Levels 4-6 
 
Interviewees contended that the area between TRLs 4 and 6 is seen as the 
point at which most of the ‘testing’ of a component takes place. One 
interviewee broke this down into two different categories that applied for 
different kinds of technologies - it was either a matter of moving abstract 
‘research’ into the market and ensuring it will work, or taking a ‘good idea’ 
into a real-world application, albeit not necessarily a commercial one: 
 
‘[TRL] 4-5-6 [is] where we’re trying to get people to either take blue 
sky research into the commercial environment, or take what’s been 
demonstrated as a good idea and the feasibility level into real-world 
application.’ 
(011, [Public, Technology]) 
 
‘If it’s 4-6 it’s proven but needs to be developed into a mission.’ 
(004, [Public]) 
 
From these two quotes the question of what exactly has ‘been proven’ or 
‘demonstrated’ is a difficult one to isolate. As we shall see shortly, those 
interviewed about TRLs 7-9 suggested that 4-6 was the point at which the 
component was ‘proven’, but in these examples it is levels 1-3 which were 
supposedly concerned with the matter of proof and the viability of the 
component. This highlights a vagueness inherent in these levels – different 
actors, even within the space industry, have differing understandings of 
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what each bracket of levels is actually for. When viewed from the 
perspective of the adaptive future narratives created afterwards, it is the 
traversing of the TRL process that is retrospectively more important than 
ensuring all relevant actors agree on what precisely each level actually 
meant during the process itself. Between TRLs 4 and 6, the best way to 
present how most interviewees understood these levels is as an intensive 
testing regime: 
 
‘TRL 4-5-6 is designed to take up to that qualified engineering, 
equipment you know will survive and do the job.’ 
(022, [Private, Technology, Comms]) 
 
‘[During TRL 4] you’re looking at £1000, £1500 a day, and your test 
campaign may last a week. But of course things will go wrong, you 
have to tweak, go back, then thermal vacuum chamber, radiation 
chamber… so it’s not unusual to have a six-figure cost for your 
testing campaign. It is a very expensive build to get across that 
nasty bit.’ 
(025, [Private, Technology]) 
 
This emphasis on testing will be returned to shortly. Whereas TRLs 1-3 are 
used to group what many consider to be ‘blue skies’ research, initial 
experiments or brainstorming, these TRLs in the 4-6 range are used to 
quantify the point in the testing regime the component is at. Although one 
might think that assignment of TRLs happens after testing – as testing 
continues and the component gathers credibility, the TRL level will rise – in 
some ways the reverse is true. As TRLs go up different forms of testing are 
required, and upon leaving TRL 6 a minimum of further testing is expected. 
Although TRLs were presented by interviewees as being entirely responsive 
to the linear development of a component, there is actually a reciprocal 
relationship between the two. Several forms of test explored later in this 
chapter can sometimes be less ‘rational’ than the discourse of TRL 
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development might suggest, and when seen in this light this period serves 
to define the limits on testing as well as being responsive to the outcomes 
of those tests. Those behind a component know that if a testing regime in 
this segment lasts too long it will raise questions about the credibility of the 
component, for the TRL model itself assumes unproblematic linear 
progress, so there is a driver for TRLs to advance irrespective of the level of 
success seen in the testing regime. This is not to imply the two are not 
related, for they undoubtedly are, but that there is an inevitable level of 
ambiguity in the way social actors – engineers, technologists, or managers – 
choose when to ‘advance’ a component along the TRL spectrum. As with 
testing more generally, the movement along the quantified chart of TRLs 
serves many goals of reassurance and a clear signal of progress, and this is 
an additional pressure to the component development. A clear narrative of 
progression must be present for the successful creation of an adaptive 
future narrative – a component that was effectively and cleanly developed 
will be more appealing than one which encountered multiple issues during 
the TRL process.  
 
In testing something is at stake – the claims that the component in question 
will work, and therefore the funding, jobs or prestige of those bound up 
with that component – so expectations are built around certain outcomes 
expected from that test (Pinch, 1993). As a technology proceeds through 
the Technology Readiness Levels, between 4-6 more than between 1-3, the 
component appears increasingly credible as tests are passed or TRLs are 
advanced. This both continues the component and continues to lay the 
groundwork for the adaptive future narrative that will be developed upon 
concluding the TRL system. When the component has reached the ninth 
TRL, the evidence of its passing through the prior levels will be seen to form 
an important and integral part of the adaptive future narrative its designers 




6.3.3. Technology Readiness Levels 7-9 
 
TRLs 7-9 are those that interviewees seemed to find hardest to describe. It 
seemed to consist of everything between ‘testing’ (TRLs 4-6) and the 
preparation for launch of the actual component on-board a satellite. In 
many ways compressing the social and political dynamics inherent in such a 
process to a numerical signifier is an even greater feat of reductionism than 
earlier TRLs. The TRL number becomes an object that does not require 
constant maintenance or upkeep, and in this case those who control it are 
managing how the component is presented to those outside the 
component development. The use of this is particularly apparent when one 
considers the requisite political interactions behind securing launch; the 
national or international dimensions to any space programme the 
component might be launched as a part of; questions over subsequent 
financial investment or insurance; and much more (Walker, 1993; Sadeh, 
2005; Spaceflightnow, 2015). The TRL stages prior to this point may have 
kept the technology broadly confined to the lab or the testing arena – 
although many external non-technical actors will have been involved – but 
from this point onwards a wide range of non-technical actors come to 
occupy the foreground, for whom the space industry will strive to present 
clear reductionist numerical categorizations rather than contested 
technologies. In the case of these final stages in the TRL system, these 
numerical categorizations meant improving and optimizing the component: 
 
‘TRL 6-7-8-9 you’re clearly in those sort of areas where what you’re 
investigating is a better design.’ 
(014, [Private, Technology])  
 





These two quotes both give a similar understanding – that these final TRLs 
are about  refining and improving the system or technology once one 
‘knows’ that it will work (as a result of passing successfully through the 
middle TRLs). The fragility of this supposed certainty will be returned to 
shortly, but it is interesting to note the position these levels occupy in 
terms of knowledge. In some ways these levels thus present the most linear 
and most simplistic part of the TRL process – there is no suggestion of 
further obstacles to overcome, but rather merely things to be improved 
and built up within a clear framework of linear technological improvement. 
The suggestion that these levels are concerned just with improving and 
optimizing the system points to a belief that the component could actually 
be used at any point from the end of TRL 6 onwards. It might not be 
optimized, but it will be functional.  
 
By placing TRL 6 point at two-thirds of the way through the process, rather 
than at the end, it implies that optimizing and improving is an equally 
inevitable part of the development of any given component. Making the 
‘improvement’ part of this linear technological process simply part of the 
main body of the development process, rather than a different or 
subsequent process, is an interesting and clever discursive move by 
engineers who have developed the TRL model to boost the subsequent 
perception of credibility. It also ensures the existence of a lengthier 
credibility narrative. Were the TRL process one that concluded upon getting 
a workable version of the technology (at around TRL 6), it may be trickier to 
persuade outside actors to continue investment and support whilst 
engineers optimize and improve the product (up to TRL 9). It would also 
reduce the length of employment for any engineers taking part in the 
component’s development. However, by placing optimization as part of the 
TRL system it makes this process (TRLs 7-9) appear to be an integral part – 
who would be willing to launch a high-risk high-cost product when it does 
not seem to be ‘finished’? Launching at ‘TRL 6’ appears eminently risky 
when that is only two-thirds of the way up the scale that all actors adhere 
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to, whereas were TRL 6 the highest TRL, launch at that point might seem 
quite reasonable. In presenting the TRL model in this way the concept of 
the ‘finished product’ is renegotiated in a manner which assists with 
maintaining funding and support for a much longer period. It also creates a 
longer narrative which will be used to support the adaptive future narrative 
that these systems of credibility support, emphasizing in more detail the 
lengths to which the component was not just tested, but improved and 
optimized. 
 
6.3.4. Technology Readiness Level Objectivity and Linearity 
 
Having established what the different groups of TRLs were, and the kinds of 
‘stages’ in which they categorized technologies, I asked my interviewees 
questions about what the functions of TRLs were and how they were 
utilized. The below quote from interviewee #013 answers both of these 
questions clearly, and highlights the two important factors for the 
subsequent discussion – the claimed use of TRLs as methods to convey 
information about components between different actors who may not 
speak the same technical language or have the same understanding of the 
technology, and as seemingly objective metrics that are simple to apply and 
simple to understand. This section will explore a number of comments from 
interviewees on these two themes, and the uses to which TRLs are put in 
the formation of a credible adaptive future narrative for the component. 
 
‘If somebody comes to me with a project or a piece of technology, 
straight away I can say ‘Well, what TRL is it?’, and there are 
comprehensive definitions of TRLs on the web so you can see all 
that, so you can determine it, then depending on what the TRL is… it 
lets you know where you are on the development scale as well, so 
what your challenges are.’ 




One particular sentence of this quote is very important to show the kinds of 
rhetoric that have built up around the use of TRLs. #013 stated that 
‘comprehensive definitions of TRLs [are] on the web so you can see all that, 
so you can determine it’. There is actually no mention of expertise here 
(though presumably a basic level of familiarity with the technology is 
assumed) – rather this posits a simple two-stage process where someone 
aiming to assess a technology consults the guidelines, looks at the 
technology, and thus comes to the only appropriate conclusion about the 
level of the technology. Those from communication or broadcast 
companies, for example, who are unaware of the internal workings of a 
technology, are instead presented with a simplified version of the 
technology where all its complexities or uncertainties (Wynne, 2002) are 
reduced down to a single number. They trust in the black box handed to 
them due to it being a simplified quantitative assessment; due to it being 
measured by scientists and engineers with a close knowledge of the 
component in question; and due to the presentation of TRLs as clearly 
defined intervals in the formalized temporal process of a component’s 
development. 
 
Actors external to the space industry are thus unlikely to challenge this 
assessment. Even if they would wish to, the blackness of the black box – an 
entire technology or component reduced to a single number – makes it 
very difficult to unpick, given the degree of trust given to the ‘objective’ 
assessments of those who assign the TRL numbers. This simplification thus 
meets a simple political goal (cf. Hilgartner, 1990) – in this case recruiting 
actors into a component development. Future predictions that promise 
technological development are difficult to reject if actors operate within an 
ontological framework where such development is an unproblematic and 
linear task (van Lente, 2000), such as the TRL system, and where any social 
complexity or conflict within development is well-hidden (Borup et al, 
2006:292). This promotion of a deterministic model of technology is part of 
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the ‘repertoire of promises and expectations and strategies’ (Jørgensen et 
al, 2009:84) for actors wishing to promote the success of their components. 
The TRL level thus acts as a system for compressing a complex piece of 
contested technology-in-development into a simple numerical figure. This 
quantification was something mentioned by a number of other 
interviewees who also elaborated on the process of assigning TRLs to 
technologies and the effect that assigning a TRL can have to close off 
debate: 
 
‘TRLs are a great way to quantify and communicate in an 
engineering term exactly the status of your product development, 
otherwise how can I tell you how mature my technology is? How can 
you take away an understanding from me of where I am in my 
development cycle? So it’s a great way of quantifying exactly and 
unambiguously the state of my technology.’ 
(025, [Private, Technology]) 
 
‘It’s well-defined, you’ve been on the Internet, you’ve seen it, it’s 
well-defined, I mean, nothing’s black and white – you might get 
people saying 'Well, we’re half-way between 4 and 5’ – but that’s 
ok.’  
(013, [Public, Private, Technology, Comms]) 
 
‘If we start getting a disagreement over whether it’s 3 or 4, let’s end 
the discussion and look at the ESA definition. It’s very clear and very 
simple to follow.’  
(025, [Private, Technology]) 
 
This is a crucial point. There is nothing mentioned in these descriptions 
about interpreting the TRL definitions, or doing a thorough assessment of 
the technology or system to decide what level it lies at – rather, the 
definition of TRLs is ‘clear’, ‘simple’, ‘exact’, ‘unambiguous’ and ‘well-
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defined’, and will immediately ‘end the discussion’ if any debate over a TRL 
level threatens to upset a component’s development. The complexity of the 
technology is reduced to the straightforward act of reading some guidelines 
and quickly and easily applying them. Interestingly, some examples of the 
TRL process are actually carried out in a way specifically designed to 
seemingly remove any social interaction. The version used by the US Air 
Force includes a ‘TRL Calculator’ – this is a set of questions implemented in 
Microsoft Excel which, when filled in, ‘outputs’ the TRL of the technology 
according to the answers given to the questions (Nolte, 2003). This once 
more hides the social aspects that went into the creation of the software 
package, leaving instead just a selection of inputs (the answers to the 
questions) and a single output (the TRL number). 
 
Additionally, the first quote by #025 raised another important issue when 
they asked ‘otherwise how I can tell you how mature my technology is?’. 
The use of the term mature is a clear connection to the linear temporal 
model of technology progression that TRLs reflect, but the question they 
posed nevertheless shows awareness of the difficulty in changing tacit 
knowledge into a language that those outside the space industry have 
experience with. Tacit knowledge is ‘practical intuition and a developed 
‘engineering gaze’’ (Sørensen & Levold, 1992:20) which exists within 
technological industries (Hamlin, 1992). This consists of information, 
concepts and understandings of a technology that have been accrued and 
developed over time within the industry in question. What distinguishes 
tacit knowledge from more codified forms of knowledge is that tacit 
knowledge is difficult to transfer outside an industry no matter how 
accurate and detailed an account is given to external actors (Kenney & 
Patton, 2005). The seminal study of this phenomenon is that of Collins 
(1974), who explored the difficulty in spreading the knowledge of how to 
construct ‘TEA lasers’ outside the epistemic community that originally 
developed them. Tacit knowledge can make it challenging to convey an 
understanding of a sophisticated technology between technical and non-
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technical actors (Rosenberg et al, 1992:4), and the associated technical 
knowledge splits those ‘who speak the language of machinery’ (Redfield, 
1996:267) from those who don’t, and is hard to acquire without any 
previous familiarity with the area.  
 
It has been argued that tacit knowledge may be higher in more complex 
and sophisticated technologies (like the space industry) than in more 
ordinary and mundane equivalents (Burgel & Murray, 2000). Those in the 
UKSA and other institutions whose employees were interviewed will 
presumably possess such knowledge, whilst those outside the space 
industry will not. From this perspective we can see that TRLs are also 
designed to quantify this seemingly unquantifiable concept. They seek to 
translate tacit knowledge of ‘engineering judgements’ and the like into a 
figure, which – to return to the above quotes – demonstrates the ‘maturity’ 
of a component. Actors must be convinced of both the accuracy of the TRL 
system in assessing this concept of ‘maturity’, and in turn trust that this is a 
reasonable and accurate translation of tacit knowledge for consumers 
beyond the space industry. A component which is classified as TRL 9 is 
conveying that the technical opinion of the space industry is that this 
component is ready for use, and therefore credible. TRLs are presented as a 
method of translating tacit knowledge into a form which other actors can 
use – ‘how I can tell you how mature my technology is?’ (my emphasis) – 
and in doing so only offer these other actors a black boxed perspective of 







Figure 1. Illustrative Chart of Technology Readiness Levels. Example 




To summarize: TRLs offer a linear and unproblematic model of 
technological development as a method for making a new component 
appear credible. They are designed to redefine a component from an 
abstract concept which has gained interest from governments or third-
party bodies, into a technology which is tested, trusted, and has been 
improved and optimized to a high standard. TRLs are not open to debate 
from outside the space industry and are presented as being a clear and 
obvious translation of technical and tacit knowledge. Any component which 
achieves the highest TRL level will be one that is then considered highly 
credible, having passed all the tests and trials that were required for it to 
reach that point. TRL 9 conveys a message that a component is ‘ready to 
use’, and that is the core of what an adaptive future narrative claims: that 
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the component is immediately, and always, ready for use. As with all the 
forms of credibility explored in this chapter, a component being at TRL 9 
combined with the evidence of that component having climbed up the TRL 
scale are both important for creating a narrative that sells the long-term 
value of that component. 
 
6.3.5. The Testing Process 
 
We should at this point return to the middle TRLs (4-6) to examine more 
closely the processes of testing and the ‘sub-industry’ within the space 
industry that has arisen to test space components. Whilst the examination 
of TRLs 1-3 showed that these levels are designed to denote the shift from 
‘research’ towards a component that merits testing, and TRLs 7-9 were 
found to be concerned with optimization and iterative improvement on a 
component that has been ‘proven’ to work, far more data was gathered 
from interviewees on these middle levels which are focused around the 
concept of testing. A range of interviewees commented in detail about the 
processes of testing when exploring these central TRLs (4-6), and described 
testing as an integral and constitutive part of creating successful 
components. As such this section will explore the use of testing as a 
method of credibility attainment and therefore its subsequent contribution 
to a successful adaptive future narrative, and examine the difference 
identified in the research between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ debates over 
testing regimes. 
 
To begin, one interviewee emphasized the importance in the space industry 
of ‘proving’ that a component will work after launch: 
 
‘If you think about it it’s quite logical. Fundamentally the [large 
space companies] deliver to operators and operators provide a 
service, so the last thing operators want is to put something up that 
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will fail. So they will only work with things that are proven, so the 
Catch 22 is: how do you ever prove something is going to provide 
the reliability?’ 
(023, [Private, Science]) 
 
The primary way in which this is ‘proven’ was found to be via the use of 
testing. Much like other parts of the space industry, testing to generate 
credibility also requires significant investment, albeit in a different model 
from that seen before. Much of the financial investment that goes into 
testing will have been acquired via earlier systems of credibility-acquisition 
explored earlier in this chapter. As with other steps in the process, testing 
and examination regimes are required in order to move the component 
‘forward’ and subsequently attain further financial investment by displaying 
the results of successful tests. Three interviewees argued that the testing 
process itself, which happens mainly in the central TRLs, is a very expensive 
process, significantly more so than the actual manufacturing costs behind 
whatever components are being tested: 
 
‘[The] James Webb [Telescope] is the perfect example where it has 
so many different mechanisms and devices that have not been done 
before, that’s what drives the cost up because you have to test it 
and test it and test it.’  
(002, [Public, Science]) 
 
 
‘You put vast amounts of money into designing it so it doesn’t go 
wrong when it’s up there.’  
(003, [Public, Technology]) 
 
‘The fundamental cost of those components is very cheap, but as I 
say it’s all the qualification and testing that really drives the cost up.’ 




As we have seen in the previous chapter of this thesis (5.3.3), the inability 
to test a component or satellite in a space-like environment is a serious 
issue for the space sector. As it cannot be tested in a space environment 
beforehand, the argument goes, and since it cannot be retrieved, it must be 
tested to as high a level as possible before launch, and this is a costly 
process: 
 
‘It’s a bit like Boeing building the 787, rolling it out, putting it to the 
end of the runway, and taking it to Tokyo on the first flight. Every 
time you’re with a spacecraft you do that – every time it’s 
impossible to test the whole thing on the ground because it’s such a 
different environment. So the building, testing, building, testing you 
do with spacecraft is what costs the money.’ 
(002, [Public, Science]) 
 
‘You can buy a lot of the parts you need to make a satellite out of a 
Radio Spares catalogue, and to take them all up it wouldn’t cost that 
much, but in reality to make them space qualified the cost goes up 
by about a factor of a thousand, literally.’ 
(017, [Private, Technology]) 
 
These costs may be met by government (Vedda, 2002), by private industry 
such as the communications sector (Slotten, 2002), ‘private spaceflight’ 
initiatives (von der Dunk, 2011) or scientific bodies (Elzinga, 2004). 
Components which lack an appropriate level of testing will likely never be 
flown, but any process of testing them is still lengthy and expensive. 
However, regardless of how much money is spent or where the money is 
sourced, there is nevertheless a point beyond which a space technology 
cannot be fully tested (and therefore fully ‘proven’) before it is launched 
and used in situ. At some point the testing regime must end, and trust must 
be placed in the component to work once deployed in the space 
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environment. In order to mitigate this issue of residual uncertainty, the 
processes of testing that have been developed for the space industry are 
designed to ‘mirror’ the conditions a satellite or component will experience 
during launch and once in space.  
 
Data from a number of interviewees suggested that this attempted 
mirroring of space conditions can be isolated into three central 
components, all of which are required for a credible testing regime. The 
first is testing in vacuum conditions; the second is testing for the potentially 
high temperatures of launch and the guaranteed low temperatures of being 
deployed in space; and the third is the ‘vibration and shock’, as in one of 
the quotes below, that will be experienced during launch. Several 
interviewees called this three-part testing regime the ‘shake-and-bake’ 
tests, and explained that although the instrumentation with which the 
results are measured may have become more accurate or refined, the 
‘fundamental’ test has not been altered significantly since the early days of 
the space industry. In this way rules have emerged from practices and 
assumptions which have later been codified (Wynne, 1988) into 
assumptions of what a thorough testing regime should look like, and 
therefore what an interested customer will look for in an adaptive future 
narrative for a credible component: 
 
‘You go through an extensive test regime anyway so all of our 
equipment is temperature cycled in vacuum, it goes through a 
simulated launch environment in terms of vibration and shock, and 
it goes through the same at a satellite level before it’s launched.’ 
(026, [Private]) 
 
‘We’ve got better at testing and controlling the test environment, 
but the fundamental test of shaking something vigorously hasn’t 
changed [laugh].’ 




These shake-and-bake tests are an example of what Trevor Pinch (1993:29) 
identifies as the establishment of a ‘similarity relationship’ – that the state 
of affairs surrounding a test is identical in all important ways to the state of 
affairs surrounding the use of the technology in situ. The dominant 
discourse around testing is that a satellite in space will undergo a, b and c, 
and therefore we must test for these things. Pinch argues instead that this 
relationship of similarity is not something which is inherently ‘out there’, 
but rather that it rests upon a social convention which agrees these two 
things are similar. Testing is therefore not designed to develop the 
fundamentals of the technology nor to pay for the launch itself, but in 
effect to pay for the component to be redefined from one that is new and 
unknown to one that is known, quantified and well-tested. It changes the 
component from something that might work into something that will work. 
The component cannot be tested in space beforehand, so a claim must be 
socially constructed that the testing done on the ground is equivalent to 
that which it will encounter after launch – a claim which will be essential to 
the construction of its adaptive future narrative, and to it progressing 
through the TRL system. After this redefinition is complete, the component 
is then ‘proven’.  
 
Other interviewees, although agreeing that the shake-and-bake tests are 
appropriate and relevant for the space industry, did however acknowledge 
a change in the specifics of the tests or the possibility for testing regimes to 
be debated: 
 
‘We have a lot of standards we work to in the industry, and these 
standards are viewed from time to time by panels of experts, but we 
have a standard we apply. The process is rigorous and pretty 
constant. The technology may shift and the requirements may 
change, but the methodology stays the same.’ 








‘The fundamental shake-and-bake tests haven’t changed, but the 
way we test them has been refined now we understand the space 
environment a bit better. So the battle of any customer is that they 
say we want this product with all these tests, but we only want to 
pay x. And we say, ‘Fascinating, but you can’t afford that. What 
you’ll get for x is a much reduced test campaign’. Then you argue 
different models for testing.’ 
(025, [Private, Technology]) 
 
‘A customer might say we’ll want a 50% margin on the vibration 
campaign, but it passed at 40%, and we know the actual launch will 
be 40% below that. So we say ‘Ok, it failed the original test, but 
maybe we’re being overzealous. Let’s scale back and revise that test 
limit and it still passes and we’ve still got a margin.’ Was it the 
margin we were originally looking for? No. Is it still good enough? 
Probably.’  
(025, [Private, Technology]) 
 
These quotes identify two related but distinct points. The first and second 
state that the standards within the space industry have shifted over time, 
whilst the third and fourth state that debate over testing between the 
space industry and those outside is debated. This difference is important to 
explore. For those within the space industry standards are expected to 
‘evolve’ and change over time, but maintain the same basic ‘methodology’ 
– which is to say, ‘shake-and-bake’ remains the dominant paradigm but the 
exact methods by which this is performed, and measured, may shift over 
time. The use of the terms ‘refined’ and ‘evolved’, and the claim that such 
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refinement is due to ‘understand[ing] the space environment better’, make 
it clear this development of testing regimes is not seen as something that 
demonstrates a level of uncertainty or debate in testing, but rather a linear 
and unproblematic model where testing regimes are constantly improved 
as more is learned about space and the space industry develops. 
 
External to the space industry, meanwhile, these quotes show that the 
process of agreeing on the severity of the test – even if the testing itself 
remains within the shake-and-bake regime – is a social process. The nature 
of the test (vibration, temperature, and also vacuum) is seen as relatively 
fixed (albeit ‘evolving’) but the intensity of the testing regime is one that is 
contested according to cost, time, requirements and a number of other 
metrics. This draws a line between two aspects of the testing regime – the 
methodology, and the intensity – which is a socially produced distinction. It 
is considered acceptable to reduce the intensity of a testing regime in 
debate with a particular customer, but it is not acceptable to change the 
method of the testing regime, so ingrained have the shake-and-bake tests 
become. The specifics of given testing regimes are therefore determined by 
humans, not technical necessities (Douglas, 2010). This creates ‘overall’ 
testing concepts whose nature and meaning gradually shift as time passes, 
and also results in specific testing regimes being based upon the 
requirements and expectations of the users (Pinch, 1993), which will 
consequently affect the ‘level of testing’ given to the eventual product 
(Sismondo, 2010:10). 
 
We can therefore see that the nature of the test is socially contested, and 
the claim that the test is ‘similar’ to the space environment is also socially 
constructed. Space industry testing regimes are constructed both to 
emphasize that the test has been appropriate and diligent, and to give 
confidence that diligently conducted test will deliver a component which 
will function correctly in the space environment. Despite this established 
similarity relationship, testing ‘methods’ change over time and testing 
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‘intensities’ are debatable between involved actors. On the one hand the 
assessments are believed to be non-social procedures that follow a clear 
set of guidelines and are only ever ‘improved’ as time goes by, but on the 
other hand those within the space industry accept that the specific set of 
standards applied for a given test are debated and contested for each 
individual component and gradually shift as a whole. The discursive 
separation between the two reflects the way in which the space industry is 
structured; those within the space sector are able to adjust and refine the 
testing criteria, whilst those outside the space sector are presented with 
just the most contemporary up-to-date regimes, reassurances that different 
levels of regime are equally valid (for different components), and a belief 
that as testing regimes ‘improve’ they do so linearly towards ‘better’ 
testing regimes, a process which masks whatever debates go on within the 
space sector about these testing regimes. These debates are only visible 
within the space industry, and when testing debates occur outside the 
space industry, the debate is presented in a very specific way. Testing 
debates with outside actors (as #025 states) are presented as a debate over 
a ‘greater’ or ‘lesser’ testing regime, not as a debate over the nature of the 
testing regime itself. In this way the internal evolution of testing regimes is 
understood as being logical and scientific, whilst in debates with outside 
actors the testing regimes are presented as being fixed and unchanging, 
and outside actors simply debate how much they are willing to pay for. No 
outside actor debates the nature of the regimes (as the internal actors 
seemingly do). 
 
Such rules for testing and accruing credibility in this phase are therefore 
socially constructed by the experts who define them. As Law (1987:120) 
puts it, testing involves the ‘construction of a background against which to 
measure success’. Both the background and the metrics of the test are 
negotiated to reflect the individual customer’s requirements whilst also 
ensuring that testing diligence is visible as ‘evidence’ to support the 
component’s future use. The component will only ever be said to function 
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correctly when it behaves ‘according to the rules’ set out for its 
functionality (Rammert, 1997:176), rules which are socially determined 
according to the space industry’s internal testing outlook combined with 
the external needs of any non-space actors. Collins & Pinch (1998, 7-29) 
echo this, arguing via their examination of Patriot missile batteries in the 
1991 Gulf War that any effort at measuring effectiveness is a social activity. 
Any arbitration on the successful or failed functioning of a technology is 
firmly social, and this social activity is carried out entirely within the space 
sector in order to enhance component credibility to those viewing from the 
outside. Debates with those outside the space industry are only about how 
‘much’ testing should be done, not ‘what’ form of testing is appropriate.  
 
However, a few interviewees also argued that these internal debates over 
testing are not just a linear progression towards ‘refined’ testing, but that 
even internal space industry testing regimes could be deeply arbitrary, and 
designed more to meet an expectation of testing standards for external 
actors than improve the space industry’s own technical diligence. It is this 
expectation of standards which we next examine in the final section on 
TRLs and testing regimes, in order to understand how standards combine 
with testing to socially construct strong claims of credibility.  
 
6.3.6. Standards and Margins 
 
We have now examined much of what interviewees understood as taking 
place within the ‘technical development’ stage of a component – initial 
investment has been acquired and the component is deemed credible for 
this early investment, and the component is progressing up the TRL scale. 
As we have seen, much of this is reliant on the testing regime carried out in 
the centre of this process. However, a test requires a standard to test 
against. Several interviewees commented on the creation and management 
of these standards. In addition to those in the previous section who 
acknowledged that the metrics by which testing is carried out have 
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changed as time has passed, and that the use of these metrics is debated 
between relevant actors, other interviewees went further and argued that 
the nature of the tests may be quite arbitrary even within the space 
industry, or that testing standards are more concerned with meeting the 
expectation of a good test than an actual metric of technical performance. 
This section explores the variation within standards and margins discovered 
in the research, and the use of standards as a ‘public act’ to maintain the 
perception of objectivity that testing regimes provide, and therefore the 
credibility they can bestow. 
 
One interviewee acknowledged the fluidity of testing standards when 
discussing ‘ECSS’, and another mentioned the nature of the expectations 
attached to this testing regime. ECSS is the ‘European Cooperation for 
Space Standardization’, an organization which works to create and improve 
standards in the space sector, and publishes documents which outline 
standards that ESA contractors and associated actors are expected to 
adhere to. Talking about ECSS, one interviewee offered a comment close to 
the official line and another emphasized the importance of ECSS: 
 
‘There’s something called ECSS which is component standardization 
and is used to define how a particular electronic component might 
go through a certain level of testing.’  
(026, [Private]) 
 
‘Invariably you make reference to ECSS, and customers will expect 
you to mention ECSS as the test standard.’  
(025, [Private, Technology]) 
 
However, another hinted towards the level of debate, confusion and 




‘I had the misfortune to be involved in the European Standards 
debate over ECSS. A truly mind-boggling exercise.’  
(019, [Public, Science]) 
 
As interviewee #025 stated, ‘customers will expect you to mention ECSS as 
the ‘test standard’’, whilst #026 emphasizes the use of ECSS for ‘component 
standardization’ in relation to testing regimes. However, the candid quote 
from #019 rather undermines this emphasis on the use of ECSS as a 
standard, suggesting that the process of developing it was far from the 
simple and scientized step-by-step ‘refinement’ of a testing regime that 
earlier interviewees mentioned. It clearly highlights that setting standards 
is not the straightforward process that most other interviewees described. 
This allows us to see that ECSS and other similar testing standards are 
expectations (as noted explicitly by #025) – customers expect a space-ready 
component to adhere to industry standards. In their examination of the 
‘sociology of expectations’, Borup et al (2006:289) argue that expectations 
are ‘constitutive’ or ‘performative’ in that they are able to attract the 
interest of useful allies and ‘broker relations’. A space component that 
meets the requirements of a well-known and well-used standard 
(irrespective of whatever debate went into that standard) will meet the 
expectations of private actors for a credible space component, as their trust 
is placed in the standard itself rather than the process that led to the 
creation of that standard, and thereby reassure them about the credibility 
of the planned component. Although what goes on will be defined as 
simply ‘carrying out the test according to the appropriate standards’ – akin 
to ‘assigning a TRL’ – it will gloss over what actually goes on during the test, 
who arbitrates on the interpretation of the test results, and by what 
changing and contested standards the tests are run, transforming the 
outcome of the test into neutral knowledge (Slayton, 2007). It is clear from 
the interview data that external actors take their lead from those within the 
space industry when it comes to testing standardization; long-accepted and 
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normalized testing regimes from within the space industry are unlikely to 
be challenged from without.  
 
To take this even further, another interviewee stepped outside even this 
emphasis on the (albeit sometimes heavily debated) level of diligence in 
space testing, instead describing a vagueness and sometimes arbitrariness 
they saw as inherent in the process: 
 
‘They tend to be sensible boxes [that need ticking]. Some of them 
aren’t – aeronautics tend to, if they can’t think of a better thing to 
do, say ‘Well, we want to see it run for 10 hours or a thousand hours 
or a hundred thousand hours’, or whatever.’   
(003, [Public, Technology]) 
 
This suggests that several of the quotes in this section and the previous 
(those from #021, #025, #026) are akin to the ‘official line’ of objective 
standards, whilst that from #003 (and #019) shows a greater willingness to 
describe the actual experience of the standards-setting process within 
testing regimes. This thus highlights an interesting point which is unlikely to 
be visible to those outside the testing sub-industry that has grown up 
around the space sector – that some aspects of testing may not be all 
about ticking the ‘sensible boxes’ but rather just doing something that has 
the appearance of a suitable testing regime and can be used in a 
subsequent future narrative. As Collins (1992:129) notes, there is an 
‘algorithmic’ quality to testing – experiments are on some level a formality 
following a set of instructions because the instructions have assigned social 
expectations and value. Carry out the ascribed tests and the component 
will be considered suitably ‘tested’. Some assessment standards within the 
space industry, therefore, appear to have much more to do with 




The data in this section shows that specific testing standards are often in 
place simply in order to have something to show in an adaptive future 
narrative based upon the testing of a component. Some interviewees 
implied that the standards against which to test were designed primarily as 
part of the public face of a testing regime, and the analysis showed that 
meeting the standards is often more important than the nature of the 
standards themselves (in much the same way as carrying out the process of 
testing and ‘moving up’ in the TRL system appears just as important as the 
nature of the tests themselves). The standards themselves are sometimes 
heavily contested, and ‘at worst’ are sometimes quite arbitrary. To 
reiterate, this is therefore a question of expectations (Borup et al, 2006) – 
testing is expected to be done according to standards, and non-space 
actors are not going to closely question the technical standards in question.  
 
In the last two sections we have seen that standards are presented as being 
things ‘out there’, and that they are presented as being the only sensible 
and rational standards for the dominant space industry testing regime – i.e. 
vacuum, heat, and vibration. This is akin to the presentation of nature in 
scientific discourse as something ‘out there’ which scientists examine and 
uncover information about (cf. Woolgar, 1976:417; Brown, 2000). Standards 
are presented as being metrics that are so clear that test results only need 
‘viewing’, without acknowledging any debate or work that goes into these 
standards, and their potentially arbitrary nature. However, the interview 
data showed two different forms of debate over both the testing, and the 
standards themselves against which the testing is performed. These two 
sections identified that debate occurred ‘inside’ the space industry on the 
nature of testing standards, which sometimes meant the gradual 
incrementing of standards, sometimes significant debate, and sometimes 
entirely arbitrary rules; and debate also occurred ‘outside’ the space 
industry between space actors and private actors, in which case debate 
focused on the level of testing required rather than the standards by which 
testing was performed, despite the internal standards debates within the 
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space industry. Testing and testing standards are therefore used both to 
form and maintain consensus (Hilgartner, 1990) for space components, and 
transform the uncertainty of any technical evaluation into a certainty other 
actors can rely upon. In this way testing is integral to a component’s 
acquisition of credibility – a seemingly objective metric is selected to test 
against, and that metric is then tested against. If successful (where success, 
as we have shown, is socially debated), then the component will be 
considered significantly more credible than when it began ‘testing’.  
 




The acquisition of component credibility – and a lasting record of the 
processes associated with this credibility having been carried out – serves 
two purposes. As the component is developed the credibility acquired 
helps it to gain more funding and support, whilst afterwards all these forms 
of credibility are used to create an adaptive future narrative (summarized 
at the conclusion to this chapter). Thus far we have seen two forms of this 
credibility that interviewees described: early credibility and the funding 
that comes with it, and then ‘technical development’ credibility, created via 
the negotiation between testing and testing standards, the steady march 
up the ladder of Technology Readiness Levels, and the transformation from 
a concept into a physical item. The final type of credibility that a 
component needs in order to successfully deploy an adaptive future 
narrative is what I shall term ‘launch credibility’. Interviewees identified the 
constituent parts of this form of credibility as taking place at the end of a 
component’s development, and just before (and to an extent, during) its 
deployment on working satellites. Launch credibility consists of two distinct 
but related aspects, and both of these combine to form the final part of a 
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compelling credibility narrative – these are ‘qualification’, and ‘flight 
heritage’. 
 
This section will first explore qualification. To understand the meaning of 
qualification we can first look to particular comments from two 
interviewees. The first of these interviewees spoke of a process of ‘product 
demonstration’, which is to say the component being understood as a 
product which should be sold and used from that point onwards, rather 
than as a component still in ‘technical development’: 
 
‘In the aerospace aeronautical regime – they are distinctly different 
between military and civil – but you still have procedures, standards 
regimes, and behind that you have an accepted path to 
development and key points in that development are demonstration 
stages, so you ground-demonstrate things, then you product-
demonstrate things, then you flight-demonstrate things, and at 
each stage you’ve got a varied but closely defined set of boxes 
you’ve got to tick, really.’ 
(003, [Public, Technology]) 
 
This comment makes an interesting point about the visibility of these 
processes by defining them as ‘demonstrations’. As Trevor Pinch argues, 
many tests are performances which are ‘witnessed’ by others, either 
directly or through documents such as reports produced about the test 
(Pinch, 1993:26) which attach meanings to particular technologies 
(McBride, 2003), in this case the successful functioning of the space 
component. In the same way, ‘product demonstrations’ are also designed 
to be witnessed by non-space actors as another stage in the acquisition of 
credibility, in this case after ‘ground-demonstrat[ing]’ (which is to say, 
testing). Following on from this first comment, the second interviewee 
talked instead of an engineering activity known as ‘qualification’, which is 
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concerned, much like the quote above, with the transformation of a single 
component-in-development into an entire line of trusted components: 
 
‘[Qualification is] very much an engineering activity. The 
qualification at the parts level you would have to prove you were 
using parts qualified to the right environment for space. There will 
be a standard for proving the right component, but then there will 
be a qualification phase which is developing flight standard 
equipment.’ 
(022, [Private, Technology, Comms]) 
 
This quote explicitly defines a separation between ‘proving the right 
component’ – the testing regimes and standardization described in the 
previous sections – and then qualifying it, which transforms a component 
into ‘flight standard equipment’. This is comparable to the first quote which 
separated ground-demonstration and product-demonstration. These two 
quotes – speaking of ‘flight standard equipment’ and of ‘product-
demonstration’ – are clearly discussing one and the same thing, which is to 
say a process that results in the component being understood at this point 
as a product, a blueprint or a selection of manufacturing processes, not 
specific copies of that component which are being trialled in a shake-and-
bake testing regime. These are two ways of expressing the same procedure, 
but from this point onwards I shall use the term ‘qualification’ due to it 
being used by several other interviewees as well as the two above, whereas 
‘product-demonstration’ was only used by the first interviewee in this 
section.  
 
The process of qualification is therefore once more an example of a 
similarity relationship (Pinch, 1993) which in this case constructs an 
assumption that all components are effectively indistinguishable from one 
another. As no physical item can be tested in space without launching it 
(and thereby removing any possibility of getting it back), components are 
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trusted based on the performance that earlier copies of those components 
were able to achieve. Interestingly, this moves the component back from 
the technical specifics of the testing regimes towards the more conceptual 
forms of credibility explored at the start of this chapter with the 
accreditation from scientific and governmental bodies. Rather than linear 
progression from a concept of the component to ever more ‘physical’ 
manifestations of that component, the tested physical copies of the 
component fade from view at this point and the focus returns to the idea of 
the component. Looking back over this chapter we can therefore see that 
credibility begins with the concept of the component which must be 
accredited, proceeds to test specific instances of that component, and then 
once more changes the component back into an abstraction by establishing 
a similarity relationship between the copies of the component that were 
tested, and all potential copies which will be launched. This leads to the 
situation mentioned by another interviewee: 
 
‘In many ways it’s what you go through to qualify it ready for flight 
that does the work. […] There’s a lot of design that’s testing, analysis 
to prove the lifetime reliability analyses, analysis where all the 
failure nodes could be, what happens if this bit fails, what’s the 
knock-on impacts on the next bit of the spacecraft, so that by the 
time you launch, by definition, you expect it to work, and you don’t 
expect it to have problems.’ 
(002, [Public, Science]) 
 
#002 supports the existence of this similarity relationship by arguing that 
by the time of launch one simply expects the component to work because 
all the others in the chain (which were tested on the ground) have done so. 
This is not necessarily an inherently flawed assumption, but it takes us back 
to the sociology of expectations and predicted futures. The expectation of 
successful functioning becomes embodied by a qualification (cf. Borup et 
al, 2006:292-3), which is specifically designed to make a future of 
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successful functioning appear realistic and credible (Brown, 2000) by 
transforming the component into a ‘product’ or a piece of ‘flight standard 
equipment’. Just as testing regimes were designed to establish a 
relationship between the outer space environment and the tests being 
done on the ground, a qualification therefore establishes a second 
similarity relationship between individual instances of the component and 
the entire potential run of future copies of that component. Crucially, the 
combination of these two similarity relationships results in a claim that 
consistent future space-based functioning of any copy of a component can 
be extrapolated from the ground-based testing on specific copies of a 
component. Testing and qualification are leveraged to create the 
component’s future credibility via these two relationships, and the 
significant extrapolation of similarity involved is hidden within the systems 
of testing and qualification that only display positive outcomes and official 
documents and reports to external actors. 
 
This is not the only aspect that qualification and the standardized testing of 
the previous sections have in common. Just as there are specific codified 
testing regimes such as ECSS which must be adhered to, so too are there 
equivalent formalized qualification regimes: 
 
‘From a quality side there is a very rigorous progression of reviews. 
[For example] EQSR [Engineering Qualification Status Review] is an 
equipment qualification status review which says anything that’s 
going on the satellite has to be reviewed and a qualified component 
– qualification against standards being the benchmark all 
technology is tested against – then dependent on the result of that 
there could be varying degrees of reviewing.’ 
(022, [Private, Technology, Comms]) 
 
Much as test standards and test results result in documents that can be 
looked back upon as evidence of appropriate testing, so too are 
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qualifications socially-produced documents (Macdonald, 2008:287). Their 
‘surface’ content (van Dijk, 1997:ix) may be the extent to which a 
component met with the qualification standard and should therefore be 
understood as a product, but the latent content of such qualifications 
allows it to recruit actors and display the credibility of the component. This 
latent content (Stephenson, 2012) brings with it a narrative: that the 
component has been thoroughly tested and examined, by standards all 
experts agree on, and has met the requirements that ready it for flight. As 
above, a qualification from a trusted agency is a projection into the future 
that the component will function as promised for the length of time 
promised, it will always function the same way, and that it can be used in 
other programmes. By creating a formal qualification system which is the 
same every time it is applied to a new component (or understood as such), 
the space industry is able to claim that any component which gets qualified 
must also, therefore, be equally worthy of qualification as all those which 
have gone before and will come after, and that qualification is an entirely 
objective measure of component viability.  
 
In this we begin to see the emergence of the adaptive future narrative as 
the conclusion of a component’s technological development. Although they 
are not explicit predictions of a specific outcome, qualifications serve as 
more general predictions about the future correct functioning of the 
component being qualified – which are precisely what adaptive future 
narratives consist of. Qualifications have a strong promissory nature that 
turns components into objects of ‘shared speculative promise’ (Brown, 
2003:16) – even competing actors who support competing programmes 
will nevertheless agree on the technological validity of a universally-
recognized qualification. 
 
To summarize: a component ready for flight has therefore had two 
similarity relationships constructed around it. An understanding that 
specific physical components for a given satellite cannot be directly tested 
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must be coupled with the claimed strength and diligence of the testing 
regime and the technologically determinist TRL discourse that surrounds it. 
The same applies to qualifications, which are used regularly across all 
components and presented as universal concepts that are applied by 
rational engineers. It is essential to sell the claim that whatever testing 
regimes and qualifications were carried out on the line of components, 
they were sufficiently rigorous. Such claims are developed from a shared 
agreement that the testing system is representative of launch conditions, 
and in turn that a qualified component is equally representative of future 
copies of that same component. However, it is interesting to note that even 
these discursive tools are not always sufficient to get a component 
accepted. Many companies demand at least three years worth of flight 
experience for a component – which is to say that copies of that 
component have been used successfully in space, not just on a test-bed. 
This therefore brings us to the final form of credibility: flight heritage. 
 
6.4.2. Flight Heritage 
 
‘Flight heritage’ as used by interviewees is difficult to define, but is an 
essential final aspect of an adaptive future narrative. It is somewhere 
between a cumulative measure of the ‘flight hours’ a component has been 
flown for, and the period of time throughout which a component has been 
flown ‘regularly’. However, since a flown component will often be flown 
multiple times as soon as it has gained any flight heritage, stating a 
component has ‘three years flight heritage’ will be approximately 
comparable regardless of which definition is adhered to. Although neither 
was defined precisely, interviewees seemed to use the two interchangeably 
– in some examples the regular-use model was simply implied, whilst in 
others the precise-timing model was used. Either way, flight heritage is a 
measure of how much the component has been flown, and it was presented 
by interviewees as an indicator of the credibility of that component and 
221 
 
how safe it is to assume any subsequent copies of that component will 
perform correctly (much akin to the above concept of qualification). The 
assumption that subsequent copies of the component will work correctly is 
the core of any adaptive future narrative, and what all these concepts of 
credibility support. To begin exploring this final factor, several interviewees 
emphasized the importance of heritage: 
 
‘[Because] once the satellite is up there you can’t repair it, heritage 
and technical confidence are paramount, absolutely fundamental. 
One of the big challenges for all space companies is if you’ve 
developed a new part or component or procedure or software or 
anything, nobody trusts it until it’s got some in-orbit heritage, and 
people like Astrium will not buy a satellite now unless every element 
of that satellite has at least 3 years of in orbit heritage. They just 
won’t buy it.’ 
(013, [Public, Private, Technology, Comms]) 
 
‘New technology that has no heritage, that’s the issue. That’s why 
we do lots and lots of testing.’ 
(021, [Public, Science]) 
 
‘It’s heritage. If Japan or India wanted to buy some satellites from 
providers, they’ll look around to see who has got the heritage – the 
proven products, got them into space. They’re not just going to get 
somebody in the garage who can do it, it has to have this heritage 
and that is what ESA gives. ESA is a system that allows people to get 
heritage and allow new products to come through.’ 
(007, [Public, EO]) 
 
Once a technology or component ‘has heritage’, the acquisition of this 
heritage transforms a new technology into one that customers may be 
willing to use, even if the physical aspects of the technology itself may not 
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have changed at all in the process of heritage-acquisition. There is a 
temporal, rather than technical, aspect in the viability of components due 
to their ‘heritage’. As we saw in Chapter 5, many successful space 
components are those which ‘stood the test of time’ irrespective of their 
original qualifications (5.3.2). As Collins (1992:144) puts it, ‘distance lends 
enchantment’. Even if the original standards by which a particular piece of 
equipment was tested might no longer be considered acceptable, the fact it 
has many years of use acts strongly in its favour. ‘Heritage’ thus acts as a 
discursive tool in its own right, for it can be used to reassure outside actors 
that the component is well-used in a space environment and should 
therefore be unlikely to fail. Interestingly, whereas many other systems 
described in this chapter serve purposes for those within the space 
industry as well as those without, the concept of flight heritage is entirely a 
tool to allow space industry actors to recruit those outside the industry into 
the development of space components. The technical development of the 
component is considered ‘complete’ at this point – all that remains is to 
gain some flight heritage so that the component does not appear to be 
fresh off the assembly line and therefore unproven within a space 
environment. 
 
Heritage transforms the technical language of components and testing into 
a more palatable discourse that shows experience with the component, and 
also crucially a level of ordinariness, predictability and stability (Neyland, 
2006). If a component has flight heritage it appears ready for use within the 
space sector. Flight heritage, like qualification, is therefore a similarity 
relationship which emphasizes that every component is equally and 
predictably reliable and effective. The copy of the component that is about 
to be flown is the same as those which have been flown before, and since 
all of those functioned correctly, this one is expected to function correctly. 
After several flights the component subsequently appears trusted due to 
both the length of time it has been used and (presumably) its lack of failure 
in that time. At this point a component with flight heritage becomes an ‘off-
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the-shelf’ component – a simple, supposedly guaranteed-to-work purchase 
that is no longer debated. This is a point of confluence with normalized 
future narratives that is important to note. In the previous chapter it was 
shown that a number of space programmes express a clear preference for 
using older ‘trusted’ components, and that much of the trust these 
components possess is due to the temporal distance between their 
development and whatever programme they are being used within. A 
component with years or ideally decades of flight heritage will become 
precisely this kind of component. 
 
We can therefore see that components which have achieved flight heritage 
are components which more conservative space programmes may seek to 
include within their own satellites, assuming that component has built up a 
successful adaptive future narrative that emphasizes its credibility and 
applicability to any and all relevant future programmes. Such off-the-shelf 
components are used in all space programmes – adaptive future narratives 
are not only used to sell the value of components for use in normalized 
programmes – but it is a point of overlap and interrelation. A component 
with a strong adaptive future narrative will be desired by more 
conservative and normalized programmes in the future that will see it as an 
unproblematic and trusted part of a larger and more complex whole. 
However, this is not to say a component may not be designed at first with a 
specific satellite in mind, even if the later adaptive future narrative is 
designed to lend it broad applicability. One interviewee stressed that flight 
heritage is something designed around the initial customer for a 
component, not a universal set of rules: 
 
‘This is normally what people ask for. People ask for the ESA 
qualification process, [though] most operators will ask for three 
years of heritage, independently of the qualification. It varies 
between operators, it varies between customers because there’s not 
only the operator but there’s the whole food chain.’ 
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(012, [Public, Private, Technology, Comms]) 
 
Expectations for heritage vary between different actors just as they do for 
testing regimes. The expectations of the actor(s) originally funding the 
development of a component may be different from any future actors who 
might want to use that same component. Some may see it as the means to 
an end, or a commercial venture, and may differ in terms of the timescales 
they can accept, and each will have different assumptions about what level 
of qualification or testing they are willing to fly with, and how much 
heritage is enough to put to rest any concerns. This means a level of 
negotiation remains – something which has ‘acquired heritage’ cannot 
immediately lend credibility to a programme, but the amount of credibility 
it lends (and the minimum point at which it lends any credibility 
whatsoever) will be socially contested each time the component is 
considered for use in a space programme. Those who push the credibility of 
a component thus must do work to both give it heritage and to assign 
meaning to that heritage as something actors should understand to be a 
marker of quality for the component – this meaning comes from the 
adaptive future narrative constructed at the conclusion of acquiring early, 
development, and ‘launch’ credibility. 
 
There are a number of examples which illustrate the above points about 
qualification and heritage. One interviewee explored at length one method 
for gaining flight heritage via certain satellites which are specifically 
designed to be flown as a ‘test’ of new equipment, whilst another echoed 
the important role of these satellites. The former was the case of 
‘TechDemoSat 1’ (TDS1), a satellite on which were flown a large number of 
previously untested components with the sole purpose of testing them and 
gaining them flight heritage. In this case there were no specific objectives 
for the satellite beyond checking whether or not these components were 




‘That classic Catch-22: I won’t fly it unless you’ve flown it! The 
government recognizes this, and we have something called 
TechDemoSat. So TDS1 is an attempt to break that cycle – let’s just 
fund a satellite that is going to be high-risk, fly these technologies, 
so we can get past this first barrier of saying ‘Yes, we have some 
flight heritage’. No, it wasn’t a commercial app[lication], it wasn’t a 
scientific mission, but you know what? It was in a space 
environment, it operated for 9 months, it did exactly what we said it 
was going to do, and then you’ll get maybe a science mission or a 
communications operator saying ‘Ok, maybe we’ll fly that as a 
secondary payload. We won’t rely on that for the primary mission, 
but you’ve convinced me enough that we’ll have a secondary 
payload and operate it, and if you survive that, you know what guys, 
absolutely, we’ll rely on you for the next one’. It’s those stepping 
stones.’ 
(025, [Private, Technology]) 
 
‘Every customer would like somebody else to prove it first. Some of 
our customers even have contractual requirements that they won’t 
take a technology which hasn’t been proven in-orbit for 3 years on 
somebody else’s programme. So somebody has to be first.’ 
(022, [Private, Technology, Comms])  
 
In this case a way has been found to ‘circumvent’ the issue of only flying 
components that have already been flown, via the system of launching 
satellites with only this purpose. This means a number of things are unique 
for satellites of this sort. The attitude to risk will be more relaxed both 
because it has no external objectives, and because part of the mission’s 
objective is to test (or rather, mitigate) risk in the first place. In this way it is 
almost akin to the early stages of the TRL cycle – it is done as a proof of 
concept, knowing that it will not have any direct or immediate economic or 
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scientific benefit, but that if successful it will pave the way for such in the 
future by lending credibility to the components it flew. 
 
In this way the space sector distributes risk in a very unequal way – 
whereas most missions are launched with an absolute minimum of 
perceived risk with highly credible components, a very small number are 
launched deliberately with components that lack flight heritage and the 
credibility that goes with it. This benefits both actors within the space 
industry and actors outside. For actors within the space industry they are 
able to present most missions to outside actors and potential investors as 
using well-tested and well-proven pieces of equipment – and can present 
themselves as sensible and rational engineers who would only ever 
consider using such equipment – whilst they are still internally able to carry 
out research and development and get new components a little further 
towards a state where they might later be flown in the ‘safe’ missions. This 
means that components without flight heritage do not have to be tested on 
more important missions where the use of such components might push up 
insurance premiums or become a source of concern for other actors. They 
therefore deploy ‘proven’ and ‘unproven’ pieces of equipment to different 
parts of the industry, as ‘applications’ missions for a specific customer and 
‘technology’ missions designed for flight heritage (Eurospace, 1994). What 
this means for actors outside the industry is that they are given a level of 
confidence knowing that only qualified equipment will be presented to 
them. This separation serves both actors, internal and external to the space 
industry, whilst keeping those outside interested by only presenting them 
with the ‘finished goods’ that have a clear history of being tested, qualified, 
flown, etc. As we shall see in the chapter conclusion below, this duality 
between emphasizing the present state of a component – it is ready to be 
flown – and the past development that went into it is an essential part of 






We can now finally bring together the many forms of credibility examined 
in the previous sections of this chapter. Space components are not entire 
space programmes in their own right, which distinguishes them from the 
scientific missions of Chapter 4 or the service-led programmes of Chapter 
5. They are single components that are initially designed either for market 
distribution or as part of a particular satellite. This chapter has shown that 
irrespective of this initial objective, the development of the component is 
aimed at turning it into an ‘off-the-shelf’ component, and that this requires 
a future narrative as integral to the contemporary space industry as either 
of those explored in the previous two chapters. Off-the-shelf components 
are positioned as components that can be easily and trivially used in any 
future space programme that may have need of such a component – rather 
than develop another new circuit board, an older one can instead be used. 
However, that older component will only be viable for use if there is a clear 
adaptive future narrative with it. That is the term I choose to use to 
describe the sum total of all the credibility narratives outlined here. 
Whereas the finite future narrative consists of clear documentation and 
planning, and the normalized future narrative is focused on definition and 
terminology that create a mundane prediction for a space programme, the 
actual form of this third future narrative is the past evidence of all the 
forms of credibility the component has accrued, and the use of this 
evidence to claim the component’s future viability. This will be primarily 
through documentary evidence, but may also be present within space 
industry employees who feel confident using the component, and from 
historical evidence of other missions in which the component has been 
successfully deployed. The more evidence of that component’s credibility, 
the stronger the adaptive future narrative, i.e. the more easily the 
component’s use may be adapted to suit any future programme. Adaptive 
future narratives create a story of repeatable success and credibility that 
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can be told again and again, but within a new context which is different in 
every programme the component is used in. 
 
This chapter explored how space components are able to attain credibility 
at different stages of the process, and how these methods combine into a 
past narrative of attained credibility to support the future narrative of 
predicted success. Those within the space industry generally broke this 
down into three temporal phases – the ‘early’ credibility phase, the 
‘technical development’ phase, and then a final phase involving qualifying 
the technology for flight and subsequent flight testing. Although I do not 
hold to this linear model of technological development, the grounded 
theory requirement to use the language of the interviewees has been a 
deciding factor in structuring the chapter this way. They saw clear 
distinctions in the ways credibility is attained and managed in these three 
perceived phases, and that is what is reflected here. 
 
This chapter thus began with the attainment of credibility in the very early 
phases of a component’s development, which consisted of two methods. 
The first of these was the value of accreditation by a recognized body – 
these are primarily bodies connected to (or part of) space agencies which 
are deemed to meet two requirements: they have the requisite technical 
knowledge to pass an accurate judgement on the technology, and they are 
sufficiently neutral to pass an objective judgement on it. As well as these 
bodies, credibility in the early stages of a component development could 
be acquired from government investment, which in turn often led to 
private investment. This meant that public money was used as an ‘anchor’ 
which would convince private actors that if it was good enough for a state 
to risk public money on (states being seen as having much longer 
timeframes than commercial space actors) then it was good enough to 




The chapter then moved on to consider how credibility was acquired and 
managed in the ‘middle’ stages of a component development. This analysis 
consisted of a large number of different aspects. Interview data showed 
that the concept of the Technology Readiness Level is key to the attainment 
of credibility in this phase. TRLs are a detailed discursive structure 
consisting of nine numerical ‘levels’ which denote the ‘stage’ a technology 
is at. The first three TRLs (levels 1-3) roughly correlate to design and 
research, the middle three (4-6) to development and testing, and the last 
three (7-9) to optimizing, improving and tweaking the technology. This 
adheres to a linear model of technological development, and much like the 
above expert opinions for early credibility, the TRL system rests upon the 
idea that all human actors who assess a technology will come to the same 
‘correct’ conclusion. The TRL system possesses a strong discourse of 
objectivity, claiming that so long as the person assigning a TRL is 
knowledgeable and qualified, they will inevitably come to the correct 
conclusion about what number it should be assigned, and this number can 
in turn be used to communicate with other actors about where the 
technology currently stands. The belief in TRLs as a system allows them to 
be used to recruit actors who are not given a complex technology-in-the-
making to understand, but rather a single digit to denote the success of the 
technology to date. 
 
The chapter then examined in more depth the ‘testing regimes’ within the 
4-6 TRLs in order to understand how these tests have been constructed 
over the past few decades, the ways they are presented, understood, and 
what work a ‘successful test’ can do to promote a component. The tests 
that space components undergo were shown to have socially constructed 
standards which are interpreted anew for each mission – an actor that 
needs a launch in a short timescale may be willing to compromise to a 
reduced testing regime. These standards function for the benefit of both 
those within the space industry and customers on the outside. They allow 
space sector actors to sell an ‘off-the-shelf’ version of a new component 
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which hides the complexity of the technology, whilst it also serves non-
space actors by giving them a ‘non-technical’, easily-understandable and 
apparently objective and accurate appraisal of the technology. Despite this 
claimed scientific objectivity the chapter found both testing and the 
standards of those tests to be highly contested and sometimes even 
‘arbitrary’, and argued that the visible or documentary evidence of 
completing a testing regime to an agreed standard may be just as 
important as the results of the tests themselves. It also noted a distinction 
between the ‘methodology’ of the tests and the ‘intensity’ of the tests, and 
that although only the latter was seen as a matter of debate (with those 
outside the space industry), the former has also gradually shifted over time, 
but these shifts have remained ‘hidden’ within the space industry so as not 
to damage or impair claims of testing objectivity and applicability. 
 
The final part of the chapter assessed how credibility may be gained 
towards the end of the development of a new component – when it is 
being considered for launch. It began by exploring the concept of 
qualification for launch, which is primarily carried out by an established 
body stating that a series of components is ready for flight – which is to say, 
no physical component which undergoes a testing regime will actually be 
flown, due to the damage it may sustain in the process, so the qualification 
process instead denotes that all copies are usable, and will work in the 
same ways as the tested copies. Interviewees defined this process as 
converting a component into either a ‘product’ or a piece of ‘flight standard 
equipment’. However, even if a component is successfully redefined as a 
product, many space actors will only use technologies that have a 
significant amount of ‘flight heritage’ – the length of time the line of 
components has already been flown for. The concept of flight heritage both 
lends greater viability to older components that have been flown many 
times, and has also forced the creation of several methods, such as 
‘technology demonstration’ missions, to allow new technologies to get 
flight heritage and thereby generate documents and experience 
231 
 
surrounding them that acknowledge their viability for flight. Upon acquiring 
flight heritage a component can then finally become an off-the-shelf 
component whose credibility will only increase with each passing 
successful flight. 
 
This examination of credibility from the initial accreditation of a concept to 
the first flights of a newly-developed component therefore allows us to 
identify and specify three broad forms of component credibility: the early 
trust placed in the component by an agency or a government, its successful 
navigation of the TRL system and testing regimes, and then its subsequent 
qualification and early flights. These are then deployed after the 
development of the component concludes. By retrospectively emphasizing 
the level of credibility the component gained, those who have developed 
the component are able to use this past narrative of the attainment of 
credibility to propose a future narrative of perpetual applicability and trust 
in that component. This past narrative gives credence to the future claims 
that the component will work well in whatever situation it is placed within. 
Given this understanding of credibility, at this point it is worth making 
explicit that the use of the term ‘credibility’ in this thesis is therefore highly 
distinct from the use of the term ‘reliability’. Whereas reliability in the 
previous chapter was a question of successful service provision designed to 
meet the needs of new space customers, credibility is focused on the 
perceived potential of technical failure. There is naturally an interrelation – 
lots of credible components will raise the perceived reliability of a 
programme – but these are two distinct factors. 
 
Components with adaptive future narratives are highly desirable to larger 
space programmes. Those developing future satellites will of course be 
aware of the long development times of space technologies, but in a 
credible component they find a part of their programme that requires no 
time investment whatsoever. It does not need to be invented, funded, 
ground-tested, developed, qualified or flight-tested, because this has 
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already happened (see 5.3.2). It was not qualified for use within their 
particular programme, admittedly, but as this chapter has shown, 
credibility is designed within the space industry to be expansive and easily 
adaptable – a component becomes credible for a wide range of uses, not 
just the satellite it was originally built for. This multiplicity of uses turns the 
component into an off-the-shelf piece of technology and one that needs no 
time to make, therefore appealing to other programmes. Such components 
are especially prevalent in programmes using the normalized future 
narratives in the previous chapter, given the conservative outlook within 
the space industry that privileges the use of such off-the-shelf hardware. In 
this way we can perceive that while finite future narratives are concerned 
with time, and normalized future narratives with risk, adaptive future 
narratives are located at the intersection of these two variables. A long 
development time and all the credibility that goes with it leads to a low-risk 
component – the temporal dimension is leveraged to reduce the 
perception of risk, and thereby create a component which appeals strongly 
to future space programmes that may utilize it. 
 
Like the finite and normalized future narratives in the previous chapters, 
the concept of the adaptive future narrative has extensive potential 
applicability to other high-risk technological industries which produce 
significant numbers of technical artefacts all of which share components (as 
with satellites in the space sector). Sectors of this sort include air traffic 
control, which has undergone an extensive standardization in recent 
decades (Wickens et al, 1998); chemical plants where trustworthy and well-
tested components are seen as essential to prevention of future disasters 
(Perron & Friedlander, 1996; Perrow, 1999:102); and nuclear weapons 
which number in their thousands and use a range of standardized 
components, such as guidance controls (Mackenzie, 1990). The creation 
and use of adaptive future narratives is designed to make components 
appear safe and credible for regular and repeated use in these high-risk and 
high-reliability sectors. With the example of the space industry this chapter 
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has showed the importance of testing and standards to such components 
as part of their transformation from an uncertain technology into an off-
the-shelf component. This creation of regular and credible components is 
essential for such technologies – focused on both concerns of risk and the 
navigation of long timescales – by presenting a component that is both de-
risked and already developed, therefore needing no further development 
time and being ready for use immediately.  
 
In conclusion, therefore, an adaptive future narrative for a component 
serves to support other programmes that will use it in the future. It does 
this by presenting a component that has no perceived risk and that does 
not need any further time to develop. These two concerns of high-risk 
technologies (risk and time) are swiftly countered when presented with a 
credible off-the-shelf component, and the forms of credibility associated 
with it are specifically designed to be adaptive, and usable in any future 
context. Like finite and normalized narratives this is a fundamentally new 
narrative for the space industry that could only have arisen after many 
decades of the industry’s existence, and one that would make little sense in 
the prior Space Race understanding which emphasized the uniqueness and 


















This concluding chapter will summarize the thesis and focus upon its 
contributions to the field of STS. This thesis asked two interrelated research 
questions about the role of narratives in the development of high-risk 
technologies: what roles do future-orientated narratives play within such 
industries, and how are these narratives subsequently constructed and 
utilized? This question was developed by summarizing existing STS 
literature on high-risk technologies, and identifying that the theoretical 
concepts designed for ‘mundane’ technologies did not necessarily translate 
well to high-risk development. The thesis proposed that the scholarly 
understanding of high-risk technology development would be significantly 
improved by examining the roles of ‘futures’ and narratives in such 
technologies, and subsequently the space industry was selected as the case 
study for this work. This goal of furthering understanding of high-risk 
technology development has been achieved via a three-part typology of 
‘future narratives’, which I have termed finite, normalized and adaptive. 
These future narratives also highlight the importance of the long-term 
nature of such technologies in addition to their high levels of risk, and 
demonstrate that a more serious consideration of the temporal dimension 
within subsequent research into high-risk technologies would be highly 
valuable to STS. 
 
7.1.1. Research Retrospective 
 
This thesis builds upon the SCOT concept of interpretive flexibility. This 
term refers to a level of ambiguity in the design of artefacts which 
undermines claims that the most successful or efficient design is always the 
one that wins out (Bijker, 1995). Within this model each interpretation of a 
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technology is a ‘frame’, and eventually a ‘dominant frame’ (Bijker, 
1993:128) may emerge that determines the understanding of an artefact. 
Although integral to existing SCOT work, the thesis argued that the process 
by which a dominant frame emerges implicitly assumes an open market for 
the circulation of competing frames, whilst existing work on high-risk 
technologies (e.g. Perrow, 1999; Boin & Schulman, 2008) suggests that an 
open-market interpretation cannot be supported or substantiated within 
the high-risk context. A study of the literature also showed that unlike 
‘mundane’ technologies where frames constantly compete during the 
development of the technology and promote a new design with each new 
dominant frame, this was not the case for high-risk technologies. Instead, 
existing case studies on high-risk technologies (Lakoff & York, 1989; 
Kinsella, 1999; Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Law, 2002; Mort, 2008; etc) showed a 
strong level of agreement upon three points – that high-risk technologies 
are planned within a closed market of powerful and influential actors, that 
the development of the technology does not (and cannot) begin until the 
acquisition and commitment of significant financial, technical and political 
capital has been achieved, and that the objectives of high-risk technology 
developments rarely change much once the practical development of that 
technology begins. The literature suggested that the success or failure of 
such programmes was rather a question of acceptance or rejection of the 
dominant frame that emerged from the initial closed-market debate on the 
programme’s objectives, but rarely explored this process. This was thus the 
initial point of departure for this work: to understand what determines the 
acceptance or rejection of a dominant frame in high-risk technologies. 
 
The eventual technology has not yet begun any form of manufacture or 
development and there may be several years until any form of working 
prototype exists, so any dominant frame must be supported by statements 
about the technology’s promised future, a narrative of how to achieve that 
future, an emphasis on the value and worth of that future. I selected the 
term ‘future narratives’ for these concepts that support the dominant 
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frame, which the research into the space industry subsequently showed to 
consist variously of plans, roadmaps, careful choices of terminology and 
component use, acquiescence to conservative impetuses, and complex 
regimes of testing, standardization and qualification. As such the thesis 
proposed that studying future narratives may be a way to explore how 
dominant frames vie for acceptance or rejection within high-risk 
technological industries. How is a future narrative created to support these 
development programmes, and what makes for a successful one? 
 
The space industry was selected as the case study for this thesis for two 
reasons. The first was its relative under-examination within sociology, 
whilst the second was the existence of a clear prior future narrative in the 
form of the Space Race. The space industry had thereby already 
demonstrated a willingness to create narratives for high-risk programmes 
which stretch a considerable distance into the future, but the Space Race 
narrative appeared to have little contemporary relevance despite the 
continued growth of the space industry, suggesting that at least one new 
narrative must have emerged that has not yet been analytically identified 
(Vedda, 2008). Using a grounded theory approach, the research into the 
space industry was conducted via 26 semi-structured interviews with those 
currently working in the space industry. Data analysis and the coding of this 
data began during the interviewing process and concluded shortly 
afterwards, resulting in over 100,000 words of transcription within which a 
range of codes relating to futures and narratives were identified. Upon 
further examination it became clear that this range of codes could be 
compressed into three dominant codes: ‘Planning’, ‘Mundanity’, and 
‘Credibility’. Each of these then informed one of the three forms of future 
narrative that form the core of the work’s contribution to our 





7.1.2. Summary of Findings 
 
STS scholars have sought to demonstrate that narratives and futures are 
essential to social life and define intended or predicted paths and 
trajectories (Bruner, 1990; Orbuch, 1997; Brown et al, 2000; Elzinga, 2004; 
Michael, 2000) just as others have explored how high-risk technologies are 
developed, constructed and managed (Perrow, 1999; Boin & Schulman, 
2008), but integration of these two bodies of work had thus far been 
relatively limited. It is these strands of future and narrative research, 
combined with high-risk technologies, which this thesis has brought 
together, and for which the space industry was an ideal case study. 
 
This thesis asked two questions – what role do future orientated narratives 
play in the development of high-risk technologies, and how are they 
constructed and utilized? By researching the space industry the thesis has 
answered these questions. Based on the empirical interview data acquired, 
I have shown that future narratives serve a wide range of purposes, that 
they are constructed to assist in every contemporary space programme 
whether scientific or commercial, and that three types of future narrative 
have emerged in order to achieve these varied purposes.  
 
The first of these I termed the finite future narrative. This form of narrative 
consists of two parts – a roadmap which denotes a series of steps or 
milestones towards reaching a valuable and desirable conclusion, and the 
conclusion itself. Such roadmaps were found to be designed to recruit and 
maintain the support of a wide number of actors and reduce the perceived 
uncertainty of many-year or many-decade programmes, while the promises 
emphasize a clear end to the programme (beyond which support will no 
longer be required) and one which is highly valuable to a range of interests. 
This analysis demonstrated the range of agendas that contemporary 
scientific high-risk programmes must appeal to, and contributes to the STS 
understanding of contemporary ‘Big Science’. The second I defined as the 
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normalized future narrative, which was found to emphasize the 
ordinariness of the contemporary space industry and play down the 
perception of risk associated with space technologies. It was identified as 
being a response to growing conservative pressures on the space industry 
and a shift away from ‘abstract science’ and towards service provision. The 
analysis demonstrated how a high-risk industry such as the space sector 
may undergo a reorientation towards such programmes, and how 
important a low sense of risk and a low chance of ‘service failure’ are seen 
within such a newly-commercial framework. The third future narrative I 
termed the adaptive future narrative, which is concerned with the 
manufacture of components rather than entire space programmes. This 
future narrative consists of many different forms of credibility and is 
designed to project the viability of a component indefinitely into the future, 
emphasizing that a given component will be usable on any future 
programme. The analysis explored how components are transformed into 
‘off-the-shelf’ products that can be used in any number of programmes, 
developing the STS understanding of standardization and regularity in high-
risk programmes which are often perceived as being always esoteric and 
rarefied. The thesis therefore demonstrates the importance of these new 
future narratives to the space sector, and analyzes the attendant interplay 
between risk, time, and prediction, exploring the value of futures and 
narratives relevant to the space industry’s post-Cold War context. 
 
The profound importance of the temporal dimension to the development 
and production of high-risk technologies was also identified by this work 
and heavily informed the analysis of all three forms of narrative. Having 
identified the crucial impact of the long timescales within which the space 
industry operates, the work presented here therefore has significant 
importance for the subsequent study of other high-risk sectors, given the 
implicit but rarely examined role of the temporal in such industries (as 
identified in Chapter 2). The three future narratives not only explore the 
role of ‘high-risk’, but also the role of the long-term within the 
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development of high-risk technologies, and serve as a typology by which 
STS can understand how these twin concerns are mitigated and negotiated. 
Rather than relegating the temporal dimension of these technologies to the 
background, these three future narratives propose bringing this dimension 
into the foreground, and demonstrate that it should be considered to be 
just as important as risk for these technologies.  
 
The thesis also marks two other contributions. It has firstly assisted in 
opening up the space industry as a new field of high-risk technology for 
sociological examination. Existing scholarly STS work has examined a wide 
range of related fields such as particle physics (Pickering, 1984), nuclear 
power (Winner, 1986; Cowan, 1990) and nuclear weapons (Mackenzie, 
1990), but the space industry has thus far remained relatively unstudied by 
sociology (exceptions include Redfield, 1996; Entradas, 2011; Pass, 2011; 
and to a lesser extent Peterson, 1997; Lester & Robison, 2009; Hill, 2012). 
By using the space industry as its case study a number of sociological 
aspects of this industry have been explicitly highlighted, including the 
interaction between space sector employees and those outside the sector, 
and the use of complex discursive structures such as the TRL system. 
Secondly, by utilizing a close study of semi-structured interview data, this 
thesis also marked a clear divergence from the methodologies of past 
space research. It was not anchored in fields traditionally associated with 
the study of the space industry – political science and policy research (cf. 
Marshall, 2008) – but instead in a sociological and STS analysis of the 
internal workings of the space sector. It points the way towards viewing the 
space industry as a technological industry reinventing itself in the wake of 
the loss of older narratives that justified immense financial investment and 
unquestioned government support. To carry out this reinvention the space 
industry has had to create new narratives to continue justification for the 
science-orientated programmes that still exist (finite future narratives), to 
broaden its reach into private market areas (normalized future narratives) 
and to build up a repertoire of off-the-shelf widely usable components to 
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offset the lengthy timescales and financial and technical risk that come 
with the sector (adaptive future narratives). These three future narratives 
form the core of the contributions of this thesis to the wider body of STS 
literature, but also shine new light on the specifics of the space industry as 
it is currently practised.  
 
7.2. Future Narratives 
 
At this point all three future narrative types proposed by this thesis may be 
examined together, and the relationships and variation between the three 
forms can be identified. From the analysis presented in the prior three 
chapters, we can produce the following table of differences between these 
three future narratives: 
 
 Finite Normalized Adaptive 
Development Length Long Medium-Short Short 
Impact Length Short Long ‘Infinite’ 
Perceived Innovation High-Medium Low Low 
Future Narrative Focus Temporality Risk Both 
 
Table 2: The typology of future narratives proposed by this thesis. 
 
There are several important things to take away from this table. Firstly, 
there were no space industry programmes (or component developments) 
identified in the research which do not fit into one or more of these 
categories – regardless of the level of innovation of a programme, or its 
length, or whether the programme struggles to negotiate its risk or its 
timescale, all programmes are contained within the above three-part 
typology. Secondly, only one of the future narratives has a significant level 
of perceived innovation: finite future narratives, which were identified in 
Chapter 4 as possessing the highest level of similarity to the prior Space 
Race narratives within the industry. Both normalized and adaptive future 
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narratives support programmes which aim at minimal and iterative change, 
and these programmes along with component development dominate the 
contemporary space industry after the loss of military and state support. 
Thirdly and lastly, the table above highlights again the importance of the 
temporal dimension. The future narratives varied widely in terms of the 
length of high-risk development they were designed to negotiate, and in 
terms of the timescale of the promises they heralded. Also, an equal 
number of future narratives were concerned with time as well as with risk. 
One future narrative focused upon risk, one upon temporality, and one 
upon both, showing that the temporal dimension is just as crucial as risk to 
this ‘high-risk’ industry. 
 
This chapter now summarizes in more detail this three-part typology of 
future narratives and the contributions it makes to STS. This begins with 
finite future narratives, followed by normalized and adaptive future 
narratives. These sections recap how these analytic concepts were derived 
from the research data, what each narrative consists of, and how they may 
be applied to the examination of high-risk technologies. After that a 
conclusion is drawn about the importance of the temporal dimension and 
the value of considering the space industry – and other related sectors – as 
‘high-risk long-term’ (HRLT) industries instead of continued use of the 
existing high-risk moniker. The chapter concludes by suggesting two 
potential directions for future research to further build upon the work 
presented here.  
 
7.2.1. Finite Future Narratives 
 
One of the three major findings of the research was the presence of ‘finite 
future narratives’ within the space industry. Explored in Chapter 4, these 
are narratives designed for programmes which may take many years or 
decades to complete, which is most often programmes with ‘scientific’ (in 
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keeping with grounded theory’s mandate to follow interviewee definitions) 
rather than technological objectives (cf. Pinch & Bijker, 1984; Hughes, 1986; 
Faulkner, 1994). The finite future narrative is designed to mitigate the 
chance that in a multi-decade programme some actors involved will drop 
out, lose commitment, lose funding, or that the objectives of the 
programme may drift from their original conception. As well as being 
designed to prevent a programme stalling in the middle of its lengthy 
development, these future narratives are also designed to entice actors 
into these programmes at their inception and subsequently throughout the 
process. This objective is achieved by promising clear and distinct temporal 
outcomes – that the programme will complete by date X, and yield 
outcome Y – and by listing a number of interim steps that are designed to 
keep those who do sign up involved in the programme until its completion. 
In doing so, finite future narratives were found to consist of two parts: a 
‘roadmap’ of how to achieve a programme’s goals, and the nature of the 
goals themselves. The combination of these two aspects is designed to 
make the objectives of the dominant frame in a high-risk programme 
appear well-planned, compelling, and likely to succeed at the end of the 
lengthy time it may take.  
 
The first of these – ‘roadmaps’ – are documents and plans designed to 
describe all the intermittent steps required in a space programme, list all 
the benefits to various actors, and in turn recruit those actors into the 
programme and serve as a tool to keep all actors committed to a common 
conception of the programme. These are designed to make the dominant 
frame appear to be well-planned, and that it has sufficient oversight and 
diligence that those involved can feel confident in its impending success. 
They serve as what Wynne (1983:15) calls ‘taken-for-granted’ frameworks 
that can act as a foundation for any number of actors to understand the 
programme. The fates of all actors involved in a roadmap become quickly 
tied to the fate of the roadmap and thus all involved become obliged to 
support the programme throughout its long time-span (Brown, 2003). 
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Interviewees also explained that roadmaps often contained a number of 
points where they were expected to ‘link up’ with other technologies also 
in development. This was a way of mitigating the uncertainty within such 
temporally lengthy programmes by acknowledging this uncertainty and 
considering it ‘within’ the programme. By stating explicitly at the beginning 
that there was uncertainty – but that it had been planned for and 
anticipated – a programme is presented as having already predicted any 
future concerns. This future-proofing (Woolley, 2003; Anderson, 2008; 
Lucquiaud et al, 2011; Georgiadou et al, 2012) presents the programme’s 
uncertainties as something that can be predicted and managed, rather than 
as issues which may arise suddenly and upset the programme’s 
development.  
 
The second part of a finite future narrative is the crucial role played by the 
selection of outcomes promised in the programme. The scientific benefits 
of space missions have always been a core argument behind the value of 
space technology (Cornelius, 2005; Swaminathan, 2005), and this was 
reflected in these promises. Interviewee statements about scientific 
outcomes took two forms. The first was the quantification of eventual 
knowledge in the form of the expected volume of journal articles (cf. 
Peterson, 1988; Ezzy, 2001; Aaltojärvi, 2008) which served to express clear 
and distinct value to scientific programmes within an understanding of 
research that privileges quantitative data over qualitative. The second was 
the importance of breakthrough science (Brown, 2000). The thesis explored 
this as a concept for qualifying the predicted eventual results as being 
highly significant – the creation of a distinct future for the programme – 
and that such a promise is created by experts in the field who are trusted to 
be able to objectively assess the eventual value and outcome of the 
programme.  
 
In addition to these scientific promises, another benefit for such missions 
was the proposal reiterated by several interviewees that space programmes 
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requiring finite future narratives are those that are most likely to generate 
‘inspiration’. Interviewees raised the claim that the Apollo missions paid for 
themselves via the number of students they inspired into STEM subjects 
and the subsequent economic benefits (Jones et al, 2007), and that this 
was a hard to quantify but important outcome from science missions. 
Related to this was the promise of national pride, which although less 
significant than in the days of the Space Race remained a promised 
outcome from missions of this sort. Lastly the role of spin-offs was argued 
by many to be very important to the modern space industry – these are 
products or applications for terrestrial technologies which are not directly 
related to the objective of the mission itself, but are supposedly generated 
by the use of involved technologies (Walsh, 2004). This is thereby distinct 
from the adaptive futures of Chapter 6 which sought to create off-the-shelf 
components for further space applications. Our understanding of the role 
these promises play built upon the work of Michael (2000), who argues 
that futures with clear and distinct goals are strengthened by such 
declarations of intent, and they may overcome some of the negative 
implications of the temporal distance that must be navigated in order to 
reach them. Lengthy programmes – focused upon scientific data, the 
delivery of services based on that data, and spin-off potential – have 
developed this repertoire of new and highly explicit promised outcomes 
which are a clear contrast to the earlier Space Race narratives that 
emphasized competitive geopolitical benefits from cutting-edge space 
technology (Launius, 2003; Ehrenfreund & Peter, 2009). They have instead 
been reoriented to emphasize the value of such missions to both the 
scientific community and further afield including actors involved in private 
commerce and education, making for clearly beneficial outcomes that a 
finite future narrative can promise to sell the value of the programme. 
 
These two above facets are combined to create future narratives specially 
designed for science-orientated high-risk programmes, which present their 
objectives as clear and easily-attained, despite the significant length of time 
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they may take. This model of the two-part future narrative is a key 
contribution of this thesis to the understanding of the oft-neglected 
temporal dimension of high-risk technologies, and how cutting-edge high-
risk technological developments – be they supercolliders and particle 
accelerators (Galison, 1997; Knorr-Cetina, 1999), fusion reactors (Kinsella, 
1999), or space technologies – can make compelling promises, appeal to a 
wider range of actors, and seek to keep those involved on-track until the 
completion of the programme, however distant that may be. In this way 
the finite future narrative demonstrates the importance of time for STS 
research into high-risk technologies, and outlines how those developing 
such technologies seek to negotiate these timescales. 
 
7.2.2. Normalized Future Narratives 
 
The second type of future narrative proposed from the research data is the 
normalized future narrative. Whereas finite future narratives aim to 
promote the types of programme many associate with the space industry – 
mostly long, complex scientific missions – the normalized future narratives 
propose the opposite, and emphasize ordinary, mundane and predictable 
space missions. This second form of future narrative was described in 
Chapter 5, which proposed the case study of the ‘Skylon’ spaceplane as 
illustrative of this trend, and identified three specific conservative themes 
from the interview data that have encouraged the space sector towards 
this normalization. 
 
The first theme was the nature of the changing customer base for the space 
industry, and why this customer base demands such high reliability. 
Interviewees argued that those previously integral to the space industry 
such as national military establishments (Huntley et al, 2010), governments 
(von der Dunk, 2011) and scientists (Pickering, 1984:11) have not been 
entirely forced out, but many of the key actors in the space industry now 
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are businesses, commercial actors and private industries. This new 
commercial presence within the space sector (Fisk, 2008) has strong 
motivations for encouraging a more cautious use of technology. 
Interviewees argued that much of the space sector is now concerned with 
being able to provide a service, such as phone communications, television, 
and broadband access. The space industry normalizes future narratives in 
order to emphasize that these programmes are safe, trusted and reliable 
ways to provide such services, and they focus upon the service the 
technology provides, rather than the technology that provides the service. 
Satellites of this sort are defined in terms of the length and quality of 
services they can provide to the customer, rather than by the specifics of 
the technologies, and this means emphasizing their reliability and 
ordinariness over their technical specifications.  
 
The second conservative theme was the importance of the past, specifically 
in terms of established human actors and well-trusted components (the 
development of which was specifically explored in Chapter 6). A number of 
interviewees explained a two-part preference for older components, 
consisting of both the observation that older components are perceived as 
being well-used, well-trusted, and suitably tested (unlike their newer 
equivalents), and that older circuit boards were potentially technically 
superior for in-space use due to radiation damage being reduced across 
circuitry which had ‘wider spacing’ than their more modern equivalents. By 
using older components a programme appears more appealing to 
conservative customers who do not require the newest and most 
innovative components, but instead desire components that have routinely 
demonstrated their correct functioning. Other interviewees described the 
role of individuals who have been well-established within the industry for 
several decades as another source of conservative preference, arguing that 
such individuals support older components that they feel confident with 
using or had a hand in developing, rather than their newer equivalents (cf. 
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van Maanen & Schein, 1977; Wynne, 1983; King & Sethi, 1992; Chompalov 
& Shrum, 1999).  
 
The third theme was a three-part issue. Interviewees explained that 
satellites cannot be retrieved after they have been launched and that 
launch itself is currently limited to chemical rockets, which are highly 
expensive and must be booked several months or years in advance. These 
meant that service satellites are expected to function correctly for 
significant lengths of time because they cannot be repaired after launch, 
and because each launch is a large investment. In turn this requirement for 
lengthy survival in space pushes the space industry towards proposing 
reliable missions that can meet this requirement. These were therefore the 
three themes drivers towards normalizing the future narratives for the 
service-led parts of the space industry – to  satisfy a conservative market-
focused customer base, to use reliable components rather than newer 
untested equivalents, and to survive for as long as possible in the space 
environment. 
 
Chapter 5 explored the impact of these three themes by examining the 
case study of the Skylon spaceplane. A number of interviewees were 
involved in the Skylon programme, and they described the importance of 
presenting Skylon – intended to be a highly innovative form of satellite 
delivery system – as being ordinary, mundane, and in keeping with previous 
expectations of the space industry. Although the interviewees working on 
this programme were generally keen to emphasize to me the new nature of 
several of the technologies involved and its potential to ‘revolutionize’ the 
space industry, the Skylon programme is depicted and defined publicly in 
language that emphasizes its ordinariness and evolution from older launch 
vehicles. Instead of affirming the break with the dominant chemical rocket 
launch regime, the future narrative for Skylon has been normalized. It 
emphasizes the continuity of Skylon with existing launch vehicles in terms 
of cost, turn-around time, efficiency and safety, and says little of the 
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technologies underpinning the programme. It is presented as an 
improvement in these space industry metrics that customers care about, 
and plays down the precise ways these improvements will be 
technologically delivered. Viewed within the context of the three 
conservative themes identified, Skylon appeals to conservative commercial 
actors by stressing its proximity to current launch technologies in terms of 
the service it provides; by building upon the past by downplaying its riskier 
new components and emphasizing its older components; and by promising 
a reduction to the cost of launch coupled with the potential to retrieve a 
satellite, therefore suggesting that future satellites may not need to survive 
untouched in the space environment for as long, and more sophisticated 
and higher-risk satellites may be acceptable for use in the future. 
 
These narratives were thereby found to be primarily concerned with the 
mitigation of perceived risk in a high-risk sector, rather than the negotiation 
of lengthy timescales, and seek to present a programme as a reliable 
method of service provision above all else. A normalized future narrative 
takes an established set of assumptions about the expected high-risk 
nature of a technological industry, and undermines these assumptions by 
playing down the technical details of the technology and playing up what 
the technology can offer the customer. This showed that much of the space 
industry in established space-faring nations is no longer concerned with 
providing spectacle or technological firsts – although these concerns 
remain significant for some nations developing a space industry for the first 
time (Luukkonen et al, 1992; Peter, 2006:109) – but rather with the 
normalization of the space industry as a field of high-risk technology that is 
now well-suited to the provision of certain services. Much as the Internet 
shifted from a high-reliability organization (cf. Boin & Schulman, 2008) 
focused on guaranteeing communication infrastructure in a time of nuclear 
war towards being a global communication and information exchange 
(Abbate, 1999), the aerospace industry shifted from military concerns (Law, 
2002) towards passenger jets (Downer, 2010), and nuclear power moved 
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from military-scientific research (Rosenberg, 1983) to a major source of 
global energy production (Winner, 1986), this is a reorientation of space 
industry promises towards providing ‘real’ and practical benefits rather 
than pushing the boundaries of science or technology. This means iterating 
upon a service that already exists instead of developing something new and 
innovative, whilst emphasizing the ordinariness and standardization of their 
objectives in order to present a high-risk technology as something much 
reliable and mundane. The concept of the normalized future narrative 
therefore allows us to examine how a previous version of a complex high-
risk technology (such as aerospace, nuclear power, the Internet, or space 
technology) may reorient and normalize in order to meet consumer needs 
after a loss of state investment, or an increase in private investment, and 
what forms their predictions for future service provision subsequently take. 
 
7.2.3. Adaptive Future Narratives 
 
The third contribution of this thesis is the ‘adaptive future narrative’, the 
final form of future narrative identified from the research data. This is a 
narrative designed to be used for individual components such as circuit 
boards or communications hardware, not entire satellites, fleets of 
satellites, or space probes. Whereas the finite future narrative is concerned 
with securing and promoting a long timescale programme, and a 
normalized future narrative is concerned with reducing the perception of 
risk and presenting a programme as conservative and reliable, an adaptive 
future narrative is focused on the concept of credibility. The analysis of the 
research data showed that credibility serves to both mitigate concerns of 
timescale and risk equally, whilst the previous two forms of future narrative 
are focused almost entirely on each of these in turn. Chapter 6 explored in 
detail the sequence of steps required to make a component ‘credible’, with 
interviewees arguing that new space components must be carefully 
planned, documented, tested, accredited and qualified before any launch 
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can take place. Interviewees presented these in a linear sequence of 
progression through three ‘stages’, and in keeping with grounded theory, 
this was the analytical structure used.  
 
The first step was the acquisition of ‘early credibility’. Based on interviewee 
data the chapter identified two central aspects of this first stage – 
accreditation from a seemingly-neutral technical arbiter such as a space 
agency, or initial funding from a government body. Both of these were seen 
as methods for a new component to immediately gain an initial level of 
credibility and in many cases to then ‘unlock’ funding from private 
investors. Accreditation from third-party bodies and space agencies like ESA 
were seen as neutral and objective judgements on the future potential of a 
new component. Initial funding from governments – seen as more willing 
to continue support for long periods of time – was perceived as a way to 
convince private actors that the component development was unlikely to 
stall, should not lose funding, and had a public ‘anchor tenant’ in the 
government who would continue to contribute to its development. In turn, 
each of these allows for the acquisition of further support for developing 
the component.  
 
Interviewees argued that as development continued, a discursive construct 
known as ‘Technology Readiness Levels’ was of eminent importance. The 
TRL system is presented as a method for quantifying the ‘stage’ a 
technology is at into a number between 1 and 9. Not just used within the 
space industry, the TRL system is also utilized in other high-risk industries 
including energy (e.g. Sanchez, 2011) and aviation (Krois et al, 2003). This 
system was found to make two key assumptions: that developing 
technology is a linear process (Williams, 2006) and that the stage of this 
process a technology is at may be readily and objectively assessed (cf. Ezzy, 
2001). Interviewees suggested that the TRL system was universal and 
impossible to misconstrue – those judging a technology’s TRL will always 
judge it correctly, and this judgement can then easily be transferred to 
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other engineers or outside actors to give them an impression of the 
component’s ‘level’ of development. TRLs actually serve as a rhetorical tool 
for recruiting actors into component development by presenting a 
seemingly objective measure of the component’s technological ‘level’, and 
therefore how far it has to go until it can be safely used. The research found 
that within the space industry the TRL system is closely tied to the creation 
of testing standards, and their use in extensive regimes of testing, due to 
the shift in much of the industry towards the provision of services. These 
testing regimes involved the construction of a similarity relationship (Pinch, 
1993) between the tests on the ground – involving vacuum, vibration, and 
extreme levels of heat and cold – and what a component would undergo 
when actually deployed in a space environment. These tests are carried out 
according to certain standards which many interviewees argued were as 
universal as the TRL systems and had remained the same over time, though 
others stepped outside this ‘public image’ discourse and explained the 
iterative and debated nature of standardization within the space industry. 
Chapter 6 argued that the eventual documentary evidence of a component 
having been tested per se is just as important as the actual metrics by 
which those tests were carried out, and that this form of public visibility of 
appropriate testing forms another type of evidence used for an adaptive 
future narrative. 
 
The third and final stage of acquiring credibility was what I termed ‘launch 
credibility’, and consisted of two parts. The first of these parts was a 
component being qualified for launch, which once more involved trusted 
bodies or industry experts who look back at the history of testing (and 
therefore the visible and documented history of credibility) that a 
component has accrued, and decide whether or not it is ready for flight. 
Much like testing, qualification is also a public act focused upon the 
presentation of appropriate expert judgement and the transformation of a 
component-in-development into a ‘product’ or a piece of ‘flight standard 
equipment’. Qualification leads to the second part of launch credibility – 
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flight testing and subsequent flight heritage. Interviewees described this as 
a process where new components would be flown for the first time, 
sometimes on what were termed ‘technology development missions’ (e.g. 
TDS1), and their performance in a space environment would be monitored 
and recorded. This was not, however, an implicit admission that the 
similarity relationship between the test environment and the space 
environment were not as closely intertwined as interviewees had 
previously claimed. Chapter 6 showed that it was instead a matter of 
further creating documentation and credibility evidence that can later be 
used by that component: the evidence of the component performing 
correctly in situ is a necessary step to gain more credibility, not a tacit 
admission that it is considered at all possible the component could fail after 
reaching this stage.  
 
Having gained flight heritage, a component’s past narrative of credibility 
and success is complete, and this enables the construction of an adaptive 
future narrative. An adaptive future narrative consists of the sum total of all 
the evidence of testing and qualification and credibility up to the present 
that a component has accumulated. The greater this body of credible 
evidence, the more easily adaptable the component will seem to any new 
programme. This future narrative is thereby dependent on the strength of 
the narrative about the component’s successful past (Michael, 2000:22). 
This transforms the component into an ‘off-the-shelf’ (Buckley & 
Vangaasbeck, 1994; Goodman, 2002; Underwood, 2003) piece of hardware 
that can be used in any number of roles for a potentially limitless (or at 
least highly significant) length of time in the future. In the space industry 
this transformation takes place as a component is used in a greater and 
greater number of satellites, but this concept of component credibility and 
promised adaptability also has potential analytic use in other high-risk 





Therefore, just as many of these credibility forms were designed to make a 
component look less risky and reduce its perception as being ‘untested’, 
they are also relevant to the temporal dimension of high-risk technologies. 
A credible component is fundamentally one that has already been used. For 
those constructing a high-risk technology, a credible off-the-shelf 
component that can be easily adapted to their needs is far more appealing 
than having to design, test and qualify one anew. An off-the-shelf 
component is not only highly credible because it gained initial interest and 
passed the appropriate testing regimes, but also because it has been used 
in the past and never failed. In this way a second similarity relationship is 
established – it is assumed that it will behave the same the next time it is 
used, and every time after that. The meaning of ‘credibility’ used in this 
thesis is therefore distinct from the meaning of ‘reliability’ that was 
essential to normalized future narratives. Reliability is a metric used for 
determining whether or not a service will continue to function for a 
suitably long period of time. By contrast, credibility refers to the belief that 
a component will function correctly in any possible role in any future 
mission. This is not to say the two are not interrelated – credible 
components contribute to a reliable service – but reliability is a question of 
service provision, whereas credibility is a question of technical failure. In 
this way, adaptive future narratives are a tool for STS to elucidate how 
components designed for a single iteration of a high-risk technology may be 
applied to many other programmes within that same industry. This concept 
has potential applicability to other sectors including air traffic control (e.g. 
Wickens et al, 1998), chemical plants (e.g. Perron & Friedlander, 1996; 
Perrow, 1999), and nuclear weapons (e.g. Mackenzie, 1990). The concept of 
the adaptive future narrative makes clear the process by which a 
component is made credible, how an untested component is transformed 
into an off-the-shelf component, and how an eventual redeployment of use 




7.3. From ‘High-Risk’ to ‘High-Risk Long-Term’ 
 
It is clear from the above summaries that the term ‘high-risk’ is not 
analytically adequate to describe the space industry or other similar 
technological sectors. Whilst naturally the entire analysis presented in the 
previous six chapters cannot ever be satisfactorily compressed into a single 
term, it is nevertheless apparent that ‘high-risk’ only makes visible one of 
the two crucial dimensions to these sectors. I therefore conclude this thesis 
by proposing that technological developments of this sort would benefit 
from being analytically re-framed into ‘high-risk, long-term’ (HRLT) 
technologies. 
 
This term is designed to build upon prior work on high-risk industries by 
identifying the importance of the temporal dimension both in this study, 
and as a route for future research into similar technological sectors. 
Timescales of technological development are an aspect previously noted as 
being important to many futures (Giddens, 1997; Michael, 2000; Elzinga, 
2004) and narratives (Ewick & Silbey, 1995; Orbuch, 1997), and in 
proposing this term I seek to more closely integrate these analyses into 
research on high-risk technologies. The thesis has demonstrated both the 
importance of the temporal dimension to future planning within the space 
industry, and the close interplay between the risk and the timescales – the 
longer a programme, the greater the financial risk will become. The more 
reliable a programme must be in order to reduce the perception of risk, the 
longer its components will take to undergo the appropriate processes of 
acquiring credibility. The further in the past a component was developed, 
the less risky it appears. By highlighting the importance of the temporal 
dimension as identified in the research data, this thesis has brought into 
greater focus for STS the importance of the development timescales of 
high-risk technologies, hitherto ordinarily a distant secondary characteristic 
to their risk or complexity. As such the space industry can be much more 
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accurately understood as a HRLT sector rather than the high-risk definition 
which this thesis began with, and this new definition in turn brings us to 
the potential future research questions raised by this study. 
 
7.4. Implications for Future Research 
 
The aim of this thesis was to understand the use of future narratives in 
high-risk industries, motivated by a relative scarcity of STS literature 
exploring the variables which determine the outcomes of such endeavours. 
To answer this question this thesis has presented a typology of future 
narratives that describe and analyze the processes by which a high-risk 
technological industry seeks to promotes the value of its technology 
developments, and negotiate the pitfalls of high-risk and long-term 
development programmes. This contributes to the existing sociological 
body of work on high-risk technologies (which the space industry is a 
relatively new addition to) by both proposing these future narratives as 
mechanisms to support and promote dominant frames, and by bringing to 
the fore the importance of the temporal dimension.  
 
The first route for future research would be into the applicability of this 
work’s three-part future narrative analysis into other high-risk industries, 
and therefore how important the temporal dimension is to high-risk 
industries beyond the space sector. The question that opened this research 
was the use of narratives within high-risk industries, using the space 
industry as an example. Three forms of narrative have been identified and 
this thesis has demonstrated the uses of all three forms within the space 
industry, all of which to a greater or lesser extent acknowledge and attempt 
to deal with the long development times of the space industry. 
Subsequently in this chapter (and in the summaries in each of the three 
preceding chapters) I have presented a number of examples from existing 
scholarly work into high-risk technologies where potential overlaps with 
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this thesis can be identified. This included other cutting-edge science 
orientated programmes (Kinsella, 1996; Galison, 1997; Knorr-Cetina, 1999), 
high-risk sectors which have shifted towards normalizing their promises 
and providing services (Winner, 1986; Abbate, 1999; Downer, 2010), and 
high-risk sectors where standardized components are of particular 
importance (Mackenzie, 1990; Wickens et al, 1998; Perrow, 1999). Many of 
these existing studies into high-risk industries covered in Chapter 2 
acknowledge the lengthy temporal dimension, but this is rarely the analytic 
focus. A study into how well the typology presented here can be 
generalized would take the form of an examination of another high-risk 
industry, using the same research methods and emphasis on grounded 
theory as in this thesis. Such a study would examine whether the forms of 
narrative that emerged from another high-risk industry were comparable to 
those within this thesis, and whether that industry’s long development 
times are as consequential as they are within the space industry.  
 
For such a study to confirm the findings of this thesis, it is not sufficient 
that other high-risk technologies are developed over long periods of time. 
To consider other industries to be HRLT, the temporal dimension must be 
important or essential to their development processes, not merely a 
backdrop over which the technology develops as it has hitherto been 
understood (2.2.2). Towards the end of this research I considered proposing 
that a range of related high-risk technologies should also potentially be re-
framed as high-risk long-term technologies, due to both the identified 
importance of temporality within the space industry coupled with the tacit 
acknowledgement in other scholarly works about the long timescales of 
such industries. However, despite this work’s significant contribution to 
understanding the temporal dimension of high-risk technological 
development, I believe such a conclusion is premature. A proposed 
redefinition of this sort may be inappropriate for high-risk industries that 
can still rely on significant state investment, and therefore may not suffer as 
many of the temporal pitfalls as the newly-commercialized space industry. 
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This potential research direction would therefore seek to answer this 
question, look more closely into the long development times of other high-
risk sectors, and explore which other industries would be more accurately 
defined with the HRLT label. 
 
A second potential research direction involves a second study of the space 
industry itself. The arguments summarized were derived from the 
descriptions provided by interviewees of how future narratives are 
constructed within the space industry and the kinds of uses to which they 
are put. In doing so this thesis followed a grounded theory approach to 
data acquisition and analysis, allowing the three future narratives to 
emerge from the gathered data on the methods by which space 
programmes are promoted and managed. Throughout this thesis the 
comments of interviewees have often emphasized the importance of 
documents for roadmaps, testing results, testing standards, or 
qualifications. However, for reasons explored in Chapter 2, a documentary 
analysis was considered unviable for this research. Many of the documents 
I wished to view were classified (Winner, 2004), whilst other documents 
required the navigation of lengthy procedures to secure my access to them, 
and in many cases only a single stakeholder denying access would have 
been enough to fully deny access. In a few cases documents were offered 
that I could read but not quote, whilst a final category of document I was 
not allowed to view the smallest part of, apparently on the rationale that 
even the slightest breach of programme secrecy would be unacceptable (cf. 
Balmer, 2004:223).  
 
A decision was thus made to focus upon a detailed analysis of interview 
data instead of conducting a partial textual analysis with potentially 
insufficient data to support it. Therefore, in future research a documentary 
analysis could be pursued at the start of the research, in order to both 
allow the casting of a much wider net for those who might provide access 
to such documents, and a greater length of time for going through the 
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processes and procedures required to access certain documents. Such 
research would provide a valuable secondary perspective to the analysis 
presented here. This thesis has shown how these future narratives are 
created, how space industry employees subsequently use them, and how 
the space industry subsists on the back of these three narrative types. A 
subsequent accompanying study of this sort would pursue the textual 
content of the documents which support these narratives and examine 
how these future narratives are presented on paper, to complement the 
primary analysis presented here about their use and construction. This 
would be particularly applicable to the choices of language used for 
normalized future narratives as explored in Chapter 5, and further study of 
testing regimes and standards as forms of documentary visibility as 





















APPENDIX A: INFORMED CONSENT FORM (IN-PERSON 
INTERVIEWS) 
 
My name is Mark Johnson. I am doing a research project on space 
technology in the United Kingdom, looking particularly at the construction 
of futures for space technology (long-term planning, goals, objectives, 
foresight, etc) and how space as an area for human activity is perceived by 
those within the space industry (whether human activity in space should be 
focused on private development, public goods, scientific advancement, 
infrastructure, communication, exploration, experimental technology, some 
combination of the above, or anything else).  
 
This interview will be recorded, but the recording will be confidential, 
anonymised and then deleted from my recorder as soon as it is typed up. 
The data will be used for no purpose other than this study. Anything that 
identifies you or others by name or association will be removed from the 
data. I would like to emphasize that your participation is entirely voluntary, 
you may withdraw at any point (and ask for any prior data to be deleted if 
you do) and choose not to answer any question you don’t feel comfortable 
with. The interview will last for between an hour and an hour and a half, 
depending on the directions the interview takes. I am interested in your 
personal perspectives on the questions and reflections on your specific 
roles in the projects – not the ‘official line’ – and no value judgments will be 
passed on any of your comments. 
 
My supervisor is Mr Brian Loader, who can be contacted on 01904 432639, 
brian.loader@york.ac.uk, or at: 
 
Mr Brian Loader 
Department of Sociology  
University of York, Heslington   
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York, YO10 5DD   
brian.loader@york.ac.uk    
  
Please sign, print & date this form to show I have explained the contents 






























APPENDIX B: INFORMED CONSENT FORM (PHONE INTERVIEW) 
 
My name is Mark Johnson. I am doing a research project on space 
technology in the United Kingdom, looking particularly at the construction 
of futures for space technology (long-term planning, goals, objectives, 
foresight, etc) and how space as an area for human activity is perceived by 
those within the space industry (whether human activity in space should be 
focused on private development, public goods, scientific advancement, 
infrastructure, communication, exploration, experimental technology, some 
combination of the above, or anything else).  
 
This interview will be recorded, but the recording will be confidential, 
anonymised and then deleted from my recorder as soon as it is typed up. 
The data will be used for no purpose other than this study. Anything that 
identifies you or others by name or association will be removed from the 
data. I would like to emphasize that your participation is entirely voluntary, 
you may withdraw at any point (and ask for any prior data to be deleted if 
you do) and choose not to answer any question you don’t feel comfortable 
with. The interview will last for between an hour and an hour and a half, 
depending on the directions the interview takes. I am interested in your 
personal perspectives on the questions and reflections on your specific 
roles in the projects – not the ‘official line’ – and no value judgments will be 
passed on any of your comments. 
 
My supervisor is Mr Brian Loader, who can be contacted on 01904 432639, 
brian.loader@york.ac.uk, or at: 
 
Mr Brian Loader 
Department of Sociology  
University of York, Heslington   
York, YO10 5DD   
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brian.loader@york.ac.uk    
  
Please sign, print & date this form to show I have explained the contents 
and you understand them. Since this form has been emailed, not signed in 
person, you – the interviewee – understand that a name written below is 





























APPENDIX C: REPRESENTATIVE INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
(Final Version) 
 
Introduction, job description, personal history 
- Career to date 
- What projects have you worked on?  
- Project objectives? How were they decided? 
- Importance of objective? Closed/open objectives?  
Credibility 
- How does credibility vary between different programmes?  
- Component credibility,  
- Private/public credibility 
- Scientific/technological credibility 
Roadmapping and Planning 
- Roadmapping, uses of roadmapping, types of roadmap 
- Affect future, or respond to future? 
- Importance of timescale 
- Roadmaps as justification and legitimation 
Mundanity 
- Risk and Reliability 
- Customers, service provision, private spaceflight 
- Old components, new components, trusted components 
- Lifespan, launch, retrieval 
Other, broader questions, relate to earlier questions 
- Return to Apollo, big state funding, etc. 
- Private spaceflight Next Big Thing? 
- Future public goods/impacts? Achievability of 10% by 2030? 






LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ANT     Actor-Network Theory 
ECSS     European Cooperation for Space Standardization 
EQSR     Engineering Qualification Status Review 
ESA     European Space Agency 
HRLT     High-Risk Long-Term 
HRO     High-Reliability Organization 
NASA     National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
SCOT     Social Construction of Technology 
SSK     Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
STEM     Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics 
STS     Science and Technology Studies 
TSB     Technology Strategy Board 
TDS1     TechDemoSat 1 
TRL     Technology Readiness Level 
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